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Abstract
Penetration Testing (short pentesting) is a methodology for assessing network secu-
rity, by generating and executing possible attacks exploiting known vulnerabilities
of operating systems and applications. Doing so automatically allows for reg-
ular and systematic testing without a prohibitive amount of human labor, and
makes pentesting more accessible to non-experts. A key question then is how to
automatically generate the attacks.
A natural way to address this issue is as an attack planning problem. In this
thesis, we are concerned with the specific context of regular automated pentesting,
and use the term “attack planning” in that sense. The following three research
directions are investigated.
First, we introduce a conceptual model of computer network attacks, based on
an analysis of the penetration testing practices. We study how this attack model
can be represented in the PDDL language. Then we describe an implementation
that integrates a classical planner with a penetration testing tool. This allows us
to automatically generate attack paths for pentesting scenarios, and to validate
these attacks by executing the corresponding actions -including exploits- against
the real target network. We also present another tool that we developed in order
to effectively test the output of the planner: a simulation platform created to
design and simulate cyber-attacks against large arbitrary target scenarios.
Secondly, we present a custom probabilistic planner. In this part, we contribute
a planning model that captures the uncertainty about the results of the actions,
which is modeled as a probability of success of each action. We present efficient
planning algorithms, specifically designed for this problem, that achieve industrial-
scale runtime performance (able to solve scenarios with several hundred hosts and
exploits). Proofs are given that the solutions obtained are optimal under certain
assumptions. These algorithms take into account the probability of success of
the actions and their expected cost (for example in terms of execution time, or
network traffic generated).
Finally, we take a different direction: instead of trying to improve the efficiency
x
of the solutions developed, we focus on improving the model of the attacker. We
model the attack planning problem in terms of partially observable Markov deci-
sion processes (POMDP). This grounds penetration testing in a well-researched
formalism, highlighting important aspects of this problem’s nature. POMDPs
allow the modelling of information gathering as an integral part of the problem,
thus providing for the first time a means to intelligently mix scanning actions with
actual exploits.
xi
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview of the Thesis
Penetration Testing (short pentesting) is a methodology for assessing network secu-
rity, by generating and executing possible attacks exploiting known vulnerabilities
of operating systems and applications (the necessary background is given in Chap-
ter 2). Doing so automatically allows for regular and systematic testing without
a prohibitive amount of human labor, and makes pentesting more accessible to
non-experts. A key question then is how to automatically generate the attacks.
A natural way to address this issue is as an attack planning problem. In this
thesis, we are concerned with the specific context of regular automated pentesting,
as in Core Security’s “Core Insight Enterprise” tool. We will use the term “attack
planning” in that sense.
The main body of this thesis is divided in three parts.
Part I In the first part we present the basic model and a complete implementation
that integrates a planner system with a penetration testing framework and
a network simulation tool.
Chapter 3 introduces a conceptual model of computer network attacks. This
model is based on an analysis of the penetration testing practices, and of the
functionality provided by pentesting frameworks. This model gives a new
perspective for viewing cyberwarfare scenarios, by introducing conceptual
tools to evaluate the costs of an attack, to describe the theater of operations,
targets, missions, actions, plans and assets involved in cyberwarfare attacks.
We then present in Chapter 4 how this attack model can be represented in
the PDDL language. To define with precision this representation, we start
1
2with simpler representations based on set theory in Section 4.2.1 and on first
order logic in Section 4.2.2.
Chapter 5 describes an implementation that integrates a classical planner
with a penetration testing tool. This allows us to automatically generate
attack paths for pentesting scenarios, and to validate these attacks by exe-
cuting the corresponding actions -including exploits- against the real target
network. We present an algorithm for transforming the information present
in the pentesting tool to the planning domain in Section 5.2, and we show
how the scalability issues of attack graphs can be solved using current plan-
ners. In Section 5.3 we make an analysis of the performance of our solution,
showing how the model scales to medium-sized networks and the number of
actions available in current pentesting tools.
Finally, we present another tool that we developed in order to effectively test
the output of the planner. Chapter 6 is devoted to a simulation platform
created to design and simulate cyber-attacks against large arbitrary target
scenarios. This simulator has surprisingly low hardware and configuration
requirements, while making the simulation a realistic experience from the
attacker’s standpoint. The scenarios include a crowd of simulated actors:
network devices, hardware devices, software applications, protocols, users,
etc. A novel characteristic of this tool is to simulate vulnerabilities (including
0-days) and exploits, allowing an attacker to compromise machines and use
them as pivoting stones to continue the attack. A user can test and modify
complex scenarios, with several interconnected networks, where the attacker
has no initial connectivity with the objective of the attack.
Chapters 4 and 5 are based on work done with Gerardo Richarte and Jorge
Lucangeli, which has been published in the SecArt workshop at the AAAI
conference [LSR10] and presented in the Hackito Ergo Sum conference [Sar10].
Chapter 6 is based on joint work with Ariel Futoransky, Fernando Miranda
and Jose´ Orlicki, and was published in the SIMUTools conference [FMOS09].
Part II The second part of the thesis describes the development of a custom
probabilistic planner. In Chapter 7 we contribute a planning model that
captures the uncertainty about the results of the actions, which is modeled
3as a probability of success of each action. We present efficient planning
algorithms, specifically designed for this problem, that achieve industrial-
scale runtime performance (able to solve scenarios with several hundred hosts
and exploits). These algorithms take into account the probability of success
of the actions and their expected cost (for example in terms of execution
time, or network traffic generated).
Of course planning in the probabilistic setting is far more difficult than in
the deterministic one. We do not propose a general algorithm, but a solution
suited for the scenarios that need to be solved in a real-world penetration
test. Two “primitives” are presented, which are used as building blocks in a
framework separating the overall problem into two levels of abstraction. The
computational complexity of our planning solution is O(n log n), where n is
the total number of actions in the case of an attack tree (with fixed source
and target hosts), and O(M2 · n log n) where M is the number of machines
in the case of a network scenario. We discuss experimental results obtained
with our implementation. For example, we were able to solve planning in
scenarios with up to 1000 hosts distributed in different networks.
The work reported in this part was presented at the FRHACK conference
[Sar09a] and the H2HC conference [Sar09b]. It was published in the ACM
Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security [SRL11] (joint work with
Gerardo Richarte and Jorge Lucangeli). A discussion on the exploits’ costs
was given at the 8.8 Security Conference [Sar11a].
Part III The third part takes a different direction: instead of trying to improve
the efficiency of the solutions developed, we focus on improving the model
of the attacker, thus formulating the problems that we think will have to be
solved in the longer term.
The approach of Chapter 5 used classical planning and hence ignores all
the incomplete knowledge that characterizes hacking. The more recent ap-
proach of Chapter 7 makes strong independence assumptions for the sake
of scaling. In Chapter 8, we take the opposite extreme of the trade-off
between accuracy and performance. We tackle the problem in full, in par-
ticular addressing information gathering as an integral part of the attack.
We achieve this by modeling the problem in terms of partially observable
4Markov decision processes (POMDP). This grounds penetration testing in a
well-researched formalism, highlighting important aspects of this problem’s
nature. POMDPs allow us to model information gathering as an integral
part of the problem, thus providing for the first time a means to intelligently
mix scanning actions with actual exploits.
As a side effect, this modeling activity serves to clarify some important
aspects of this problem’s nature. A basic insight is that, whereas in Chapter 7
we model the uncertainty as non-deterministic actions—success probabilities
of exploits—this uncertainty is more naturally modeled as an uncertainty
about states (in Chapter 8). The exploits as such are deterministic in that
their outcome is fully determined by the system configuration. Once this
basic modeling choice is made, all the rest falls into place naturally.
Our experiments are based on a problem generator that is not industrial-scale
realistic, but that allows us to create reasonable test instances by scaling the
number of machines, the number of possible exploits, and the time elapsed
since the last activity of the pentesting tool. Unsurprisingly, we find that
POMDP solvers do not scale to large networks. However, scaling is reason-
able for individual pairs of machines. As argued in Section 7.6, such pairwise
strategies can serve as the basic building blocks in a framework decomposing
the overall problem into two abstraction levels.
The material of Chapter 8 is joint work with Jo¨rg Hoffmann and Olivier
Buffet, and has been published in the SecArt workshop at IJCAI [SBH11].
A discussion of the different directions taken in our attack planning research
was given in the H2HC conference [Sar11b].
1.2 The Confluence
The work of this thesis was performed while I was working as a researcher in
CoreLabs, the research center of a company that produces software for penetration
testing. This is an important part of the context, since it explains the original
motivation, the original questions that we tried to answer with Gerardo Richarte:
We have this penetration testing tool, how can we make it easier to use? How
can we make it more autonomous? How can we put more expert knowledge in the
software, so it requires less expertise from the user?
5The work started with a strong foothold in the world of industry, and thanks to
my co-supervisor Eduardo Bonelli it also gained a foothold in the academic world.
For the solutions that we devised, we also asked ourselves: Has this problem
already been studied? How do our solutions compare to the ones found by other
researchers? What are the state-of-the-art tools that we could use? How can we
assure that the solutions that we find are optimal (or at least good)?
This way, the natural flow of the research led us to work in what I like to think
of as the confluence of Industry and Academics. Answering questions that come
from real-world applications, and in the process generating ideas and formulating
models that have an academic interest. In my limited experience, I saw that the
worlds of Industry and Academics are often disjointed, and that there is a lot to
gain by building bridges between both worlds.
This work is also placed in another confluence: the problems that we try to
solve come from the field of Information Security, and the tools used to provide
answers come mainly from the field of Artificial Intelligence. Being at this intersec-
tion also opened up the way to a very interesting experience: a collaboration with
Jo¨rg Hoffman and Olivier Buffet, recognized experts in the field of Automated
Planning, experienced researchers and great persons from whom I learned a lot.
And fortunately we were not alone at this intersection: the workshops SecArt (on
Intelligent Security) and AISec (on Artificial Intelligence and Security) provided
a great environment to present and discuss some of the results that we obtained.
Another confluence where fruitful bridges are being built.
6Figure 1.1: The Confluence.
Chapter 2
Background on Penetration
Testing
In this preliminary chapter, we give a brief background on computer network
intrusions and penetration testing frameworks. The study of these tools, and the
need to automate their functionality, provides the basis for the work of this thesis.
2.1 Computer Network Intrusions
During a network intrusion, an attacker tries to gain access to software systems
that require authorization (web servers, database servers, accounting systems).
The intrusion may be illegal (this is what people usually have in mind when
speaking about intrusions), or may be an authorized audit performed by security
professionals. The latter is called a network penetration test, of which we give a
definition below.
Definition 2.1. A penetration test, also called pentest, is a method of evaluating
the security of a computer system or network by performing a controlled attack.
The process involves an active analysis of the system for any potential vulnerabil-
ities that could result from poor or improper system configuration, both known
and unknown hardware or software flaws, or operational weaknesses in process
or technical countermeasures. This analysis is carried out from the position of a
potential attacker and involves active exploitation of security vulnerabilities.
As networks evolve, and combine a multitude of interconnected technologies,
the penetration test has become an accepted practice to evaluate the global se-
curity of a network (ultimately assessing effectiveness of the deployed security
countermeasures). The interesting point for us is that pentesters basically use the
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Figure 2.1: Anatomy of a real-world attack — Sample scenario.
same tools and methodologies as unauthorized attackers, so we can focus on the
former (whose practices are also more documented!)
2.2 On Vulnerabilities and Exploits
2.2.1 Basic Definitions
Definition 2.2. A vulnerability (noun) is a flaw in a system that, if leveraged
by an attacker, can potentially impact the security of said system. Also called a
security bug, security flaw, or security hole [Arc05]. It may also be an intentional
feature – in this case it is called a backdoor.
Definition 2.3. To exploit (verb) is to use or manipulate to one’s advantage a
security vulnerability.
Definition 2.4. An exploit (noun) is a piece of software, a chunk of data, or
sequence of commands that take advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order
to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on a computer software,
9Figure 2.2: First Computer Bug.
hardware, or electronic device. This frequently includes such things as gaining
control of a computer system or allowing privilege escalation or a denial of service
attack.
2.2.2 Anatomy of an Exploit
The exploits are the most important actions during an attack. According to
the literal meaning of “exploit”, it takes advantage and makes use of a hidden
functionality. When used for actual network attacks, exploits execute code that
can alter, destroy or expose information assets. When examining an exploit, three
main components can be distinguished.
Attack Vector
The attack vector is the mechanism the exploit uses to make a vulnerability man-
ifest, in other words, how to reach and trigger the bug. For example, in the case
of Apache Chunked Encoding Exploit, the attack vector is the TCP connectivity
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that must be established on port 80 to reach the application. In a client-side at-
tack, the attack vector might be an email sent to a user, with a specially crafted
attachment that will trigger a vulnerability in the application used to open it.
Exploited Vulnerability
To obtain an unauthorized result, the exploit makes use of a vulnerability. This
can be a network configuration vulnerability, or a software vulnerability: a design
flaw or an implementation flaw (buffer overflow, format string, race condition).
The most classic example is the buffer overflow, first described in “Smashing
the stack for fun and profit” by Aleph One [One96]. The questions for the attacker
are: how to insert code and how to modify the execution flow to execute it? In
the example of a stack based buffer overflow, the code is inserted in a stack buffer
and by overflowing the buffer, the attacker can overwrite the return address and
jump to his code.
Payload
Once the attacker manages to trigger and exploit a security flaw, he gains control
of the vulnerable program. The payload is the functional component of the exploit,
the code the attacker is interested in running. Classic payloads allow attackers to:
• Add a user account: on Unix systems, it was done by adding a line to
the system password file (/etc/password) or changing the password of root.
However such changes are easily detected and to use the account the attacker
needs connectivity through legitimate paths (firewalls can block them). This
classic payload is no longer used.
• Make changes to system configuration: for example, to add a line to inetd
(Internet services daemon), to open a port and later connect to the system
via the newly opened port.
• Open a shell: the payload consists of opening a shell (a command inter-
preter), that the attacker can use to execute available commands. These
payloads are more difficult to detect, but are also more difficult to write.
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See the article of Aleph One [One96] for a report of this technique. Com-
monly known as shellcode, this was the most popular payload, until the de-
velopment of exploitation frameworks such as Metasploit and Core Impact
provided more generic techniques, as we discuss in the next section.
Writing payloads is a very difficult task, that requires solving multiple restric-
tions simultaneously. The payload is a sequence of byte codes, so each payload will
only work on a specific operating system and on a specific platform. Depending
on the attack vector, the payload may be sent to the vulnerable machine as an
ASCII string (or some protocol field), and thus must respect a particular grammar
(examples: byte 0 is forbidden, only 7-bit ASCII is accepted, only alphanumeric
characters are accepted, etc.) Libraries have been developed to help exploit writ-
ers to generate shellcodes. MOSDEF and InlineEgg are two well known cases,
with tools to cope with the restrictions. The payload is also typically limited in
size (for example the buffer size in the case of a buffer overflow), so the code that
the attacker will run must fit in a few hundred bytes. If he wants to execute more
complex applications, he must find another way...
2.2.3 Syscall Proxy Agents
We present here a solution to the limitations of payload development described in
the previous section. It is called “syscall proxy” and was developed by Caceres
et al. (see [Cac02] for more details). The idea is to build a sort of “universal
payload” that allows an attacker to execute any system call on the vulnerable
host. By installing a small payload (a thin syscall server), the attacker will be
able to execute complex applications on his local host (a fat client), with all
system calls executed remotely.
Background on Syscalls
An application usually interacts with certain resources: a file on a disk, the screen,
a networking card, a printer, etc. Applications can access these resources through
system calls (syscalls for short). These syscalls are operating system services,
usually identified with the lowest layer of communication between a user mode
process and the OS kernel.
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Different operating systems implement syscall services differently, sometimes
depending on the processor’s architecture. The main groups are UNIX and Win-
dows.
UNIX systems use a generic and homogeneous mechanism for calling system
services, usually in the form of a “software interrupt”. Syscalls are classified by
number and arguments are passed either through the stack, registers or a mix
of both. The number of system services is usually kept to a minimum (about
380 syscalls are found in a Linux with kernel version 3.01), as more complex
functionality is provided on higher user-level functions.
Windows also provides system calls. However, for the sake of simplicity and
generality, the authors of syscall proxy decided to use “Windows syscalls” to refer
to any function in any dynamic library available to a user mode process [Cac02].
Syscall Proxy
The resources that a process can access, and the kind of access it has to them,
define the “context” in which it is executed. For example, a process that reads
data from a file might do so using the open, read and close syscalls.
Figure 2.3: Diagram of a proxy call execution
Syscall proxying inserts two additional layers between the process and the
underlying operating system. These layers are the syscall client layer and the
syscall server layer.
1Updated as of June 2012.
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Syscall client (on local system). The syscall client layer acts as a link between
the running process and the underlying system services. This layer is respon-
sible for forwarding each syscall argument and generating a proper request
that the syscall server can understand. It is also responsible for sending this
request to the syscall server, usually through the Internet, and returning
back the results to the calling process.
Syscall server (on remote system). The syscall server layer receives requests
from the syscall client to execute specific syscalls using the underlying oper-
ating system services. This layer marshals back the syscall arguments from
the request in a way that the underlying OS can understand and calls the
specific service. After the syscall finishes, its results are marshalled2 and
sent back to the client, again through the Internet.
Definition 2.5. In the context of this chapter, we will refer to a syscall server on
a remote system as an agent.
In conclusion, the syscall proxy technology gives the attacker the possibility
of executing his tools on a compromised machine, without the need of actually
copying all those tools on the target machine. This makes the process of installing
a base camp cleaner and simpler. This technology is implemented within the agents
of “Core Impact Pro” and “Core Insight Enterprise”, and allows the attacker to
perform transparent pivoting on compromised machines (see Section 2.3.5).
As a final remark, there are multiple connection methods between agents. The
originating agent can use: connect to target (similar to bindshell), connect from
target (similar to reverse shell), reuse connection and HTTP tunneling. Agents
can also be chained together to reach network resources with limited connectivity.
2.3 Main Steps of an Attack
Traditionally, the pentesting process is divided in steps, and an attack will follow
the pattern of steps that we describe below. Of course, this division in steps is
arbitrary, and corresponds to an accepted practice in the field (refer to [AM04,
2In computer science, marshalling is the process of transforming the memory representation
of an object to a data format suitable for storage or transmission. It is typically used when data
must be moved between different parts of a computer program or from one program to another.
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AR03, Ric03]). We will show in subsequent chapters that this methodology can be
improved by using planning techniques before executing the attack – and whose
output may be to mix actions from different steps in order to run a faster or more
reliable attack.
2.3.1 Information Gathering
A successful attack depends on the ability to gather relevant information about
the target network, including active IP addresses, operating systems and available
services. This step is called information gathering in the context of pentesting. It
is also called reconnaissance in the military context, and be considered as part of
the OODA loop3 or Boyd cycle (refer to [Boy87, Hig90]).
Actions realized during this phase include:
• Network discovery: performed using mechanisms such as ARP, TCP SYN
packets, ICMP echo request, TCP connect and passive discovery.
• Port scanning: an exhaustive scan of open and closed ports of all the network
hosts.
• OS identification: consists of recognizing the OS of a remote host by analyz-
ing its responses to a set of tests. Classical Nmap’s fingerprinting database
can be combined with a neural network to accurately match OS responses to
signatures, see [BS06]. Additional OS identification capabilities are available
for more specific situations. For instance, OS detection utilizing the DCE-
RPC and SMB protocols can identify Windows machines more precisely.
• Other techniques available to human attackers are social engineering and
Google hacking (using publicly available information to gain insight into the
target organization). Although these techniques are difficult (or impossible)
to automate, they can nevertheless be included in the planning phase –
eventually the execution of the resulting plan will require the intervention
of a human attacker to carry out that action.
3OODA stands for Observe, Orient, Decide, Act.
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2.3.2 Attack and Penetrate
During this phase, the attacker selects and launches remote exploits making use
of data obtained in the Information Gathering step. According to the definition
given in Section 2.2.1, an exploit is a piece of software that injects code into the
vulnerable system’s memory and modifies the execution flow to make the system
run the exploit code. As discussed in Section 2.2.3, the exploit can be thought of
as a way to install an agent on a compromised host.
2.3.3 Local Information Gathering
The Local Information Gathering step collects information about computers that
the attacker has successfully compromised. During this phase, the attacker may
gather information about the OS, network configuration, users and installed appli-
cations; browse the filesystem on compromised systems; view rights obtained and
interact with compromised systems via shells and other applications (for example,
a remote desktop application).
2.3.4 Privilege Escalation
During the Privilege Escalation phase, the attacker attempts to penetrate deeper
into a compromised computer by running local exploits in an attempt to obtain
administrative privileges.
2.3.5 Pivoting
After Privilege Escalation, the attacker can use the newly controlled host as a
vantage point from which to run attacks deeper into the network (i.e. by making
use of the syscall proxy agents technology presented in Section 2.2.3). By sending
instructions to an installed agent, the attacker can run local exploits to attack
systems internally, rather than from across the network. He can view the networks
to which a compromised computer is connected, and launch attacks from any
compromised system to other computers on the same network, gaining access
to systems with increasing levels of security. That is, the attacker executes the
previous steps (Information Gathering and Attacking) using the new agent as
source.
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Figure 2.4: Anatomy of a real-world attack — Pivoting is required.
2.3.6 Clean Up
The attacker needs to erase his footprints in order to avoid detection. Towards
this end, all the executed actions should minimize the produced noise, for example
by making modifications only in memory and by the avoidance of writing files in
the target’s filesystem.
2.4 The Need for Automation
To conclude this background on penetration testing, we have to speak about a
new kind of information security tool, whose development started in 2001: the
penetration testing frameworks. This type of tool facilitates the work of network
penetration testers, and make the assessment of network security more accessible
to non-experts. The main tools available are:
• Core Impact (since 2001)
• Immunity Canvas (since 2002)
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• Metasploit (open source project that started in 2003, owned by Rapid7 since
2009)
The book [BKB+07] provides a survey of computer security tools, and in particular
of penetration testing tools.
The main difference between these tools and network security scanners such
as Nessus, Qualys Guard or Retina is that pentesting frameworks have the ability
to launch real exploits for vulnerabilities, helping to expose risk by conducting an
attack in the same way a real external attacker would [AM04].
As pentesting tools have evolved and have become more complex, covering new
attack vectors, and shipping increasing numbers of exploits and information gath-
ering modules, the problem of controlling the pentesting framework successfully
has become an important question. We detail below the main reasons:
• A computer-generated plan for an attack would isolate the user from the
complexity of selecting suitable exploits for the hosts in the target network.
• A suitable model to represent these attacks would help to systematize the
knowledge gained during manual penetration tests performed by expert
users, making pentesting frameworks more accessible to non-experts.
• The possibility of incorporating the attack planning phase into the pentesting
framework would allow for optimizations based on exploit running time,
reliability, or impact on Intrusion Detection Systems.
• Finally, automated attacks allow the user to perform reproducible tests,
which open the path to computing security metrics whose evolution would
be a key indicator of the security posture of the organization.
Part I
Integrating a Pentesting Tool
with Classical Planners
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Chapter 3
Conceptual Model of Network
Attacks
In the first Part of this thesis, we present the basic model of penetration testing,
and a complete implementation that integrates a planner system with a penetra-
tion testing framework and a network simulation tool.
3.1 Introduction
Our work on the attack planning problem applied to pentesting began in 2003 with
the construction of a conceptual model of an attack, distinguishing assets, actions
and goals [FNRS03, Ric03, AR03]. In this attack model, the assets represent both
information and the modifications in the network that an attacker may need to
obtain during an intrusion, whereas the actions are the basic steps of an attack,
such as running a particular exploit against a target host. This model was designed
to be realistic from an attacker’s point of view, and contemplates the fact that
the attacker has an initial incomplete knowledge of the network, and therefore
information gathering should be considered as part of the attack.
This model also has a theoretical value: “we understand what we can build.”
Our motivation was to provide the Information Security community with a deeper
and more detailed model of the attacks against computer networks. It turned out
that having such a model is also necessary to communicate with other communi-
ties, such as the Artificial Intelligence and Planning ones.
The main application of this model is to provide a basis for autonomous attack
planning, in particular for automating penetration tests. The description that we
give in this chapter is still informal, and lacks the level of precision required to
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interact with planning tools. In Chapter 4 we give a precise description of how
these ideas can be represented in the PDDL language. In Chapter 5 we present a
deterministic version of the problem, and use deterministic planning techniques to
solve it. In Chapter 7 we present a probabilistic version, and algorithms to solve
planning in the probabilistic setting. Chapter 8 presents a version of the attack
planning problem with uncertainty about the target network, formulated in the
theoretical framework of POMDPs.
Another important application of the model is attack simulations, which can be
used by a system administrator to simulate attacks against his network, evaluate
the vulnerabilities of the network and determine which countermeasures will make
it safe. We present a network simulator based on these ideas in Chapter 6.
In the rest of this chapter we describe the components of our model – proba-
bilistic assets, quantified goals, agents and actions – and their relations.
3.2 Assets
Definition 3.1. An asset can represent anything that an attacker may need to
obtain during the course of an attack. In particular it can represent the knowledge
that an agent has of a real object or property of the network.
We describe below some examples of assets (and their parameters):
AgentAsset (agent, capabilities, host). An AgentAsset represents an agent
with a collection of capabilities running on a host.
BannerAsset (banner, host, port). A BannerAsset represents the banner that
an agent obtains when trying to connect to a certain port on a host.
OperatingSystemAsset (os, host). An OperatingSystemAsset represents the
knowledge that an agent has about the operating system of a host.
IPConnectivityAsset (source, target).
TCPConnectivityAsset (source, target, port). A TCPConnectivityAsset rep-
resents the fact that an agent is able to establish a TCP connection between
a source host and a certain port of a target host.
In the PDDL language, assets will be represented as predicates (see Section 4.3
for the details of the PDDL representation).
21
3.2.1 Representations and Assumptions
In Chapters 4, 7 and 8, we will describe different representations of this general
model. Different assumptions can be made about the model components in or-
der to make different trade-offs between the complexity of the resulting planning
problem and the realism of the model.
In the simpler case, the assets are deterministic, and can be translated as
propositions. However this assumption can be relaxed with:
Probabilistic Assets
The assets can be probabilistic. This allows us to represent properties which the
attacker guesses are true with a certain probability or negative properties (which
the attacker knows to be false). This idea is further explored in Chapters 7 and 8.
For example, an action which determines the operating system of a host using
banners (OSDetectByBannerGrabber) may give as result an OperatingSystemAs-
set os=linux with probability=0.8 and a second one with os=openbsd and
probability=0.2. Another example, an ApplicationAsset host=192.168.13.1
and application=#Apache with probability=0 means that our agent has deter-
mined that this host is not running Apache.
Level of Trust
We can allocate a certain level of trust to the information that a certain asset
represents. When an action returns an asset, we may trust this information, but
then trust diminishes with time. An interesting questions is how to estimate that
decrease.
Problem 3.2. Calculate the decrease of the level of trust for each asset, as a
function of time.
When we first considered this problem, we had no clue on how to solve it. Sev-
eral years later, we eventually arrived (with Hoffman and Buffet) to the POMDP
model, wherein this question can be precisely formulated. In the POMDP formu-
lation (studied in Chapter 8), the attacker does not observe directly the state of
the target network, but rather observes a probability distribution over the states
of the system, which is called a belief state (see definition 8.11). The problem of
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how to estimate the initial belief state (and thus to provide an answer to Problem
3.2) is considered in Section 8.4.4.
3.2.2 The Environment Knowledge
The environment knowledge is a collection of information about the computer net-
work being attacked or hosting an agent. Naturally, this information is represented
by assets (or predicates in the PDDL language). By abuse of language, we may
speak of the environment instead of the environment knowledge. At the beginning
of an attack, the environment contains at least an AgentAsset: the localAgent
which will initiate the attack.
The environment will play an important role during the planning phase and
during the execution phase of an attack, since it continuously feeds back the be-
havior of the agent. Note also that each agent has its own environment knowledge
and that exchanging assets would be an important part of the communications
between autonomous agents.
As we will discuss in Section 4.3, the input for a planner is divided in two files:
the domain file which contains the PDDL representation of the attack model (in
particular, the actions that are available to the attacker); and the problem file
which is a collection of predicates about the initial state of the target system.
The environment knowledge is thus translated as the problem file in the PDDL
representation. It also corresponds to the initial state s0 ∈ S in the Definition 4.6
of a planning problem.
3.3 Goals
A goal represents a question or a request of the type: “complete this asset” (every
goal has an associated asset). A goal can be quantified, and can be associated with
a list of actions which may complete his asset. In the Definition 4.6 of a planning
problem, the goals are represented of a set of states Sg ⊆ S. Although the goals
can be enumerated explicitely, in the earlier steps of our research we found it more
convenient to consider quantifiers to simplify the representation.
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3.3.1 Goal Quantifiers
We considered three types of quantifiers: Any, All and AllPossible. An example
will clarify their meaning: consider that PortAsset has attributes (host, port,
status). The following goals will mean:
asset = PortAsset (host=192.168.13.1, status=#open),
quantifiers = (Any #port from:1 to:1024):
find an open port in host 192.168.13.1 between ports 1 and 1024. To fulfill
this goal, an action like PortScan will begin examining the ports of host
192.168.13.1 until it finds an open port (completes the PortAsset and returns
a success signal) - or reaches port 1024 (and returns a failure signal).
asset = PortAsset (host=192.168.13.1, status=#open),
quantifiers = (All #port from:#(21,22,23,80)):
find whether all the ports #(21,22,23,80) are open in host 192.168.13.1. This
time, PortScan will examine the four mentioned ports and return success
only if the four of them are open (and in that case completes four PortAs-
sets).
asset = AgentAsset (capabilities=#(TCP,UDP,FileSystem)),
quantifiers = (AllPossible #host from:192.168.1.0/24):
install agents in all the hosts that you can in netblock 192.168.1.0/24. An
action able to fulfill this goal will be a subclass of Exploit (for example
ApacheChunkedEncodingExploit). To fulfill this goal, the Exploit action
will try to exploit a vulnerability in all the machines it reaches in that
netblock. It returns an AgentAsset for each compromised host, and returns
success if at least one machine is compromised.
3.4 Actions
These are the basic steps which form an attack. Examples of actions are: Apache
Chunked Encoding Exploit, WuFTPglobbing Exploit, Banner Graber, OS Detect
By Banner, OS Fingerprint, Network Discovery, IP Connect, TCP Connect. In
this section we review the principal attributes of an action.
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3.4.1 Action Goal
An action has a goal: when executed successfully the action completes the asset
associated with its goal. It is also common to speak about the result of an action
(for example to increase access, obtain information, corrupt information, gain use
of resources, denial of service).
In Chapter 4 we will formalize the notion of actions. In particular, in Defini-
tion 4.8, we will consider a set of actions A and for each action a ∈ A the effects
of a. Conceptually, with the idea of action goal, we are only taking into account
the expected result of the action. Undesired results and other side effects fall into
the category of noise (see Section 3.4.4). In the formalization of Chapter 4, the
expected result and undesired results will be collectively considered as the effects
of the action.
3.4.2 Action Requirements
The requirements of an action are assets that must have been obtained before
the considered action can be executed. The requirements are the equivalent of
children nodes in [Sch00] and subgoals in [MEL01] and [TLFH01].
An abstract action has thus the information on which assets it may satisfy
and which assets it requires before running. These relationships will be used to
construct the attack graph, by chaining actions and connecting them with the
assets they require (see also Section 7.5.1 wherein a similar graph is constructed
in the context of probabilistic planning).
Figure 3.1 shows a sample attack graph, wherein the actions are depicted as
red boxes and assets as blue ellipses. This is a layered graph, with alternating
layers of actions and assets. The figure also illustrates the relation between the
actions and their requirements.
In the formalization of Chapter 4, the requirements of an action a ∈ A are
defined as the preconditions precond(a). In the notations of Definition 4.8, an
action a ∈ A is applicable to a state s ∈ S if precond(a) ⊆ s.
3.4.3 The Execution Phase (or the Action Itself)
The information about the results and requirements of the actions is used during
a planning phase to obtain an attack plan pi (see Definition 4.11). Once the attack
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Figure 3.1: Sample Attack Graph, showing the relation between the actions and
their requirements.
plan is obtained, it is used to control a penetration testing framework, wherein
the actions of the plan pi are effectively executed on the target network. During
this execution phase, the actual code of the actions (e.g. the code of the exploits
or information gathering modules) is executed by the agent.
One interesting point to mention here, is that the action can be executed
in a real network or in a simulated network (with simulated hosts and network
topology). The difference between working in those two settings will be noticeable
only during the execution phase. This makes our framework easy to adapt for both
real and simulated attacks. Chapter 6 will describe a network simulator specially
crafted to provide realistic simulations of cyber-attacks.
3.4.4 Noise Produced and Stealthiness
The execution of the action will produce noise. This noise can be network traffic,
log lines in IDS, etc. Given a list as complete as possible of network sensors, we
have to quantify the noise produced with respect to each of these sensors. The
knowledge of the network configuration and which sensors are likely to be active,
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will allow us to calculate a global estimate of the noise produced by the action.
We will come back to the issue of refining the actions’ costs in Section 7.2.2 of
Chapter 7, wherein we reformulate the present attack model in the context of
probabilistic planning.
With respect to every network sensor, the noise produced can be classified into
three categories: unremovable noise, noise that can be cleaned in case the action is
successful (or another subsequent action is successful), noise that can be cleaned
even in case of failure. So we can also estimate the noise remaining after cleanup.
Of course, the stealthiness of an action will refer to the low level of noise produced.
3.4.5 Running Time and Probability of Success
The expected running time and probability of success depend on the nature of the
action, but also on the environment conditions, so their values must be updated
every time the agent receives new information about the environment. These
values are necessary to take decisions and choose a path in the graph of possible
actions.
Together with the stealthiness, these values constitute the cost of the action
and can be used to evaluate sequences of actions. This will be further discussed
in Chapter 7 in the context of probabilistic planning.
Because of the uncertainties inherent in the execution environment, these val-
ues can be considered as dependend on the agent’s belief about the target network
(we will discuss that in the POMDP model of Chapter 8).
3.4.6 Exploited Vulnerability
The action, if aiming to obtain an unauthorized result, will exploit a vulnerability.
The information about the exploited vulnerability is not needed by the attacking
agent, but is useful for the classification and analysis of detected intrusions. This
vulnerability can be:
• software vulnerability: a design flaw or an implementation flaw (buffer over-
flow, format string, race condition).
• network configuration vulnerability.
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• trust relationship: this refers to higher level, non autonomous attack mod-
ules: hacking a software provider, getting an insider in a software provider,
inserting backdoors in an open-source project.
3.5 Agents
We can think of the actions as being the verbs in a sequence of sentences describing
the attack. The agents will then be the subject of those verbs. Of course, an attack
is always initiated by human attackers, but during the course of the attack, actions
will typically be executed by software agents.
3.5.1 Human Attackers
There are different types of attackers. They can be classified roughly as:
• script kiddies, who attack more or less randomly using standard tools
downloaded from the Internet;
• hackers, who attack computers for challenge, status or research;
• security auditors (pen testers), who evaluate the security of a network;
• government agencies and criminal organizations, who possess access
to the highest skill level and resources for performing attacks.
The way we model these different types of attackers is through the attack pa-
rameters: stealthiness, non traceability, expected running time, expected success;
and a skill level given by the collection of actions available to the attacker. A script
kiddie will not worry about stealthiness or non traceability. His attacks will have
low expected success and require low skill level. On the other hand, a government
agency will use maximum stealthiness, non traceability and skill level, with a high
expected success. A security auditor will not worry about non traceability but
may require stealthiness to carry out the penetration test.
There are a number of actions that will require a human agent to execute them,
for example social engineering1. But it is important to include them in our model
– for the sake of completeness, and also because they can be considered during
the planning phase as part of an attack.
1Note that social engineering could also be performed by an autonomous agent. An example
of this would be a virus who relies on a suggestive title to be opened by the receiver.
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3.5.2 Software Agents
In general the execution of an action will require the execution of machine code and
therefore involves a software agent A executing this code. This is a generalization
of Definition 2.5, that refered to agents in the context of a penetration framework
such as “Core Impact”.
The command of executing this action might come from the agent itself, from
another software agent or from a human attacker: we will not distinguish between
these cases but just say that the action was executed by the agent A. A software
agent can take several forms: script, toolkit or other kinds of programs. Let us
point out the autonomous agents who are able to take decisions and continue the
attack without human intervention.
3.5.3 Communication between Agents
This framework supports the interactions between agents, which collaborate to
achieve the objective. The agents establish communication channels amongst
themselves to exchange knowledge, gained information and missions to be exe-
cuted. For example, each agent has a collection of actions. Agents can learn
new actions and exchange actions with each other through the communication
channels.
The communication between human attackers can take place through unlimited
types of channels (direct interaction, telephone, email, chat, irc, written mail).
We will not enter into details here. Examples of communication channels between
software agents are POP3 and SMTP, HTTP/HTTPS, DNS, TCP, and covert
channels like Loki.
3.5.4 Agent Mission
We contemplate different types of organization between the agents. One scenario
is given by a “root agent” who plans the attack and then gives the other agents
orders (for executing actions), eventually creating new agents if necessary, and
asks the agents for feedback about action results in order to decide further steps.
Another scenario is when the root agent delegates responsibilities to the other
agents, giving them higher level missions. To fulfill the mission, the agent will
have to do its own planning and communicate with other agents. This scenario
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is likely to arise when stealthiness is a priority: communication is very expensive
and it becomes necessary to rely on the agents to execute their missions without
giving feedback (or the smallest amount of feedback, or delayed feedback because
of intermittent communication channels).
3.6 Building an Attack
An attack involves a group of agents, executing a series of actions in order to fulfill
a goal (or a set of goals). Notice that this goal can change during the course of
the attack.
The target is the logical or physical entity which is the objective of the attack.
Usually, the target is a computer or a computer network or some information
hosted on a computer. The target can also change during the course of the attack.
It is also possible that an attack has no specific target at all (for example, a script
kiddie running a specific exploit against all the computers he reaches, until it
succeeds).
The complete graph of all combinations of actions determines which goals we
(as attackers) can reach. Considering the complete graph of possible actions, to
build an attack will consist in finding a path to reach the objective (this implies
in particular finding a path through the physical networks to reach the target).
3.6.1 Attack Parameters
We will try to find the best path to reach the objective, and to evaluate this we
must take into account the attack parameters: non traceability, tolerated noise,
expected success, execution time, zero-dayness. These parameters have initial
values for the whole attack, but they can vary from agent to agent, for example
an agent might create other agents with a different profile.
Non traceability: refers to the ability to dissimulate the origin of the attack. We
could also call it “deniability”. To achieve non traceability, special modules
must be executed, who will insert intermediate agents (we call them “pivots”
or stepping stones) between the originating agent and the agents executing
the objective or partial objectives.
Tolerated noise: is the level of noise that we allow our agents to make. It can
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vary from agent to agent, for example an agent executing a DNS spoofing
module would benefit from other agents simultaneously executing a DNS
flooding (and generating a high level of noise).
Expected success: determines the priority which will be given to successfully
executing the actions, over the other parameters. If set to the maximum
value, the agent will try to execute the projected action, even though the
noise generated might be higher than the tolerated noise level.
Execution time: each agent will be given a limit of time to execute each action.
This is necessary to plan the attack, as it usually consists of a series of
dependent steps.
Zero-dayness: specifies whether the agent is allowed to use zero-day exploits (a
valuable resource that should be used only for critical missions).
3.6.2 Evaluating Paths
A path is a sequence of actions (in a specific order and without branchings). To
be able to choose between different paths, we have to evaluate the paths in terms
of the attack parameters: the probability of success, the noise probably produced,
the running time and the traceability.
For the probability of success, we consider the success of each action as inde-
pendent of the previous ones, and that all the actions in the paths are necessary, so
the probability of success of the path is the product of the probabilities of success
of each action.
For the running time of the path, we consider three time estimations (minimum,
average, maximum) that we have for each module and sum them to obtain the
path’s minimal, average and maximal running time.
The stealthiness of the path, that we define as the probability of not being
discovered, diminishes with each executed action. As with the probability of
success, we consider them independent and compute the stealthiness of the path
as the product of the stealthiness of the actions.
The traceability is harder to estimate. It depends basically on the number of
hops (or pivots or stepping stones) introduced, and this is how we compute it,
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although each can contribute a different amount to the global “non traceability”
of the path of actions.
3.7 Applications
3.7.1 Attack Planning
This is the main application that we are considering in this thesis, and will be
further studied in Chapters 4, 5, 7 and 8.
3.7.2 Simulations and Analysis of Network Security
As we have mentioned in Section 3.4, our framework can be used to build attacks
against a simulated network. Of course, the quality of this simulation will depend
on how accurately we simulate the machines. Using VMwares we obtain a slow
and accurate simulation, for faster simulations a tradeoff must be made between
accuracy and speed.
The system administrator can simulate different types of attackers by using
different attack parameters and different collections of available actions, and eval-
uate the response of his network to these attackers. For example, he can start
with an attacker with a minimal portfolio of actions, and gradually add actions to
the arsenal of his simulated attacker until there is a successful attack which goes
undetected by the IDS. This will give him an indication of which attack actions
he should defend his network against.
Also consider that the system administrator has a set of measures which make
certain attack actions less effective (in our framework, a measure may reduce
the probability of success of an attack action, or increase the noise it produces,
for example by adding a new IDS). He can then use the simulation to see if his
system becomes safe after all the measures are deployed, or to find a minimal set
of measures which make his system safe.
As opposed to VMwares, rudimentary simulations of machines allow us to
simulate a huge amount of machines. This can be used to investigate the dis-
semination of worms (considered as autonomous agents with a minimalist set of
actions) in large networks. This is further studied in Chapter 6.
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3.8 Related Work
3.8.1 Description of Security Incidents
In [HL98], Howard and Longstaff describe an incident taxonomy, which was the
result of a project to establish a “common language” in the field of computer
security. In [LJ97], Lindqvist and Jonsson also work on the classification of intru-
sions. We try to use the high-level terms proposed by Howard and Longstaff, in
particular, the attributes: vulnerability, action, target, result and objective.
One common flaw of these classifications is that they exclusively adopt the
point of view of the system owners or the intrusion detection sensors. But an
attack is always composed of several steps, some of which may be invisible to
the sensors. We will add to the attributes considered in [HL98] and [LJ97], some
attributes which are relevant only to the attacker (or risk assessment team). Thus
a first result of our framework will be a widening of the concepts used to describe
security intrusions.
3.8.2 Attack Models
In [Sch99] and [Sch00], Bruce Schneier proposes describing attacks against a sys-
tem using “attack trees”, where each node requires the execution of children nodes,
and the root node represents the goal of the attack. There are two types of nodes:
OR nodes and AND nodes.
In [TLFH01] the authors propose an attack specification language, which ex-
tends the attack trees model. Each node has preconditions (system environment
properties which facilitate the execution of the attack node), subgoals (these are
the children nodes), and postconditions (changes in systems and environments).
[MEL01] is also based on the attack trees model. The model is extended by attack
patterns and attack profiles. These authors’ objective is to provide a means for
documenting intrusions. Their models are purely descriptive and doe not allow
the construction or prediction of new attacks.
3.8.3 Attack Graphs
Since the actions have requirements (preconditions) and results, given a goal, a
graph of the actions/assets that lead to this goal can be constructed. This graph is
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related to the attack graphs2 studied in [PS98, JNO05, NEJ+09] and many others.
In [LI05] the authors reviewed past papers on attack graphs, and observed that
the “first major limitation of these studies is that most attack graph algorithms
have only been able to generate attack graphs on small networks with fewer than
20 hosts”. For example, Figure 3.2 shows an attack graph for a small network,
comprising 14 hosts, taken from [NJ04]. This figure illustrates the fact that attack
graphs become rapidly too complex to be represented in their integrity, whether
visually or as a data structure in the computer’s memory.
Figure 3.2: Attack Graph for a small network (14 hosts).
In [SPG98] and [JWS02] the authors propose using attack graphs to determine
the security of networked systems. There are two main differences with our model.
Firstly, the system they propose is an analysis system, which requires as input a
great amount of information: a database of common attacks broken down into
atomic steps, specific network configuration and topology information, and an
attacker profile. Our model is a system for building attacks, starting with possibly
zero information about the network, and gathering this information as the attack
takes place. Secondly, the attack graph we construct for planning purposes differs
from the attack graph of [SPG98] and [JWS02]. In particular, it has a smaller size,
which allow us to effectively find a plan for real world instances of the problem.
2Nodes in an attack graph identify a stage of the attack, while edges represent individual
steps in the attack.
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Additionally we introduce several new dimensions to the graph, like quantified
goals, probabilistic assets and a complex cost function.
3.9 Summary
In this chapter we presented a conceptual model to evaluate the costs of an attack,
to describe the theater of operations, targets, missions, actions, plans and assets
involved in cybernetic attacks.
A contribution of this model concerns the costs of the actions. We show that
the cost is given by a tuple a values: not only the probability of success, but
also the stealthiness (which depends on the noise produced), time consumed, non
traceability and zero-dayness. The noise produced is particularly relevant, and
when we first published these ideas, we had not seen it in other models3. These
dimensions, considered as attack parameters, also allow us to model different types
of attackers.
The most important application of this model is automated planning. Inte-
grated in a tool like Core Impact, it leads the way to automated penetration test-
ing. Used against simulated networks, it is a tool for evaluating the vulnerabilities
of a network.
Working on this model has opened a lot of questions and directions for fu-
ture work: how to estimate the probability of success and noise produced by an
action, how to modify these values after an execution, how to combine the differ-
ent dimensions of the cost in order to obtain a total order between costs, how to
choose the agents who will execute the actions, when to create a new agent on a
specific host, how to decide the profiles (or personalities) of the agents, the use of
planning techniques, and the applications of the simulation scenario. It also led
us to review current penetration testing practices and opened new dimensions for
planning attacks and creating new tools.
3More recent work does take the noise into account, for instance the paper [EKMM11] pub-
lished at the SecArt workshop in 2011.
Chapter 4
Planning Representations
Along this thesis, we will develop several representations of the attack model that
we informally presented in Chapter 3. To understand and formulate precisely the
differences between those representations, we will consider them in the general
model of state-transition systems and enunciate the assumptions that are relaxed
in each case (in Section 4.1).
Another important point of this chapter is how the attack model of Chapter 3
can be represented in the PDDL language. To define with precision this represen-
tation, we start by recalling in Section 4.2 the simpler representations based on set
theory and first order logic. We then provide in Section 4.3 a detailed description
of the PDDL representation of the attack planning problem.
We conclude this chapter with two exercises concerning the expressivity of this
representation and the complexity of the corresponding planning problem.
4.1 Basic Formalization
To formalize the attack model, we will use a general model of dynamic systems,
the model of state-transition systems [GNT04]. We give below the basic definition,
then give a list of common assumptions, and discuss how they can be relaxed to
obtain different versions of the model.
4.1.1 Formalization as a Dynamic System
Definition 4.1. In general, a state-transition system is a tuple Σ = 〈S,A, E , γ〉
where:
• S = {s1, s2, . . .} is a finite set of states;
• A = {a1, a2, . . .} is a finite set of actions;
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• E = {e1, e2, . . .} is a finite set of events;
• γ : S ×A× E → 2S is a state-transition function.
A state represents a “state of the world”, which is the combined knowledge
that the agents have of the environment (network topology, operating systems,
running services, agents distribution, etc).
Actions are transitions that are controlled by the plan executor. If a ∈ A is
an action and γ(s, a) 6= ∅, the action a is applicable to state s.
Events are transitions that are contingent: instead of being controlled by the
plan executor, they correspond to the internal dynamics of the system.
4.1.2 General Assumptions
The following is a list of common assumptions made when modeling planning
problems. These assumptions restrict the complexity of the problem.
Assumption A1 (Fully Observable Σ).
The system Σ is fully observable, the attacker has complete knowledge about
the state of Σ.
Assumption A2 (Deterministic Σ).
The system Σ is deterministic. For every state s and every action a, |γ(s, a)| ≤
1. If an action is applicable to a state, its application brings a deterministic
system to a single other state.
Assumption A3 (Static Σ).
The system Σ is static if the set of events E is empty. The system stays in
the same state until the controller applies some action.
Assumptions A4 (Restricted Goals).
The planner handles only restricted goals that are specified as an explicit
goal state sg or set of goal states Sg. The objective is any sequence of state
transitions that ends at one of the goal states. Extended goals such as states
to be avoided and constraints on state trajectories or utility functions are
nor handled under this assumption.
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Assumptions A5 (Sequential Plans).
A solution plan to a planning problem is a linearly ordered finite sequence
of actions.
Assumptions A6 (Implicit Time).
Actions and events have no duration. In state-transition systems time is not
explicitly represented.
Assumptions A7 (Offline Planning).
The planner is not concerned with any change that may occur in Σ while it
is planning.
4.1.3 Extending the Model
Several models can be obtained by relaxing some of these restrictive assumptions.
In the development of the thesis, we will make the following relaxations to obtain
different versions of the model.
Relaxing Assumption A1 (Fully Observable Σ).
If the system is partially observable, then the observation of Σ will not fully
disambiguate which state Σ is in. For each observation o, ther may be
more than one state s that produce the observation o. This situation will
be studied with the model based on Partially Observable Markov Decision
Processes (POMDP) in Chapter 8.
Relaxing Assumption A2 (Deterministic Σ).
In a nondeterministic system, each action can lead to different possible
states, so the planner may have to consider alternatives. Usually nonde-
terminism requires assumption A5 as well, because a plan must encode ways
for dealing with alternatives. Nondeterministic systems will be studied in
Chapter 7 about probabilistic algorithms and Chapter 8 about the POMDP
model.
Relaxing Assumption A4 (Restricted Goals).
Extended goals allow one to specify to the planner requirements not only
about the final state, but also on the states traversed, for example critical
states to be avoided, states that the system should go through, states it
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should stay in, and other constraints on its trajectories. Another possibility
is to specify a utility function to be optimized. This is used in the POMDP
model, wherein the objective of the planner is to maximize the expected
reward.
Relaxing Assumption A5 (Sequential Plans).
A plan may be a mathematical structure that can be richer than a simple
sequence of actions. Relaxing assumption A5 is often required when other
assumptions are relaxed, as we have seen in the case of nondeterministic
systems (assumption A2). In the POMDP model, the output of the planner
is a policy that specifies which action to execute for each belief state.
Relaxing Assumption A6 (Implicit Time).
To handle time explicitly will require an extension of the model: in the
PDDL model (Chapter 5) the execution time of an action a ∈ A is specified
as a numerical effect of a.
In the POMDP model (Chapter 8), the execution time of an action a is
encoded in the reward function r(s, a).
4.1.4 Number of States
We give below some estimations of the size of the state space S in several examples.
Example 4.2. To get a grasp on the number of states involved, let’s begin with
a very simple example. Let S be a scenario with M machines. Suppose that
the only information that the attacker may obtain about each machine is its OS
information. The only action that the attacker can execute with each machine,
is to recognize its Operating System. That is, for each machine m, the attacker
may have the OperatingSystemAsset for m or not. The number of states in this
scenario is
|S| = 2M .
Example 4.3. To make the previous example slightly more realistic, suppose that
for each machine, there are k bits of information that the attacker may obtain:
the knowledge of the Operating System and of k − 1 applications that may be
running on that machine. The number of states is
|S| = (2k)M
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which is exponential on the number of machines.
Example 4.4. Suppose now that the attacker can learn which Operating System
version is running on a host, the applications running (and their versions), and the
connectivity between machines. Let Os be the set of Operating Systems for each
machine (including the “unknown” operating system), App the set of applications
and Vs the possible versions of applications (to simplify, we suppose them to be
uniform for all the applications). Then the number of states is
|S| = (|Os| × |Vs||App|)M × 2M×M .
As these examples show, representing explicitly all the states of a network, even
in a simple scenario, becomes quickly unfeasible when the number M of machines
grow. Implicit representations are needed, that will enable us to describe subsets
of S in a way that can be easily searched.
Another approach that enabled us to deal with the exponential growth of the
number of states (as a function of M) was to decompose the problem into different
levels of abstraction, and search for approximate solutions. We will present such
ideas in Chapter 7 (used for a probabilistic planner) and in Chapter 8 (used for a
planner based on POMDPs).
4.2 Classical Planning Representations
Figure 4.1: Picture of a Classical Planner.
Classical planning, also called STRIPS planning, refers to planning in a re-
stricted state-transition system. The importance of classical planning is given by
the fact that several general purpose and efficient planners exist for this setting.
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In this sense, classical planners can be considered as the “hammers” of planning,
which are more suitable for real-world applications [Gef10].
Definition 4.5. A restricted state-transition system is one that meets the restric-
tive assumptions 〈A1, . . . ,A7〉 given in Section 4.1.2. It is a deterministic, static,
and fully observable state-transition system with restricted goals and implicit time.
Such a system is denoted Σ = 〈S,A, γ〉. Since the system is deterministic, if a is
applicable to s then γ(s, a) contains one state s′. To simplify notations, we will
say that γ(s, a) = s′ instead of γ(s, a) = {s′}. The transition function is thus
noted as:
γ : S ×A → S
γ(s, a) =
s′ if a is applicable to sundefined otherwise
Definition 4.6. A planning problem for a restricted state-transition system Σ =
〈S,A, γ〉 is defined as a triple P = 〈Σ, s0, Sg〉, where
• s0 ∈ S is the initial state,
• Sg ⊆ S corresponds to a set of goal states.
Note that the initial state s0 ∈ S corresponds to what we called the “environment
knowledge” of the attacker in Chapter 3.
Problem 4.7. (Planning in the restricted model) Given Σ = 〈S,A, γ〉, an initial
state s0 and a set of goal states Sg, find a sequence of actions (a1, a2, . . . , ak)
corresponding to a sequence of state transitions (s0, s1, . . . , sk) such that s1 =
γ(s0, a1), . . . , sk = γ(sk−1, ak), and sk ∈ Sg.
4.2.1 Set-Theoretic Representation
The set-theoretic representation uses only a finite set of proposition symbols that
represent propositions about the world. This representation is more concise and
readable than enumerating all the states and transitions explicitly. It can be
precisely formulated, and provides the foundation for the classical representation.
We recall the basic definitions from [GNT04].
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Definition 4.8. Let L = {p1, . . . , pn} be a finite set of proposition symbols. A
set-theoretic planning domain is a restricted state-transition system Σ = 〈S,A, γ〉
such that:
• S ⊆ 2L, i.e, each state s is a subset of L. The state s tells us which
propositions currently hold. If p ∈ s, then p holds in the state of the world
represented by s.
• Each action a ∈ A is a triple of subsets of L. We will write it as
a = (precond(a), effect−(a), effect+(a))
• The set precond(a) is called the preconditions of a.
• The set effect−(a) is called the delete effects of a, and the set effect+(a) is
called the add effects of a. We require that effect−(a) ∩ effect+(a) = ∅.
• An action a ∈ A is applicable to a state s ∈ S if precond(a) ⊆ s.
• For every s ∈ S and action a applicable to s, the set (s − effect−(a)) ∪
effect+(a) ∈ S.
• The state-transition function is
γ(s, a) =
(s− effect
−(a)) ∪ effect+(a) if a is applicable to s
undefined otherwise.
Note that the effects of an action a ∈ A (the add effects and delete effects) corre-
spond to what we called the action goal (in Section 3.4.1) and the noise produced
by the action (in Section 3.4.4). The preconditions of an action a correspond to
the requirements of the action (as defined in Section 3.4.2).
Example 4.9. This is a very small example involving only two hosts h1 and h2.
The attacker can detect the operating system of these hosts, and install an agent
if he has already detected the OS. He can also uninstall agents.
L = { win-h1, linux-h2, agent-h1, agent-h2 } where
win-h1 means that (the attacker detected that) host h1 is running windows;
linux-h2 means that host h2 is running linux;
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agent-h1 means that host h1 has been compromised (agent installed);
agent-h2 means that host h2 has been compromised.
A = { detect-h1, detect-h2, install-h1, install-h2, uninstall-h1,
uninstall-h2 } where:
detect-h1 = ( { }, { }, { win-h1 } );
detect-h2 = ( { }, { }, { linux-h2 } );
install-h1 = ( { win-h1 }, { }, { agent-h1 } );
install-h2 = ( { linux-h2 }, { }, { agent-h2 } );
uninstall-h1 = ( { agent-h1 }, { agent-h1 }, { } );
uninstall-h2 = ( { agent-h2 }, { agent-h2 }, { } ).
S = {s0, . . . , s8} where:
s0 = { };
s1 = { win-h1 };
s2 = { linux-h2 };
s3 = { win-h1, linux-h2 };
s4 = { win-h1, agent-h1 };
s5 = { linux-h2, agent-h2 };
s6 = { win-h1, linux-h2, agent-h1 };
s7 = { win-h1, linux-h2, agent-h2 };
s8 = { win-h1, linux-h2, agent-h1, agent-h2 }.
Definition 4.10. A set-theoretic planning problem is a triple P = 〈Σ, s0, g〉 where:
• s0 ∈ S is the initial state.
• g ⊆ L is a set of propositions called goal propositions that give the require-
ments that a state must satisfy to be a goal state. The set of goal states is
Sg = {s ∈ S | g ⊆ s}.
Note that the initial state s0 ∈ S corresponds to what we called the “environment
knowledge” of the attacker in Chapter 3.
Definition 4.11. A plan is any sequence of actions pi = 〈a1, . . . , ak〉, where k ≥ 0.
The length of the plan is |pi| = k.
The state produced by applying pi to a state s is the state produced by applying
the actions of pi in the given order. We extend the state-transition function as
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follows:
γ(s, pi) =

s if k = 0
γ(γ(s, a1), 〈a2, . . . , ak〉) if k > 0 and a1 is applicable to s
undefined otherwise
Definition 4.12. Let P = 〈Σ, s0, g〉 be a planning problem. A plan pi is a solution
for P if g ⊆ γ(s0, pi). A solution pi is minimal if no other solution plan for P
contains fewer actions than pi.
State Reachability
We give below some basic definitions and facts concerning state reachability.
Definition 4.13. If s is a state, then the set of all successors of s is
Γ(s) = {γ(s, a) | a ∈ A and a is applicable to s}
Definition 4.14. Let Γ2(s) = Γ(Γ(s)) =
⋃{Γ(s′) | s′ ∈ Γ(s)}, and similarly for
Γ3, . . . ,Γn, then the set of states reachable from s is the transitive closure:
Γˆ(s) = Γ(s) ∪ Γ2(s) ∪ Γ3(s) ∪ . . . (4.1)
Definition 4.15. An action a is said to be relevant for a goal g if and only if
g ∩ effect+(a) 6= ∅ and g ∩ effect−(a) = ∅. In other words, these conditions state
that a can contribute to producing a state in Sg = {s ∈ S | g ⊆ s}.
Definition 4.16. The regression set of a goal g, for an action a that is relevant
for g, is the minimal set of propositions required in a state in order to apply a and
get g:
γ−1(g, a) = (g − effect+(a)) ∪ precond(a) (4.2)
Thus for any state s,
γ(s, a) ∈ Sg ⇐⇒ γ−1(g, a) ⊆ s (4.3)
4.2.2 First Order Logic Representation
This representation generalizes the set-theoretic representation using first-order
logic notation. We start with a first-order language L in which there is a finite
number of predicate symbols and constant symbols. A state is a set of ground
atoms of L.
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Definition 4.17. A planning operator o is a triple (name(o), precond(o), effects(o))
whose components are:
• The name of the operator, name(o), is a syntactic expression of the form
n(x1, . . . , xk) where n is a unique symbol and x1 . . . , xk are all the variable
symbols that appear anywhere in o.
• The preconditions and effects are generalizations of the set-theoretic precon-
ditions and effects: instead of being sets of propositions, they are sets of
literals (atoms and negations of atoms).
Definition 4.18. For any set of literals L, L+ is the set of all atoms in L and L−
is the set of atoms whose negations are in L. If o is an operator, then precond+(o)
and precond−(o) are its positive and negative preconditions, respectively, and
effect+(o) and effect−(o) are its positive and negative effects, respectively.
Definition 4.19. An action is any ground instance of a planning operator. If a
is an action and s is a state such that precond+(a) ⊆ s and precond−(a) ∩ s = ∅,
then a is applicable to s and the result of applying a to s is the state
γ(s, a) = (s− effects−(a)) ∪ effects+(a)
Definition 4.20. Let L be a first-order language that has finitely many predicate
symbols and constant symbols. A classical planning domain in L is a restricted
state-transition system Σ = (S,A, γ) such that:
• S ⊆ 2{all ground atoms of L} .
• A = {all ground instances of operators in O} .
• The state-transition function is γ(s, a) = (s − effects−(a)) ∪ effects+(a) if
a ∈ A is applicable to s ∈ S and undefined otherwise.
• S is closed under γ, that is for every s ∈ S and action a applicable to s,
γ(s, a) ∈ S.
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4.3 The PDDL Representation in Detail
We use an extension of the classical representation that allows the use of typed
variables and relations. This extension improves the efficiency of a planning system
by reducing the number of ground instances it needs to create. More concretely
we use the PDDL planning language notation [M+98, FL03].
The PDDL description language serves as the bridge between the pentesting
tool and the planner. Since exploits have strict platform and connectivity require-
ments, failing to accurately express those requirements in the PDDL model would
result in plans that cannot be executed against real networks. This forces our
PDDL representation of the attack planning problem to be quite verbose.
On top of that, we take advantage of the optimization abilities of planners that
understand numerical effects1, and have the PDDL actions affect different metrics
commonly associated with penetration testing such as running time, probability
of success or possibility of detection (stealth).
We will focus on the description of the domain.pddl file, which contains the
PDDL representation of the attack model. We will not delve into the details of
the problem.pddl file, since it consists of a list of networks and machines, described
using the predicates to be presented in this section.
The PDDL requirements of the representation are :typing, so that predicates
can have types, and :fluents, to use numerical effects. We will first describe the
types available in the model, and then list the predicates that use these types. We
will continue by describing the model-related actions that make this predicates
true, and then we will show an example of an action representing an exploit. We
close this section with an example PDDL plan for a simple scenario.
4.3.1 Types
Table 4.1 shows a list of the types that we used. Half of the object types are
dedicated to describing in detail the operating systems of the hosts, since the
successful execution of an exploit depends on being able to detect the specifics of
the OS.
1Numerical effects allow the actions in the PDDL representation to increase the value of
different metrics defined in the PDDL scenario. The planner can then be told to find a plan that
minimizes a linear function of these metrics.
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network operating system
host OS version
port OS edition
port set OS build
application OS servicepack
agent OS distro
privileges kernel version
Table 4.1: List of object types
4.3.2 Predicates
The following are the predicates used in our model of attacks. Since exploits also
have non-trivial connectivity requirements, we chose to have a detailed represen-
tation of network connectivity in PDDL. We need to be able to express how hosts
are connected to networks, and the fact that exploits may need both IP and TCP
or UDP connectivity between the source and target hosts, usually on a particular
TCP or UDP port. These predicates express the different forms of connectivity:
(connected_to_network ?s - host ?n - network)
(IP_connectivity ?s - host ?t - host)
(TCP_connectivity ?s - host ?t - host ?p - port)
(TCP_listen_port ?h - host ?p - port)
(UDP_listen_port ?h - host ?p - port)
These predicates describe the operating system and services of a host:
(has_OS ?h - host ?os - operating_system)
(has_OS_version ?h - host ?osv - OS_version)
(has_OS_edition ?h - host ?ose - OS_edition)
(has_OS_build ?h - host ?osb - OS_build)
(has_OS_servicepack ?h - host ?ossp - OS_servicepack)
(has_OS_distro ?h - host ?osd - OS_distro)
(has_kernel_version ?h - host ?kv - kernel_version)
(has_architecture ?h - host ?a - OS_architecture)
(has_application ?h - host ?p - application)
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4.3.3 Actions
We require some “model-related” actions that make true the aforementioned pred-
icates in the right cases.
(:action IP_connect
:parameters (?s - host ?t - host)
:precondition (and (compromised ?s)
(exists (?n - network)
(and (connected_to_network ?s ?n)
(connected_to_network ?t ?n))))
:effect (IP_connectivity ?s ?t)
)
(:action TCP_connect
:parameters (?s - host ?t - host ?p - port)
:precondition (and (compromised ?s)
(IP_connectivity ?s ?t)
(TCP_listen_port ?t ?p))
:effect (TCP_connectivity ?s ?t ?p)
)
(:action Mark_as_compromised
:parameters (?a - agent ?h - host)
:precondition (installed ?a ?h)
:effect (compromised ?h)
)
Two hosts on the same network possess IP connectivity, and two hosts have
TCP (or UDP) connectivity if they have IP connectivity and the target host has
the correct TCP (or UDP) port open. Moreover, when an exploit is successful an
agent is installed on the target machine, which allows control over that machine.
An installed agent is hard evidence that the machine is vulnerable, so it marks
the machine as compromised2.
2Depending on the exploit used, the agent might have regular user privileges, or superuser
(root) privileges. Certain local exploits allow a low-level (user) agent to be upgraded to a high-
level agent, so we model this by having two different privileges PDDL objects.
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The penetration testing framework we used has an extensive test suite that col-
lects information regarding running time for many exploit modules. We obtained
average running times from this data and used that information as the numeric
effect of exploit actions in PDDL. The metric to minimize in our PDDL scenarios
is therefore the total running time of the complete attack.
Finally, the following is an example of an action: an exploit that will attempt
to install an agent on target host t from an agent previously installed on the source
host s. To be successful, this exploit requires that the target runs a specific OS,
has the service ovtrcd running and is listening on port 5053.
(:action HP_OpenView_Remote_Buffer_Overflow_Exploit
:parameters (?s - host ?t - host)
:precondition (and (compromised ?s)
(and (has_OS ?t Windows)
(has_OS_edition ?t Professional)
(has_OS_servicepack ?t Sp2)
(has_OS_version ?t WinXp)
(has_architecture ?t I386))
(has_service ?t ovtrcd)
(TCP_connectivity ?s ?t port5053)
)
:effect(and (installed_agent ?t high_privileges)
(increase (time) 10)
))
In our PDDL representation there are several versions of this exploit, one for
each specific operating system supported by the exploit. For example, another
supported system for this exploit looks like this:
(:action HP_OpenView_Remote_Buffer_Overflow_Exploit
:parameters (?s - host ?t - host)
:precondition (and (compromised ?s)
(and (has_OS ?t Solaris)
(has_OS_version ?t V_10)
(has_architecture ?t Sun4U))
(has_service ?t ovtrcd)
(TCP_connectivity ?s ?t port5053)
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)
:effect(and (installed_agent ?t high_privileges)
(increase (time) 12)
))
The main part of the domain.pddl file is devoted to the description of the
actions. In our sample scenarios, this file has up to 28,000 lines and includes up
to 1,800 actions. The last part of the domain.pddl file is the list of constants that
appear in the scenario, including the names of the applications, the list of port
numbers and operating system version details.
4.3.4 An Attack Plan
We end this section with an example plan obtained by running Metric-FF on a
scenario generated with this model. The goal of the scenario is to compromise
host 10.0.5.12 in the target network. This network is similar to the test network
that we will describe in detail in Section 5.3. The plan requires four pivoting steps
and executes five different exploits in total. The localagent object represents the
pentesting framework running in the machine of the user/attacker. The exploits
shown are real-world exploits currently present in the pentesting framework.
0: Mark_as_compromised localagent localhost
1: IP_connect localhost 10.0.1.1
2: TCP_connect localhost 10.0.1.1 port80
3: Phpmyadmin Server_databases Remote Code Execution
localhost 10.0.1.1
4: Mark_as_compromised 10.0.1.1 high_privileges
5: IP_connect 10.0.1.1 10.0.2.2
6: TCP_connect 10.0.1.1 10.0.2.2 port80
7: PHP memory_limit exploit
10.0.1.1 10.0.2.2
8: Mark_as_compromised 10.0.2.2 high_privileges
9: IP_connect 10.0.2.2 10.0.3.2
10: SNMPc Network Manager Trap Packet Remote Buffer
Overflow 10.0.2.2 10.0.3.2
11: Mark_as_compromised 10.0.3.2 high_privileges
12: IP_connect 10.0.3.2 10.0.4.2
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13: Snort TCP Stream Integer Overflow
10.0.3.2 10.0.4.2
14: Mark_as_compromised 10.0.4.2 high_privileges
15: IP_connect 10.0.4.2 10.0.5.12
16: TCP_connect 10.0.4.2 10.0.5.12 port445
17: Novell Client NetIdentity Agent Buffer Overflow
10.0.4.2 10.0.5.12
18: Mark_as_compromised 10.0.5.12 high_privileges
4.4 Expressivity of the PDDL Representation
Choosing to use the PDDL representation to model our problem turned out to be
a very happy choice. First of all, because the PDDL language was created for the
International Planning Competition, and using it we could experiment with a set
of different planners designed to take PDDL input. Secondly because the PDDL
language has been widely extended [FL03, YL04], and the set of problems that
be represented using this language is very wide. We will illustrate its expressivity
with a simple exercise: to model the Attack Trees proposed by Bruce Schneier
[Sch99].
Example 4.21. Schneier’s article [Sch99] takes as an example a simple attack
tree against a physical safe. The attack is represented in a tree structure, with
the goal as the root node and different ways of achieving that goal as leaf nodes.
There are AND nodes and OR nodes: the OR nodes are alternatives, and the
AND nodes represent different steps toward achieving the same goal.
This representation does not distinguish between actions and assets. Let us
model the same attack in the PDDL language, using predicates for the assets.
The actions of this example are described follow. The leaf nodes of the tree
are marked as “possible” or “impossible” in the attack tree, this is translated as
preconditions, where (possible) is a true predicate in the initial conditions of the
problem.
(:action PickLock
:precondition (impossible)
:effect (open_safe)
)
(:action UseLearnedCombo
:precondition (safe_combination)
:effect (open_safe)
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)
(:action CutOpenSafe
:precondition (possible)
:effect (open_safe)
)
(:action InstallImproperly
:precondition (impossible)
:effect (open_safe)
)
(:action FindWrittenCombo
:precondition (impossible)
:effect (safe_combination)
)
(:action GetComboFromTarget
:precondition
(safe_combination_from_target)
:effect (safe_combination)
)
(:action Threaten
:precondition (impossible)
:effect (safe_combination_from_target)
)
(:action Blackmail
:precondition (impossible)
:effect (safe_combination_from_target)
)
(:action Eavesdrop
:precondition (and
(conversation_eavesdropped)
(target_states_combo)
)
:effect (safe_combination_from_target)
)
(:action Bribe
:precondition (possible)
:effect (safe_combination_from_target)
)
(:action ListenToConversation
:precondition (possible)
:effect (conversation_eavesdropped)
)
(:action GetTargetToStateCombo
:precondition (impossible)
:effect (target_states_combo)
)
The assets, formulated as predicates, are:
(:predicates
(possible)
(impossible)
(open_safe)
(safe_combination)
(safe_combination_from_target)
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(conversation_eavesdropped)
(target_states_combo)
)
This is the domain definition of the problem. The initial conditions and the
goal are:
(define (problem attack_tree_figure1)
(:domain AttackTree)
(:init (possible))
(:goal (open_safe))
)
When executing the planner FF with this problem, we get the following plan
ff: search configuration is best-first on 1*g(s) + 5*h(s) where
metric is plan length
advancing to distance: 1
0
ff: found legal plan as follows
step 0: CutOpenSafe
Example 4.22. Let’s see a continuation of the previous example. Consider that
we distinguish between actions that require special equipment and those which
don’t. We also add a cost to each leaf action (in thousands of dollars). This
is done via the cost function and adding numerical effects to the actions. The
domain with these modifications is now:
(define (domain AttackTree)
(:requirements :TYPING :FLUENTS)
(:functions
(cost)
)
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(:predicates
(none)
(special_equipment)
(open_safe)
(safe_combination)
(safe_combination_from_target)
(conversation_eavesdropped)
(target_states_combo)
)
(:action PickLock
:precondition (special_equipment)
:effect (and
(open_safe)
(increase (cost) 30))
)
(:action UseLearnedCombo
:precondition (safe_combination)
:effect (open_safe)
)
(:action CutOpenSafe
:precondition (special_equipment)
:effect (and
(open_safe)
(increase (cost) 10))
)
(:action InstallImproperly
:precondition (none)
:effect (and
(open_safe)
(increase (cost) 100))
)
(:action FindWrittenCombo
:precondition (none)
:effect (and
(safe_combination)
(increase (cost) 75))
)
(:action GetComboFromTarget
:precondition
(safe_combination_from_target)
:effect (and
(safe_combination)
(increase (cost) 0))
)
(:action Threaten
:precondition (none)
:effect (and
(safe_combination_from_target)
(increase (cost) 60))
)
(:action Blackmail
:precondition (none)
:effect (and
(safe_combination_from_target)
(increase (cost) 100))
)
(:action Eavesdrop
:precondition (and
(conversation_eavesdropped)
(target_states_combo))
:effect (safe_combination_from_target)
)
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(:action Bribe
:precondition (none)
:effect (and
(safe_combination_from_target)
(increase (cost) 20))
)
(:action ListenToConversation
:precondition (special_equipment)
:effect (and
(conversation_eavesdropped)
(increase (cost) 20))
)
(:action GetTargetToStateCombo
:precondition (none)
:effect (and
(target_states_combo)
(increase (cost) 40))
)
)
And the initial conditions and the goal of the problem are now:
(define (problem attack_tree_figure1)
(:domain AttackTree)
(:init
(none)
(= (cost) 0)
)
(:goal (open_safe))
(:metric MINIMIZE (cost))
)
In particular we suppose that the attacker hasn’t got the special equipment
required by some actions, and the objective is to obtain the goal (open safe) while
minimizing the cost function.
The output of the planner Metric-FF is the following plan:
ff: search configuration is best-first on 1*g(s) + 5*h(s) where
metric is ((1.00*[RF0](cost)) - () + 0.00)
advancing to distance: 1
0
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ff: found legal plan as follows
step 0: FindWrittenCombo
1: UseLearnedCombo
It is noteworthy that this plan doesn’t minimize the total cost, since the given
plan has a cost of $ 75k, whereas the optimal plan (below) has a cost of $ 20k.
step 0: Bribe
1: GetComboFromTarget
2: UseLearnedCombo
This plan was not found by Metric-FF because in its heuristic search, the
planner only considered plans with 2 actions (which are sufficient to obtain the
goal) before looking for an optimal plan within that horizon.
To conclude the example, it showed that Schneier’s Attack Trees can be per-
fectly modeled in PDDL with fluents, and it also showed us a limitation of Metric-
FF, that failed to find the optimal plan even in this very small example.
4.5 The Hypergraph Representation
In this section we explore briefly the Hypergraph representation, and use it to
prove that a version of the Attack Planning Problem is NP-hard. Of course this
comes as no surprise, and the following section can thus be considered as an
exercise performed during the early phases of our research.
4.5.1 Basic concepts
We recall some basic definitions.
Definition 4.23. A directed hypergraph, or simply hypergraph, is a pair H =
(V,E) where V is the set of nodes, and E is the set of hyperarcs. A hyperarc is a
pair e = (T (e), h(e)), where T (e) ⊆ V is the tail of e while h(e) ∈ V is the head
of e.
The nodes represent the attack assets. The actions are modeled as hyperarcs.
The assets contained in the tail T (e) of an action are the requirements. The head
of the hyperarc is the result of the action.
56
Action templates are instantiated.
Definition 4.24. A directed hyperpath, or simply hyperpath, PSt from the source
set S ⊆ V to the target node t ∈ V is a minimal acyclic sub-hypergraph of H
containing the nodes in S and the node t, such that each node (except the nodes
in S) has exactly one entering hyperarc.
4.5.2 NP-Hardness of the Hypergraph Formulation
Suppose that the hypergraph H is given. The planning problem is to find an
optimal hyperpath. The following problem is NP-hard [FR99].
Problem 4.25. (Directed Steiner Tree problem)
Instance: A directed graph G = (V,E), a node s ∈ V , a subset of nodes K =
{i1, . . . , ik} ⊆ V and weights w : A −→ Z+.
Task: Find a directed subtree T , rooted at node s and of minimum weight that
contains all nodes in K.
We state the following version of the Attack Planning problem.
Problem 4.26. (Attack Planning, hypergraph formulation)
Instance: A directed hypergraph G = (V,E), nodes s, t and weights w : E −→ Z+.
Task: Find a subhypergraph G1 of minimum weight that contains a directed
hyperpath from node s to node t.
We note that if G1 contains a hyperarc ({i1, . . . , ik}, j), it must contain nodes
{i1, . . . , ik, j}.
Theorem 4.27. The version of Attack Planning Problem stated above is NP-hard.
Proof. The Attack Planning Problem contains the Directed Steiner Tree Problem
as a special case. More precisely, given an instance (G, s,K, c) of the Directed
Steiner Tree Problem we construct the following hypergraph G′: we add an extra
node t to graph G and we add a hyperarc ({i1, . . . , ik}, t) from all nodes in K to
node t of zero cost. That is, let V ′ = V ∪ {t}, let A′ = A ∪ {({i1, . . . , ik}, t)} and
let G′ = (V ′, A′). The cost c′ of each arc of A′ is the same as before and the cost
of the hyperarc is zero.
Then, solving the Attack Planning Problem on (G′, s, t, c′) implies solving the
Directed Steiner Tree Problem on (G, s,K, c).
Chapter 5
Integration with Classical
Planners
Assessing network security is a complex and difficult task. Attack graphs have
been proposed as a tool to help network administrators understand the potential
weaknesses of their networks (see Section 3.8). However, one problem has not yet
been addressed by previous work on this subject; namely, how to actually execute
and validate the attack paths resulting from the analysis of the attack graph. In
Chapter 4 we presented a complete PDDL representation of an attack model. In
the rest of this chapter, we present an implementation that integrates a planner
into a penetration testing tool.
This allows us to automatically generate attack paths for penetration testing
scenarios, and to validate these attacks by executing the corresponding actions
-including exploits- against the real target network. We present an algorithm
for transforming the information present in the penetration testing tool to the
planning domain in Section 5.2, and we show how the scalability issues of attack
graphs can be solved using current planners. In Section 5.3 we make an analysis
of the performance of our solution, showing how the model scales to medium-sized
networks and the number of actions available in current penetration testing tools.
5.1 Attack Planning in the Real World
In medium-sized networks, building complete attack graphs quickly becomes un-
feasible (their size increases exponentially with the number of machines and avail-
able actions). To deal with the attack planning problem, a proposed approach
[SW08, Sar09a] is to translate the model into a PDDL representation and use
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classical planning algorithms to find attack paths. Planning algorithms manage
to find paths in the attack graph without constructing it completely, thus helping
to avoid the combinatorial explosion [BF97]. A similar approach was presented at
SecArt’09 [GG09], but the authors’ model is less expressive than the one used in
this work, as their objective was to use the attack paths to build a minimal attack
graph, and not to carry out these attacks against real networks.
In the following sections we present an implementation of these ideas. We
have developed modules that integrate a pentesting framework with an external
planner, and execute the resulting plans back in the pentesting framework, against
a real network. We believe our implementation proves the feasability of automating
the attack phases of a penetration test, and allows us to think about continuing
this line of work in order to automate the whole process. We show how our model,
and its PDDL representation, scales to hundreds of target nodes and available
exploits, numbers that can be found when assessing medium-sized networks with
current pentesting frameworks.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: in Section 5.2 we present
a high-level description of our solution, describing the steps needed to integrate
a planner with a penetration testing framework. We have already described the
PDDL representation in detail in Section 4.3 explaining how the “real world” view
that we take forces a particular implementation of the attack planning problem
in PDDL. Section 5.3 presents the results of our scalability testing, showing how
our model manages medium-sized networks using current planners.
5.2 Architecture of our Solution
In this section we describe the components of our solution, and how they fit
together to automate an attack. Figure 5.1 shows the relationship between these
different components. The penetration testing framework is a tool that allows
the user/attacker to execute exploits and other pre/post exploitation modules
against the target network. Our implementation is based on Core Impact1. The
planner is a tool that takes as input the description of a domain and a scenario, in
PDDL2. The domain contains the definition of the available actions in the model,
1As mentioned in the previous section, Metasploit is an open-source alternative.
2Refer to [FL03] for a description of the PDDL planning language.
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execution
Figure 5.1: Architecture of our solution.
and the scenario contains the definition of the objects (networks, hosts, and their
characteristics), and the goal which has to be solved.
The attack workspace contains the information about the current attack or pen-
etration test. In particular, the discovered networks and hosts, information about
their operating systems, open/closed ports, running services and compromised
machines. In the current version of our solution we assume that the workspace
has this network information available, and that no network information gathering
is needed to generate a solvable plan. We will address this limitation in Section
5.5 when we discuss future work.
5.2.1 The “Transform” Algorithm
The transform algorithm generates the PDDL representation of the attack plan-
ning problem, including the initial conditions, the operators (PDDL actions), and
the goal. From the pentesting framework we extract the description of the oper-
ators, in particular the requirements and results of the exploits, which will make
up most of the available actions in the PDDL representation. This is encoded in
the domain.pddl file, along with the predicates and types (which only depend on
the details of our model).
From the attack workspace we extract the information that constitutes the
initial conditions for the planner: networks, machines, operating systems, ports
and running services. This is encoded in the problem.pddl file, together with the
goal of the attack, which will usually be the compromise of a particular machine.
A common characteristic of pentesting frameworks is that they provide an
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incomplete view of the network under attack. The pentester has to infer the
structure of the network using the information that he sees from each compro-
mised machine. The transform algorithm takes this into account, receiving extra
information regarding host connectivity.
5.2.2 The Planner
The PDDL description is given as input to the planner. The advantage of using the
PDDL language is that we can experiment with different planners and determine
which best fits our particular problem. We have evaluated our model using both
SGPlan [CWH06] and Metric-FF [Hof02].
The planner is run from inside the pentesting framework, as a pluggable module
of the framework that we call PlannerRunner. The output of the planner is a plan,
a sequence of actions that lead to the completion of the goal, if all the actions are
successful. We make this distinction because even with well-tested exploit code,
not all exploits launched are successful. The plan is given as feedback to the
pentesting framework, and executed against the real target network.
5.3 Performance and Scalability Evaluation
This model, and its representation in PDDL, are intended to be used to plan
attacks against real networks, and execute them using a pentesting framework.
To verify that our proposed solution scales up to the domains and scenarios we
need to address in real-world cases, we carried out extensive performance and
scalability testing – to see how far we could take the attack model and PDDL
representation with current planners. We focused our performance evaluation on
four metrics:
• Number of machines in the attacked network
• Number of pivoting steps in the attack
• Number of available exploits in the pentesting suite
• Number of individual predicates that must be fulfilled to accomplish the goal
The rationale behind using these metrics is that we needed our solution to scale
up reasonably with regard to all of them. For example, a promising use of planning
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algorithms for attack planning lies in scenarios where there are a considerable
number of machines to take into account, which could be time-consuming for a
human attacker.
Moreover, many times a successful penetration test needs to reach the inner-
most levels of a network, sequentially exploiting many machines in order to reach
one which might hold sensitive information. We need our planning solution to be
able to handle these cases where many pivoting steps are needed.
Pentesting suites are constantly updated with exploits for new vulnerabilities,
so that users can test their systems against the latest risks. The pentesting tool
that we used currently3 has about 700 exploits, of which almost 300 are the remote
exploits that get included in the PDDL domain. Each remote exploit is represented
as a different operator for each target operating system, so our PDDL domains
usually have about 1800 operators, and our solution needs to cope with that input.
Finally, another promising use of planning algorithms for attack planning is the
continuous monitoring of a network by means of a constant pentest. In this case
we need to be able to scale to goals that involve compromising many machines.
We decided to use the planners Metric-FF4 [Hof02] and SGPlan5 [CWH06]
since we consider them to be representative of the state of the art in classical
planners. The original FF planner was the baseline planner for IPC’086. Metric-
FF adds numerical effects to the FF planner. We modified the reachability analysis
in Metric-FF to use type information, as in FF, to obtain better memory usage.
SGPlan combines Metric-FF as a base planner with a constraint partitioning
scheme which allows it to divide the main planning problem in subproblems; these
subproblems are solved with a modified version of Metric-FF, and the individual
solutions combined to obtain a plan for the original problem. This method, ac-
cording to the authors, has the potential to significantly reduce the complexity of
the original problem [CWH06]. It was successfully used in [GG09].
3As of March, 2010.
4Latest version available (with additional improvements).
5SGPlan version 5.22.
6The International Planning Competition, 2008.
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5.3.1 Generating the Test Scenarios
We tested both real and simulated networks, generating the test scenarios using
the same pentesting framework we would later use to attack them. For the large-
scale testing, we made use of a network simulator [FMOS09]. This simulator allows
us to construct sizable networks7, but to still view each machine independently
and, for example, to execute distinct system calls in each of them. The simulator
integrates tightly with the pentesting framework, to the point where the framework
is oblivious to the fact that the network under attack is simulated and not real.
This allowed us to use the pentesting tool to carry out all the steps of the test,
including the information gathering stage of the attack. Once the information
gathering was complete, we converted the attack workspace to PDDL using our
transform tool.
. . .
. . .
. . .
Gateway
Router
Switch
Server
Desktop
. . .
Attacker
Figure 5.2: Test network for scalability evaluation.
7We tested up to 1000 nodes in the simulator.
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We generated two types of networks for the performance evaluation. To eval-
uate the scalability in terms of number of machines, number of operators, and
number of goals; the network consists of five subnets with varying numbers of
machines, all joined to one main network to which the user/attacker initially has
access. Figure 5.2 shows the high-level structure of this simulated network.
To evaluate the scalability in terms of the number of pivoting steps needed to
reach the goal, we constructed a test network where the attacker and the target
machine are separated by an increasing number of routers, and each subnetwork
in between has a small number of machines.
Machine type OS version Share Open ports
Windows desktop Windows XP SP3 50% 139, 445
Windows server Windows 2003 Server SP2 14% 25, 80, 110, 139,
443, 445, 3389
Linux desktop Ubuntu 8.04 or 8.10 27% 22
Linux server Debian 4.0 9% 21, 22, 23, 25,
80, 110, 443
Table 5.1: List of machine types for the test networks
The network simulator allows us to specify many details about the simulated
machines, so in both networks, the subnetworks attached to the innermost routers
contain four types of machines: Linux desktops and servers, and Windows desktops
and servers. Table 5.1 shows the configuration for each of the four machine types,
and the share of each type in the network. For server cases, each machine randomly
removes one open port from the canonical list shown in the table, so that all
machines are not equal and thus not equally exploitable.
5.3.2 Experimental Results
As we expected, both planners generated the same plans in all cases, not taking
into account plans in which goals were composite and the same actions could be
executed in different orders. This is reasonable given that SGPlan uses Metric-FF
as its base planner. We believe that the performance and scalability results are
more interesting, since a valid plan for an attack path is a satisfactory result in
itself.
Figures 5.3 to 5.10 show how running time and memory consumption scale
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Figure 5.3: Running time, increasing number of machines. (Fixed values: 1600
actions, 1 pivoting step).
Figure 5.4: Memory usage, increasing number of machines.
for both planners, with respect to the four metrics considered8. Recall that, as
explained in Section 4.3, each exploit maps to many PDDL actions.
8Testing was performed on a Core i5 750 2.67 GHz machine with 8 GB of RAM, running
64-bit Ubuntu Linux; the planners were 32-bit programs.
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As illustrated by Figures 5.3 and 5.4, both running time and memory con-
sumption increase superlinearly with the number of machines in the network. We
were not able to find exact specifications for the time and memory complexities of
Metric-FF or SGPlan, though we believe this is because heuristics make it diffi-
cult to calculate a complexity that holds in normal cases. Nonetheless, our model,
coupled with the SGPlan planner, allows us to plan an attack in a network with
480 nodes in 25 seconds and using less than 4 GB of RAM. This makes attack
planning practical for pentests in medium-sized networks.
Moving on to the scalability with regard to the depth of the attack (Figures
5.5 and 5.6), it was surprising to verify that memory consumption is constant even
as we increase the depth of the attack to twenty pivoting steps, which generates
a plan of more than sixty steps. Running time increases slowly, although with a
small number of steps the behaviour is less predictable. The model is therefore
not constrained in terms of the number of pivoting steps.
With regard to the number of operators (i.e. exploits) (Figures 5.7 and 5.8),
both running time and memory consumption increase almost linearly; however,
running time spikes in the largest cases. Doubling the number of operators, from
720 to 1440 (from 120 to 240 available exploits), increases running time by 163%
for Metric-FF and 124% for SGPlan. Memory consumption, however, increases
only 46% for Metric-FF, and 87% for SGPlan. In this context, the number of
available exploits is not a limiting factor for the model.
Interestingly, these three tests also verify many of the claims made by the
authors of SGPlan. We see that the constraint partition used by their planner
manages to reduce both running time and memory consumption, in some cases by
significant amounts (like in Figure 5.6).
The results for the individual number of predicates in the overall goal (Figures
5.9 and 5.10) are much more surprising. While SGPlan runs faster than Metric-
FF in most of the cases, Metric-FF consumes significantly less memory in almost
half of them. We believe that as the goal gets more complex (the largest case we
tested requests the individual compromise of 100 machines), SGPlan’s constraint
partition strategy turns into a liability, not allowing a clean separation of the
problem into subproblems. By falling back to Metric-FF, our model can solve, in
under 6 seconds and using slightly more than 1 GB of RAM, attack plans where
half of the machines of a 200-machine network are to be compromised.
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Figure 5.5: Running time versus increasing number of pivoting steps. (Fixed
values: 1600 actions, 120 machines).
Figure 5.6: Memory usage versus increasing number of pivoting steps.
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Figure 5.7: Running time versus increasing number of actions. (Fixed values: 200
machines, 1 pivoting step).
Figure 5.8: Memory usage versus increasing number of actions.
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Figure 5.9: Running time versus increasing number of predicates in the goal.
(Fixed values: 200 machines, 1 pivoting step for each compromised machine, 1600
actions).
Figure 5.10: Memory usage versus increasing number of predicates in the goal.
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5.3.3 Improving the Memory Usage of Metric-FF
During our initial tests with Metric-FF, we were not able to solve even medium-
sized scenarios without running out of memory on a machine with 4 GB of RAM.
We discovered that Metric-FF was performing a very inefficient reachability anal-
ysis before the actual planning, thus causing said memory problems. More specif-
ically, the reachability analysis allocated four integer arrays with room for all the
possible “states” of each predicate. These states corresponded to all possible com-
bination of constants for each argument of the predicate. The problem was that
Metric-FF was not using type information, and therefore it considered all con-
stants, regardless of type, for each argument of each predicate. Due to the fact
that we need to represent many characteristics of the target machine and operat-
ing system for each exploit, our domain contains a lot of constants, representing
port numbers, operating system versions, editions, distributions, service packs,
and kernel versions.
Metric-FF allocated
∑p
i=1(c
ai) 32-bit integers for each array, where p is the
number of predicates (20 in our scenarios), c is the number of constants (around
300 in our scenarios), and ai is the arity of predicate i (max(ai) = 3 in our
scenarios). We modified Metric-FF to only allocate space for constants of the
correct type, using type information as originally implemented in the planner FF,
and obtained much better results. The reachability analysis for our standard
domain would consume over 4 GB of RAM, and we managed to reduce that to
a little over 2 MB, by significantly reducing the number of constants associated
with each argument of each predicate.
5.4 Related Work
Work on attack modeling applied to penetration testing had its origin in the possi-
bility of programmatically controlling pentesting tools such as Metasploit or Core
Impact. This model led to the use of attack graphs. Earlier work on attack graphs
such as [PS98, RA00, SHJ+02] were based on the complete enumeration of attack
states, which grows exponentially with the number of actions and machines. As we
mentioned in Section 3.8 the survey of [LI05] shows that the major limitations of
past studies of attack graphs is their lack of scalability to medium-sized networks.
One notable exception is the Topological Vulnerability Analysis (TVA) project
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conducted in George Mason University described in [JNO05, NJ05, NEJ+09] and
other papers, which has been designed to work in real-size networks. The main
differences between our approach and TVA are the following:
• Input. In TVA the model is populated with information from third party
vulnerability scanners such as Nessus, Retina and FoundScan, from databases
of vulnerabilities such as CVE and OSVDB and other software. All this in-
formation has to be integrated, and will suffer from the drawbacks of each
information source, in particular from the false positives generated by the
vulnerability scanners about potential vulnerabilities.
In our approach the conceptual model and the information about the target
network are extracted from a consistent source: the pentesting framework
exploits and workspace. The vulnerability information of an exploit is very
precise: the attacker can execute it in the real network to actually compro-
mise systems.
• Output. The attack graph generated by TVA is presented to the end-user
through an interactive graphical interface. Whereas in our approach, the
output of the planner is a sequence of actions that are directly executed
by the pentest tool on the target network, and is shown as an actual agent
installed in the target host.
• Monotonicity. TVA assumes that the attacker’s control over the network
is monotonic [AWK02]. In particular, this implies that TVA cannot model
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, or the fact that an unsuccessful exploit
may crash the target service or machine. It is interesting to remark that the
monotonicity assumption is the same used by FF [Hof01] to create a relaxed
version of the planning problem, and use it as a heuristic to guide the search
through the attack graph. By relying on the planner to do the search, we
do not need to make this restrictive assumption.
5.5 Summary and Future Work
[FNRS03] proposed a model of computer network attacks which was designed to
be realistic from an attacker’s point of view. We have shown in this chapter that
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this model scales up to medium-sized networks: it can be used to automate attacks
(and penetration tests) against networks with hundreds of machines.
The solution presented shows that it is not necessary to build the complete
attack graph (one of the major limitations of earlier attack graph studies). Instead
we rely on planners such as Metric-FF and SGPlan to selectively explore the state
space in order to find attack paths.
We have successfully integrated these planners with a pentesting framework,
which allowed us to execute and validate the resulting plans against a test bench of
scenarios. We presented the details of how to transform the information contained
in the pentesting tool to the planning domain9.
One important question that for future work on this subject is how to deal
with incomplete knowledge of the target network (actually we deal with that
issue in Chapters 7 and 8). The architecture that we presented supports running
non-classical planners, so one possible approach is to use probabilistic planning
techniques, where actions have different outcomes with associated probabilities.
For example, a step of the attack plan could be to discover the operating system
details of a particular host, so the outcome of this action would be modeled as a
discrete probability distribution.
Another approach would be to build a “metaplanner” that generates hypothe-
ses with respect to the missing bits of information about the network, and uses
the planner to test those hypotheses. Continuing the previous example, the meta-
planner would assume that the operating system of the host was Windows and
request the planner to compromise it as such. The metaplanner would then test
the resulting plan in the real network, and verify or discard the hypothesis.
9Our implementation uses Core Impact, but the same ideas can be extended to other tools
such as the open-source project Metasploit.
Chapter 6
Simulation of Network Scenarios
In this chapter we present a simulation platform called Insight, created to design
and simulate cyber-attacks against large arbitrary target scenarios. This platform
was used to test the implementation described in Chapter 5, namely the integra-
tion of a classical planner with a pentesting framework. To be able to test our
implementation, we needed to execute attack paths in networks with hundreds of
machines, something that could only be done on a simulated network (given our
current infrastructure).
The simulation platform that we developed has surprisingly low hardware and
configuration requirements, while making the simulation a realistic experience
from the attacker’s standpoint. The scenarios include a crowd of simulated actors:
network devices, hardware devices, software applications, protocols, users, etc.
A novel characteristic of this tool is to simulate vulnerabilities (including 0-
days) and exploits, allowing an attacker to compromise machines and use them
as pivoting stones to continue the attack. A user can test and modify complex
scenarios, with several interconnected networks, where the attacker has no initial
connectivity with the objective of the attack.
We give a concise description of this new technology, and its possible uses in
the security research field, such as pentesting training, study of the impact of 0-day
vulnerabilities, evaluation of security countermeasures, and as a risk assessment
tool (besides providing a testbed for our planning implementation).
6.1 Motivation
Computer security has become a necessity in most of today’s computer uses and
practices. However it is a wide topic and security issues can arise from almost
everywhere: binary flaws (e.g., buffer overflows [One96]), Web flaws (e.g., SQL
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injection, remote file inclusion), protocol flaws (e.g., TCP/IP flaws [Bel89]), not
to mention hardware, human, cryptographic and other well known flaws.
Although it may seem obvious, it is useless to secure a network with a hundred
firewalls if the computers behind it are vulnerable to client-side attacks. The
protection provided by an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is worthless against
new vulnerabilities and 0-day attacks. As networks have grown in size, they have
implemented a wider variety of more complex configurations and include new
devices (e.g. embedded devices) and technologies. This has created new flows
of information and control, and therefore new attack vectors. As a result, the
job of both black hat and white hat communities has become more difficult and
challenging.
The previous examples are just the tip of the iceberg. Computer security is a
complex field and it has to be approached with a global view, considering all parts
of the whole picture simultaneously: network devices, hardware devices, software
applications, protocols, users, et cetera. The simulation platform Insight has been
created with that goal in mind.
6.1.1 Design Restrictions
In practice, the simulation of complex networks requires resolving the tension
between the scalability and accuracy of the simulated subsystems, devices and
data. This is a complex issue, and to find a satisfying solution for this trade-off
we have adopted the following design restrictions:
1. Our goal is to have a simulator on a single desktop computer, running hun-
dreds of simulated machines, with simulated traffic realistic only from the
attacker’s standpoint.
2. Attacks within the simulator are not launched by real attackers in the wild
(e.g. script-kiddies, worms, black hats). As a consequence, the simulation
does not have to handle exploiting details such as stack overflows or heap
overflows. Instead, attacks are executed from an attack framework by Insight
users who know they are playing in a simulated environment.
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6.1.2 Main Features
To demonstrate that our approach is valid, we have developed a proof of concept
called Insight. This program introduces a platform for executing attack experi-
ments and tools for constructing these attacks. We show that users of this tool
are able to design and adapt attack-related technologies, and have better tests
to assess their quality. Attacks are executed from an attack framework which
includes many information gathering and exploitation modules. Modules can be
scripted, modified or even added.
One of the major Insight features is the capability to simulate exploits. An
exploit is a piece of code that attempts to compromise a computer system via
a specific vulnerability. There are many ways to exploit security holes. If a
computer programmer makes a programming mistake in a computer program, it
is sometimes possible to circumvent security. Some common exploiting techniques
are stack exploits, heap exploits, format string exploits, etc.
To simulate these techniques in detail is very expensive. The main problem
is to maintain the complete state (e.g., memory, stack, heap, CPU registers) for
every simulated machine. From the attacker’s point of view, an exploit can be
modeled as a magic string sent to a target machine to unleash a hidden feature
(e.g., reading files remotely) with a probabilistic result. This is a lightweight
approach, and we have sacrificed some of the realism in order to support very
large and complex scenarios. For example, 1, 000 virtual machines and network
devices (e.g., hubs, switches, IDS, firewalls) can be simulated on a single Windows
desktop, each one running their own simulated OS, applications, vulnerabilities
and file systems. Certainly, taking into account available technologies, it is not
feasible to use a complete virtualization server (e.g., VMware) running thousands
of images simultaneously.
As a result, the main design concept of our implementation is to focus on the
attacker’s point of view, and to simulate on demand. In particular, the simulator
only generates information as requested by the attacker. By performing this on-
demand processing, the main performance bottleneck comes from the ability of the
attacker to request information from the scenario. Therefore, it is not necessary,
for example, to simulate the complete TCP/IP packet traffic over the network if
nobody is requesting that information. A more lightweight approach is to send
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data between network sockets writing in the memory address space of the peer
socket, and leaving the full packet simulation as an option.
6.2 Background and Related Work
Using simulated networks as a research tool to gather knowledge regarding the
techniques, strategy and procedures of the black hat community is not a new
issue. Solutions such as honeypots and honeynets [Pro06, Spi02] were primarily
designed to attract malicious network activities and to collect data. A precise
definition for the term honeypot is given by The Honeynet Project [Pro04a]:
Definition 6.1. A honeypot is an information system resource whose value lies
in unauthorized or illicit use of that resource.
Over the last decade a wide variety of honeypot systems have been built
[MPS+03, BCJ+05, SMS01, YBP, Pro04b], both academic and commercial. Hon-
eypots have emerged as an interesting tool for gathering knowledge on new meth-
ods used by attackers, and the underlying strength of the approach lies in its
simplicity. Typically, honeypots offer minimal interaction with the attacker, em-
ulating only small portions of the behavior of real networks. However, this sim-
plicity is also a weakness: none of these systems execute kernel or application
code that attackers seek to compromise, and only a few ones maintain a per-flow
and per-protocol state to allow richer emulation capabilities. Thus, honeypots
are most useful for capturing indiscriminate or large-scale attacks, such as worms,
viruses or botnets, rather than very focused intrusions targeting a particular host
[VMC+05].
In Table 6.1 we show the main differences with our approach. In particular,
we are interested in the ability to compromise machines, and use them as pivoting
stones1 to build complex multi-step attacks.
In contrast, “high interaction honeypots” and virtualization technologies (e.g.,
VMware, Xen, Qemu) execute native system and application code, but the price
of this fidelity is quite high. For example, the RINSE approach [LLN+05] is im-
plemented over the iSSFNet network simulator, which runs on parallel machines
to support real-time simulation of large-scale networks. All these solutions share
1 In a network attack, to pivot means to use a compromised machine as a stepping stone to
reach further networks and machines, making use of its trust relationships.
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Honeypot-like tools Insight
Design focus: to detect, understand
and monitor real cyber-attacks.
Design focus: to reproduce or
mimic cyber-attacks, penetration
test training, what-if and 0-day sce-
narios.
Attacks are launched by real attack-
ers: worms, botnets, script-kiddies,
black-hats.
Attacks are launched by the Insight
users: pentest and forensic auditors,
security researchers.
Simulation up to transport layer. Simulation up to application layer,
including vulnerabilities and ex-
ploits.
Stateless or (a kind of) per-flow and
per-protocol state.
Applications and machines’ internal
states.
No exploit simulation. No pivoting
support.
Full exploit and agent (shellcode)
simulation. Ability to pivot through
a chain of agents.
Table 6.1: Honeypots vs. Insight.
the same principle of simulating almost every aspect of a real machine or real net-
work, but share similar problems too: expensive configuration cost and expensive
hardware and software licenses. Moreover, most of these solutions are not fully
compatible with standard network protection (e.g., firewalls, IDSs), suffering a
lack of integration between all security actors in complex cyber-attack scenarios.
Security assessment and staging are other well known security practices. It is
common, for example in web application development, to duplicate the production
environment on a staging environment (accurately mimicking or mirroring the
first) to anticipate changes and their impact. The downside is that it is very
difficult to adopt this approach in the case of network security due to several
reasons. It would require the doubling of the hardware and software licenses and
(among other reasons) there are no means to automatically configure the network.
Other interesting approaches to solve these problems include the framework
developed by Bye et al. [BSLA08]. While they focus on distributed denial of
service attacks (DDoS) and defensive IDS analysis, we focus on offensive strate-
gies to understand the scenarios and develop countermeasures. Also Loddo et al.
[LS08] have integrated User Mode Linux [Dik06] and Virtual Distributed Ethernet
[Dav05] to create a flexible and very detailed network laboratory and simulation
tool. The latter project has privileged accuracy and virtualization over scalability
and performance.
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The Potemkin Virtual Honeyfarm [VMC+05] is another interesting prototype.
It improves high-fidelity honeypot scalability by up to six times while still closely
emulating the execution behavior of individual Internet hosts. Potemkin uses quite
sophisticated on-demand techniques for instantiating hosts2, but this approach fo-
cuses on attracting real attacks and it shows the same honeypot limitations to
reach this goal. As an example, to capture e-mail viruses, a honeypot must posses
an e-mail address, must be scripted to read mail (executing attachments like a
naive user) and, most critically, real e-mail users must be influenced to add the
honeypot to their address books. Passive malware (e.g., many spyware applica-
tions) may require a honeypot to generate explicit requests, and focused malware
(e.g., targeting only financial institutions) may carefully select its victims and
never touch a large-scale honeyfarm. In each of these cases there are partial solu-
tions, and they require careful engineering to truly mimic the target environment.
In conclusion, new trends in network technologies make cyber-attacks more
difficult to understand, learn and reproduce, and the current tools to tackle these
problems have some deficiencies when facing large complex scenarios. In spite of
that, it is possible to overcome the problems described above using the lightweight
software simulation tool we present.
6.3 Insight Approach and Overview
A diagram of the Insight general architecture is showed in Fig. 6.1. The Simulator
subsystem is the main component. It performs all simulation tasks on the simu-
lated machines, such as system call execution, memory management, interrupts,
device I/O management, etcetera.
At least one Simulator subsystem is required, but the architecture allows several
ones, each running in a real computer (e.g., a Windows desktop). In this example,
there are two simulation subsystems, but more could be added in order to support
more virtual hosts.
The simulation proceeds in a lightweight fashion. It means, for example, that
not all system calls for all OSes are supported by the simulation. Instead of imple-
menting the whole universe of system calls, Insight handles a reduced and generic
2Including copy-on-write file system optimizations implemented also in Insight, as we are
going to see it in §6.5.5.
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Figure 6.1: Insight architecture layout.
set of system calls, shared by all the simulated OSes. Using this approach, a
specific OS system call is mapped to an Insight syscall which works similarly to
the original one. For example, the Windows sockets API is based on the Berkeley
sockets API model used in Berkeley UNIX, but both implementations are slightly
different3. Similarly, there are some instances where Insight sockets have to diverge
from strict adherence to the Berkeley conventions, usually due to implementation
difficulties in the simulated environment. In spite of this (and ignoring the differ-
ences between OSes), all sockets system calls of the real world have been mapped
to this unique simulated API.
Of course, there are some system calls and management tasks closely related to
the underlying OS which were not fully supported, such as UNIX fork and signal
syscalls, or the complete set of functions implemented by the Windows SDK. There
is a trade-off between precision and efficiency, and the decision of which syscalls
3For additional details look at the Winsock API documentation (available from http://
msdn.microsoft.com), which includes a section called Porting Socket Applications to Winsock.
79
were implemented was made with the objective of maintaining the precision of the
simulation from the attacker’s standpoint.
The exploitation of binary vulnerabilities4 is simulated with a probabilistic ap-
proach, to keep the attack model simple, lightweight, and to avoid tracking anoma-
lous conditions (and their countermeasures), such as buffer overflows, format string
vulnerabilities, exception handler overwriting—among other well known vulnera-
bilities [AHLR07]. This probabilistic approach allows us to mimic the unpre-
dictable behavior when an exploit is launched against a targeted machine.
Let us assume that a simulated computer was initialized with an underlying
vulnerability (e.g. it hosts a vulnerable OS). In this case, the exploit payload
is replaced by a special ID or “magic string”, which is sent to the attacked ap-
plication using a preexistent TCP communication channel. When the attacked
application receives this ID, Insight will decide if the exploit worked or not based
on a probability distribution that depends on the exploit and the properties de-
scribing the simulated computer (e.g., OS, patches, open services). If the exploit
is successful, then Insight will grant the control in the target computer through
the agent abstraction, which will be described in §6.4.
The probabilistic attack model is implemented by the Simulator subsystems,
and it is supported by the Exploits Database, a special configuration file which
stores the information related to the vulnerabilities. This file has a XML tree
structure, and each entry has the whole necessary information needed by the
simulator to compute the probabilistic behavior of a given simulated exploit. For
example, a given exploit succeeds against a clean XP SP2 with 83% probability
if port 21 is open, but crashes the system if it is a SP1. We are going to spend
some time looking at the probability distribution, how to populate the exploits
database, and the Insight attack model in the next sections.
Returning to the architecture layout showed in Fig. 6.1, all simulator sub-
systems are coordinated by a unique Simulator Monitor, which deals with man-
agement and administrative operations, including administrative tasks (such as
starting/stopping a simulator instance) and providing statistical information for
the usage and performance of these.
A set of Configuration Files defines the snapshot of a virtual Scenario. Similarly,
4Insight supports simulation for binary vulnerabilities. Other kind of vulnerabilities (e.g.
client-side and SQL injections) will be implemented in future versions.
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a scenario snapshot defines the instantaneous status of the simulation, and involves
a crowd of simulated actors: servers, workstations, applications, network devices
(e.g. firewalls, routers or hubs) and their present status. Even users can be
simulated using this approach, and this is especially interesting in client-side attack
simulation, where we expect some careless users opening our poisoned crafted e-
mails.
Finally, at the bottom right of the architecture diagram, we can see the Pene-
tration Testing Framework, an external system which interacts with the simulated
scenario in real time, sending system call requests through a communication chan-
nel implemented by the simulator. This attack framework is a free tailored version
of the Impact solution5, however other attack tools are planned to be supported
in the future (e.g., Metasploit [Moo06]).
The attacker actions are coded as Impact script files (using Python) called mod-
ules, which have been implemented using the attack framework SDK, as shown in
the architecture diagram. The framework Python modules include several tools
for common tasks (e.g. information gathering, exploits, import scenarios). The
attacks are executed in real time against a given simulated scenario; a simulation
component can provide scenarios of thousands of computers with arbitrary con-
figurations and topologies. Insight users can design new scenarios and they have
scripts to manage the creation and modification of the simulated components, and
therefore iterate, import and reproduce cyber-attack experiments.
6.4 The Simulated Attack Model
One of the characteristics that distinguish the scenarios simulated by Insight is the
ability to compromise machines, and use them as pivoting stones to build complex
multi-step attacks. To compromise a machine means to install an agent that will
be able to execute arbitrary system calls (syscalls) as a user of this system.
The agent architecture is based on the solution called syscall proxy (see [Cac02]
for more details). The idea of syscall proxying is to build a sort of universal payload
that allows an attacker to execute any system call on a compromised host. By
installing a small payload (a thin syscall server) on a vulnerable machine, the
5Available from http://trials.coresecurity.com/.
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attacker will be able to execute complex applications on his local host, with all
system calls executed remotely. This syscall server is called an agent.
In the Insight attack model, the use of syscall proxying introduces two addi-
tional layers between a process run by the attacker and the compromised OS.
These layers are the syscall client layer and the syscall server layer.
The syscall client layer runs on the attacker’s Penetration Testing Framework.
It acts as a link between the process running on the attacker’s machine and the
system services on a remote host simulated by Insight. This layer is responsible for
forwarding each syscall argument and generating a proper request that the agent
can understand. It is also responsible for sending this request to the agent and
sending back the results to the calling process.
The syscall server layer (i.e. the agent that runs on the simulated system)
receives requests from the syscall client to execute specific syscalls using the OS
services. After the syscall finishes, its results are marshalled and sent back to the
client.
6.4.1 Probabilistic Exploits
In the simulator security model, a vulnerability is a mechanism used to access an
otherwise restricted communication channel. In this model, a real exploit payload
is replaced by an ID or “magic string” which is sent to a simulated application.
If this application is defined to be vulnerable (and some other requirements are
fulfilled), then an agent will be installed in the computer hosting the vulnerable
application.
The simulated exploit payload includes the aforementioned magic string. When
the Simulator subsystem receives this information, it looks up for the string in the
Exploits Database. If it is found, then the simulator will decide if the exploit worked
or not and with what effect based on a probability distribution that depends on
the effective scenario information of that computer and the specific exploit. Sup-
pose, for example, that the Penetration Testing Framework assumes (wrongly) the
attacked machine is a Red Hat Linux 8.0, but that machine is indeed a Windows
system. In this hypothetical situation, the exploit would fail with 100% of proba-
bility. On the other side, if the attacked machine is effectively running an affected
version of Red Hat Linux 9.0, then the probability of success could be 75%, or as
determined in the exploit database.
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Figure 6.2: Remote attack model.
6.4.2 Remote Attack Model Overview
In Fig. 6.2 we can see the sequence of events which occurs when an attacker
launches a remote exploit against a simulated machine. The rectangles in the top
are the four principal components involved: The Penetration Testing Framework,
the Simulator and the Exploits Database are the subsystems explained in Fig. 6.1;
the Vulnerable Application is a simulated application or service which is running
inside an Insight scenario and has an open port. In the diagram the declared
components are represented as named rectangles, messages are represented as
solid-line arrows, and time is represented as a vertical progression.
When an exploit is launched against a service running in a simulated machine,
a connection is established between the Penetration Testing Framework and the
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service6. Then, the simulated exploit payload is sent to the application. The
targeted application reads the payload by running the system call read. Every
time the syscall read is invoked, the Simulator subsystem analyzes if a magic string
is present in the data which has just been read. When a magic string is detected,
the Simulator searches for it in the Exploits Database. If the exploit is found, a new
agent is installed in the compromised machine.
The exploit payload also includes information of the OS that the Penetration
Testing Framework knows about the attacked machine: OS version, system archi-
tecture, service packs, etcetera. All this information is used to compute the prob-
abilistic function and allows the Simulator to decide whether the exploit should
succeed or not.
6.4.3 Local Attack Model Overview
Insight can also simulate local attacks: If an attacker gains control over a machine
but does not have enough privileges to complete a specific action, a local attack
can deploy a new agent with higher privileges.
6This connection is established, for example, by a real Windows socket or a simulated TCP/IP
socket, see §6.5.2.
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In Fig. 6.3 we can see the sequence of events which occurs when a local at-
tack is launched against a given machine. A running agent has to be present in
the targeted machine in order to launch a local exploit. All local simulated at-
tacks are executed by the Simulator subsystem identically: The Penetration Testing
Framework will write the exploit magic string into the agent standard input, using
the write system call, and the Simulator will eventually detect the magic string
intercepting that system call.
In a similar way as the previous example, the exploit magic string is searched in
the database and a new agent (with higher privileges) is installed with probabilistic
chance.
6.5 Detailed Description
One of the most challenging issues in the Insight architecture is to resolve the
tension between realism and performance. The goal was to have a simulator
on a single desktop computer, running hundreds of simulated machines, with a
simulated traffic realistic from a penetration test point of view. But there is a
trade-off between realism and performance and we are going to discuss some of
these problems and other architecture details in the following sections.
6.5.1 The Insight Development Library
New applications can be developed for the simulation platform using a minimal C
standard library, a standardized collection of header files and library routines used
to implement common operations such as: input, output and string handling in
the C programming language.
This library—a partial libc—implements the most common functions (e.g.,
read, write, open), allowing any developer to implement his own services with the
usual compilers and development tools (e.g., gcc, g++, MS Visual Studio). For
example, a web server could be implemented, linked with the provided libc and
plugged within the Insight simulated scenarios.
The provided libc supports the most common system calls, but it is still
incomplete and we were unable to compile complex open source applications. In
spite of this, some services (e.g., a small DNS) and network tools (e.g., ipconfig,
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netstat) have been included in the simulation platform, and new system calls are
planned to be supported in the future.
6.5.2 Simulating Sockets
A hierarchy for file descriptors has been developed as shown in Fig. 6.4. File
descriptors can refer (but they are not limited) to files, directories, sockets, or
pipes. At the top of the hierarchy, the tree root shows the descriptor object
which typically provides the operations for reading and writing data, closing and
duplicating file descriptors, among other generic system calls.
SocketReal
(IP Raw)
SocketReal
(UDP)
SocketDirect
(UDP)
Descriptor
PipeSocketFile
SocketRealSocketDirect
SocketDirect
(TCP)
SocketReal
(TCP)
Figure 6.4: Descriptors’ object hierarchy tree.
The simulated sockets implementation spans in two kinds of supported sockets
subclasses:
1. SocketDirect. This variety of sockets is optimized for the simulation on
one computer. Socket direct is fast: as soon as a connection is established,
the client keeps a file descriptor pointing directly to the server’s descrip-
tor. Routing is only executed during the connection and the protocol con-
trol blocks (PCBs) are created as expected, but they are only used during
connection establishment. Reading and writing operations between direct
86
sockets are carried out using shared memory. Since both sockets can access
the shared memory area like regular working memory, this is a very fast way
of communication.
2. SocketReal. In some particular cases, we are interested in having full socket
functionality. For example, the communication between Insight and the out-
side world is made using real sockets. As a result, this socket subclass wraps
a real BSD socket of the underlying OS.
Support for routing and state-less firewalling was also implemented, support-
ing the simulating of attack payloads that connect back to the attacker, accept
connections from the attacker or reuse the attack connection.
6.5.3 The Exploits Database
When an exploit is raised, Insight has to decide whether the attack is successful or
not depending on the environment conditions. For example, an exploit can require
either a specific service pack installed in the target machine to be successful,
or a specific library loaded in memory, or a particular open port, among others
requirements. All these conditions vary over the time, and they are basically
unpredictable from the attacker’s standpoint. As a result, the behavior of a given
exploit has been modeled using a probabilistic approach.
In order to determine the resulting behavior of the attack, Insight uses the
Exploits Database showed in the architecture layout of Fig. 6.1. It has a XML tree
structure. For example, if an exploit succeeds against a clean XP professional SP2
with 83% probability, or crashes the machine with 0.05% probability in other case;
this could be expressed as follows:
<database>
<exploit id="sample exploit">
<requirement type="system">
<os arch="i386" name="windows" />
<win>XP</win>
<edition>professional</edition>
<servicepack>2</servicepack>
</requirement>
<results>
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<agent chance="0.83" />
<crash chance="0.05" what="os" />
<reset chance="0.00" what="os" />
<crash chance="0.00" what="application" />
<reset chance="0.00" what="application" />
</results>
</exploit>
<exploit> ... </exploit>
<exploit> ... </exploit>
...
</database>
The conditions needed to install a new agent are described in the requirements
section. It is possible to use several tags in this section, they specify the conditions
which have influence on the execution of the exploit (e.g., OS required, a specific
application running, an open port). The results section is a list of the relevant
probabilities. In order, these are the chance of:
1. successfully installing an agent,
2. crashing the target machine,
3. resetting the target machine,
4. crashing the target application,
5. and the chance of resetting the target application.
To determine the result, we follow this procedure: processing the lines in order,
for each positive probability, choose a random value between 0 and 1. If the value
is smaller than the chance attribute, the corresponding action is the result of the
exploit.
In this example, we draw a random number to see if an agent is installed. If the
value is smaller than 0.83, an agent is installed and the execution of the exploit
is finished. Otherwise, we draw a second number to see if the OS crashes. If
the value is smaller than 0.05, the OS crashes and the attacked machine becomes
useless, otherwise there is no visible result. Other possible results could be: raising
an IDS alarm, writing some log in a network device (e.g. firewall, IDS or router)
or capturing a session id, cookie, credential or password.
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The exploits database allows us to model the probabilistic behavior of any
exploit from the attacker’s point of view, but how do we populate our database?
A paranoid approach would be to assign a probability of success of 100% to every
exploit. In that way, we would consider the case where an attacker can launch
each exploit as many times as he wants, and will finally compromise the target
machine with 100% probability (assuming the attack does not crash the system).
A more realistic approach is to use statistics from real networks. Currently we
are using the framework presented by Picorelli [Pic06] in order to populate the
probabilities in the exploits database. This framework was originally implemented
to assess and improve the quality of real exploits in QA environments. It allows us
to perform over 500 real exploitation tests daily on several running configurations,
spanning different target operating systems with their own setups and applications
that add up to more than 160 OS configurations. In this context, a given exploit
is executed against:
• All the available platforms
• All the available applications
All these tests are executed automatically using low end hardware, VMware
servers, OS images and snapshots. The testing framework has been designed to
improve testing time and coverage, and we have modified it in order to collect
statistical information of the exploitation test results.
6.5.4 Scheduler
The scheduler’s main task is to assign the CPU resources to the different simulated
actors (e.g. simulated machines and process). The scheduling iterates over the
hierarchy machine-process-thread as a tree (like a depth-first search), each machine
running its processes in round-robin.
In a similar way, running a process is giving all its threads the order to run until
a system call is needed. Obviously, depending on the state of each thread, they
run, change state or finish execution. The central issue is that threads execute
systems calls and then (if possible) continue their activity until they finish or
another system call is required.
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Insight threads are simulated within real threads of the underlying OS. Simu-
lated machines and processes are all running within one or several working pro-
cesses (running hundreds of threads), and all of them are coordinated by a unique
scheduler process called the master process. Thanks to this architecture, there is
a very low loss of performance due to context switching7.
6.5.5 File System
In order to handle thousands of files without wasting a huge amount of disk space,
the file system simulation is accomplished by mounting shared file repositories.
We are going to refer to these repositories as template file systems. For example,
all simulated Windows XP systems could share a file repository with the default
installation provided by Microsoft. These shared templates would have reading
permission only. Thus, if a virtual machine needs to read or change a file, it will
be copied within the local file system of the given machine.
This technique is known as copy-on-write. The fundamental idea is to allow
multiple callers to ask for resources which are initially indistinguishable, giving
them pointers to the same resource. This function can be maintained until a
caller tries to modify its copy of the resource, at which point a true private copy is
created to prevent the changes from becoming visible to everyone else. All of this
happens transparently to the callers. The primary advantage is that no private
copy needs to be created if a caller never makes any modification.
Additionaly, with the purpose of improving the simulator’s performance, a file
cache is implemented: the simulator saves the most recent accessed files (or block
of files) in memory. In high scale simulated scenarios, it is very common to have
several machines doing the same task at (almost) the same time8. If the data
requested by these kind of tasks are in the file system cache, the whole system
performance will improve, because less disk accesses would be required, even in
scenarios of hundreds or thousands of simulated machines.
7Because descriptors and pointers remain valid when switching from one machine to the other.
8For example, when the simulation starts up, all UNIX machines would read the boot script
from /etc/initd file.
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6.6 Performance Analysis
To evaluate the performance of the simulator we run a test including a scenario
with an increasing number of complete LANs with 250 computers each, simulta-
neously emulated. The tests only involve the execution of a network discovery on
the complete LANs through a TCP connection to port 80. An original pen-testing
module used for information was executed with no modifications, this was a design
goal of the simulator, to use real unmodified attack modules when possible.
Performance of the simulator
LANs Computers Time (secs) Syscalls/sec
1 250 80 356
2 500 173 236
3 750 305 175
4 1000 479 139
Table 6.2: Evolution of the system performance as the simulated scenario grows,
running a network discovery module, connecting to a predefined port. This bench-
mark was run on a single Intel Pentium D 2.67Ghz, 1.43GB RAM.
We can observe the decrease of system calls processed per second as we increase
the number of simulated computers as Insight was run on a single real computer
with limited resources. Nevertheless, the simulation is efficient because system
calls are required on demand by the connections of the module gathering the
information of the networks through TCP connections.
6.7 Applications
We have created a playground to experiment with cyber-attack scenarios which
has several applications. The most important are:
Attack Planning. This is the main application. In Chapter 5 we used this sim-
ulator to test attack planning algorithms in a variety of scenarios.
Data collection and visualization. Having the complete network scenario in
one computer allows an easy capture and log of system calls and network
traffic. This information is useful for analyzing and debugging real pen-test
tools and their behavior in complex scenarios. Some efforts have been made
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to visualize attack pivoting and network information gathering using the
platform presented.
Pentest training. Our simulation tool is already being used in Pentest courses.
It provides reproducible scenarios, where students can practice the different
steps of a pentest: information gathering, attack and penetrate, privilege
escalation, local information gathering and pivoting.
The simulation allows the student to grasp the essence of pivoting. Set-
ting up a real laboratory where pivoting makes sense is an expensive task,
whereas our tool requires only one computer per student (and in the case of
a network / computer crash, the simulation environment can be easily reset).
Configuring new scenarios with more machines or more complex topologies
is easy, as a scenario wizard is provided.
In Pentest classes with Insight, the teacher can check the logs to see if stu-
dents used the right tools with the correct parameters. He can test the
students’ ability to plan and see if they avoided performing unnecessary ac-
tions. The teacher can also identify their weaknesses as pentesters and plan
new exercises to work on these. The students can be evaluated: success,
performance, stealth and quality of reports can be measured.
Worm Spreading Analysis. The lightweight design of the platform allows the
simulation of socket/network behavior of thousands of computers, providing
a good framework for research on worm infestation and spreading. It should
be possible to develop very accurate applications to mimic worm behavior
using the Insight C programming API. There are available abstract modeling
[CGK03] or high-fidelity discrete event [WMS05] studies but no system call
level recreation of attacks like the one we propose as future application of
this platform.
Analysis of countermeasures. Duplication of the production configuration on
a simulated staging environment accurately mimicking or mirroring the se-
curity aspects of an organization’s network allows the anticipation of soft-
ware/hardware changes and their impact on security. For example, you can
answer questions like “Will the network avoid attack vector A if firewall rule
R is added to the complex rule set S of firewall F?”
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Impact of 0-day vulnerabilities. The simulator can be used to study the im-
pact of 0-days (vulnerabilities that have not been publicly disclosed) in your
network. How is that possible, if we do not know current 0-days? But we
can model the existence of 0-day vulnerabilities based on statistics. In our
security model, the specific details of the vulnerability are not needed to
study the impact on the network, just that it may exist with a measurable
probability.
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Figure 6.5: Probabilities before disclosure.
That information can be gathered from public vulnerability databases: the
discovery date, exploit date, disclosure date and patch date are found in
several public databases of vulnerabilities and exploits [CER, Secb, Seca,
FrS].
The risk of a 0-day vulnerability is given by the probability of an attacker
discovering and exploiting it. Although we do not have data about the
security underground, the probabilities given by public information are a
lower bound indicator.
As shown in [FMFP06], the risk posed by a vulnerability exists before the
discovery date, augments as an exploit is made available for the vulnerability,
and when the vulnerability is disclosed. The risk only diminishes as a patch
becomes available and users apply the patches (and workarounds).
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The probability of discovery, and the probability of an exploit being de-
veloped, can be estimated as a function of the time before disclosure (see
Fig. 6.5 taken from [FMFP06]). For Microsoft products, we have visibility of
upcoming disclosures of vulnerabilities: every month (on patch Tuesday) on
average 9.40 patches are released (high and medium risk). Based on those
dates we estimate the probability that the vulnerabilities were discovered
and exploited during the months before disclosure.
6.8 Summary
We have created a playground to experiment with cyber-attack scenarios. The
framework is based on a probabilistic attack model—that model is also used by
attack planning tools developed in our lab. By making use of the proxy syscalls
technology, and simulating multiplatform agents, we were able to implement a sim-
ulation that is both realistic and lightweight, allowing the simulation of networks
with thousands of hosts.
The framework provides a global view of the scenarios. It is centered on the
attacker’s point of view, and designed to increase the size and complexity of sim-
ulated scenarios, while remaining realistic for the attacker.
The value of this framework is given by its multiple applications:
• Systematic study of Attack Planning techniques.
• Evaluation of network security.
• Evaluation of security countermeasures.
• Anticipating the risk posed by 0-day vulnerabilities.
• Pentest training.
• Worm spreading analysis.
• Data generation to test visualization techniques.
Part II
Development of a Probabilistic
Attack Planner
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Chapter 7
Probabilistic Attack Planning
We have presented in Chapter 5 an approach to the attack planning problem based
on modeling the actions and assets in the PDDL language, and using off-the-shelf
AI tools to generate attack plans. This approach however is limited. In particular,
the planning is classical (the actions are deterministic) and thus not able to handle
the uncertainty involved in this form of attack planning.
In this chapter we contribute a planning model that does capture the un-
certainty about the results of the actions, which is modeled as a probability of
success of each action. We present efficient planning algorithms, specifically de-
signed for this problem, that achieve industrial-scale runtime performance (able
to solve scenarios with several hundred hosts and exploits). These algorithms
take into account the probability of success of the actions and their expected cost
(for example in terms of execution time, or network traffic generated). We thus
show that probabilistic attack planning can be solved efficiently for the scenarios
that arise when assessing the security of large networks (under certain simplifying
assumptions that will be discussed during the chapter).
Two “primitives” are presented, which are used as building blocks in a frame-
work separating the overall problem into two levels of abstraction. We also present
the experimental results obtained with our implementation, and conclude with
some ideas for further work.
7.1 Introduction
Penetration testing is one of the most trusted ways of assessing the security of
networks large and small. The result of a penetration test is a repeatable set of
steps that result in the compromise of particular assets in the network. As we
have discussed in Chapter 2, penetration testing frameworks have been developed
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to facilitate the work of penetration testers and make the assessment of network
security more accessible to non-expert users.
In Section 2.4 we discussed how the evolution of pentesting tools – covering
new attack vectors, and shipping increasing numbers of exploits and information
gathering techniques – created the need to automate the control of the pentest
framework. This is what we call the attack planning problem. This problem
was introduced to the AI planning community by Boddy et al. as the “Cyber
Security” domain [BGHH05]. In the pentesting industry, Lucangeli et al. proposed
a solution based on modeling the actions and assets in the PDDL language,1 and
using off-the-shelf planners to generate attack plans [LSR10]. Using PDDL to work
with attack graphs has also been explored in [GG09]. Herein we are concerned
with the specific context of regular automated pentesting, as in “Core Insight
Enterprise” tool, and use the term “attack planning” in that sense.
Recently, a model based on partially observable Markov decision processes
(POMDP) was proposed [SBH11] (this is the subject of Chapter 8). This grounded
the attack planning problem in a well-researched formalism, and provided a precise
representation of the attacker’s uncertainty with respect to the target network. In
particular, the information gathering phase was modeled as an integral part of the
planning problem. However, as the authors show, this solution does not scale to
medium or large real-life networks.
In this chapter, we take a different direction: the uncertainty about the results
of the actions is modeled as a probability of success of each action, whereas in
[SBH11] the uncertainty is modeled as a distribution of probabilities over the
states. This allows us to produce an efficient planning algorithm, specifically
designed for this problem, that achieves industrial-scale runtime performance.
Of course planning in the probabilistic setting is far more difficult than in the
deterministic one. We do not propose a general algorithm, but a solution suited for
the scenarios that need to be solved in a real world penetration test. In particular,
we make simplifying assumptions about the actions and the machines, namely
supposing that the actions and machines are independent from each other. In the
trade-off between realism of the model and scalability of the resulting planning
problem, we chose here to prioritize scalability. The computational complexity of
1PDDL stands for Planning Domain Definition Language. Refer to [FL03] for a specification
of PDDL 2.1.
97
our planning solution is O(n log n), where n is the total number of actions in the
case of an attack tree (with fixed source and target hosts), and O(M2 · n log n)
where M is the number of machines in the case of a network scenario. With our
implementation, we were able to solve planning in scenarios with up to 1000 hosts
distributed in different networks.
We start with a brief review of the attack model in Section 7.2, then continue
with a presentation of two “primitives” in Sections 7.3 and 7.4. These primitives
are applied in more general settings in Sections 7.5 and 7.6. Section 7.7 shows
experimental results from the implementation of these algorithms. We conclude
with some ideas for future work.
7.2 The Attack Model
We summarize below the basic background from the conceptual model of computer
attacks presented in Chapter 3 (for more details refer to [AR03, FNRS03, Ric03,
RT07]), and further develop some aspects of the model like the actions’ costs.
This model is based on the concepts of assets, goals, agents and actions. In this
description, an attack involves a set of agents, executing sequences of actions,
obtaining assets (which can be information or actual modifications of the real
network and systems) in order to reach a set of goals.
An asset can represent anything that an attacker may need to obtain during
the course of an attack, including the actual goal. Examples of assets: information
about the Operating System (OS) of a host H; TCP connectivity with host H on
port P ; an Agent installed on a given host H. To install an agent means to break
into a host, take control of its resources, and eventually use it as pivoting stone
to continue the attack by launching new actions based from that host.
The actions are the basic steps which form an attack. Actions have require-
ments (also called preconditions) and a result: the asset that will be obtained
if the action is successful. For example, consider the exploit IBM Tivoli Storage
Manager Client Remote Buffer Overflow 2 for the vulnerabilities in dsmagent de-
scribed by CVE-2008-4828. The result of this action is to install an agent, and it
requires that the OS of the target host is Windows 2000, Windows XP, Solaris 10,
2The particular implementations that we have studied are the exploit modules for Core Impact
and Core Insight Enterprise, although the same model can be applied to other implementations,
such as Metasploit.
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Windows 2003, or AIX 5.3. In this model, all the exploits (local, remote, client-
side, webapps) are represented as actions. Other examples of actions are: TCP
Network Discovery, UDP Port Scan, DCERPC OS Detection, TCP Connectivity
Probe.
The major differences between the attack model used in this work and the
attack graphs used in [AWK02, JNO05, JSW02, PS98, RA00, SHJ+02] are twofold:
to improve the realism of the model, we consider that the actions can produce
numerical effects (for example, the expected running time of each action); and
that the actions have a probability of success (which models the uncertainty about
the results of the action).
7.2.1 Deterministic Actions with Numerical Effects
In the deterministic case, the actions and assets that compose a specific planning
problem can be successfully represented in the PDDL language. This idea was
proposed in [SW08] and further analyzed in [LSR10], and treated in Chapter 5 of
this thesis. The assets are represented as PDDL predicates, and the actions are
translated as PDDL operators. The authors show how this PDDL representation
allowed them to integrate a penetration testing tool with an external planner,
and to generate attack plans in realistic scenarios. The planners used – Metric-
FF [Hof02] and SGPlan [CWH06] – are state-of-the-art planners able to handle
numerical effects.
Fig. 7.1 shows an example of a PDDL action: an exploit for the IBM Tivoli
vulnerability, that will attempt to install an agent on target host t from an agent
previously installed on the source host s. To be successful, this exploit requires
that the target runs a specific OS, has the service mil-2045-47001 running and
listening on port 1581.
The average running times of the exploits are measured by executing all the
exploits of the penetration testing tool in a testing lab. More specifically, in
Core’s testing lab there are more than 748 virtual machines with different OS and
installed applications, where all the exploits of Core Impact are executed every
night [Pic06].
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(:action IBM_Tivoli_Storage_Manager_Client_Exploit
:parameters (?s - host ?t - host)
:precondition (and
(compromised ?s)
(and (has_OS ?t Windows)
(has_OS_edition ?t Professional)
(has_OS_servicepack ?t Sp2)
(has_OS_version ?t WinXp)
(has_architecture ?t I386))
(has_service ?t mil-2045-47001)
(TCP_connectivity ?s ?t port1581)
)
:effect(and
(installed_agent ?t high_privileges)
(increase (time) 4)
))
Figure 7.1: Exploit represented as PDDL action.
7.2.2 Actions’ Costs
The execution of an action has a multi-dimensional cost. We detail below some
values that can be measured (and optimized in an attack):
Execution time: Average running time of the action.
Network traffic: The amount of traffic sent over the network increases the level
of noise produced.
IDS detection: Logs lines generated and alerts triggered by the execution of the
action increase the noise produced.
Host resources: The execution of actions will consume resources of both the
local and remote host, in terms of CPU, RAM, hard disc usage, etc.
Traceability of the attack: Depends on the number of intermediate hops and
topological factors.
Zero-day exploits: Exploits for vulnerabilities that are not publicly known are
a valuable resource, that should be used only when other exploits have failed
(the attacker usually wants to minimize the use of “0-days”).
In our experiments, we have chosen to optimize the expected execution time.
In the context of regular penetration tests, minimizing the expectation of total
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execution time is a way of maximizing the amount of exploits successfully launched
in a fixed time frame (pentests are normally executed in a bounded time period).
However, the same techniques can be applied to any other scalar cost, for ex-
ample to minimize the noise produced by the actions (and the probability of being
detected). The issue of measuring the costs of the exploits, and more generally of
evaluating Exploit Quality Metrics, was more recently discussed in [Sar11a].
7.2.3 Probabilistic Actions
Another way to add realism to the attack model is to consider that the actions
are nondeterministic. This can be modeled by associating probabilities to the
outcomes of the actions. In the case of an exploit, the execution of the exploit can
be successful (in that case the attacker takes control of the target machine) or a
failure. This is represented by associating a probability of success to each exploit.
The probability of success is conditional: it depends on the environment con-
ditions. For example, the IBM Tivoli exploit for CVE-2008-4828 is more reliable
(has a higher probability of success) if the OS is Solaris since it has no heap pro-
tection, the stack is not randomized and is executable by default. Alternatively,
the exploit is less reliable (has a lower probability of success) if the OS is Windows
XP SP2 or Windows 2003 SP1, with Data Execution Prevention (DEP) enabled.
On Windows Vista, the addition of Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
makes the development of an exploit even more difficult, and diminishes its proba-
bility of success. In practice, the probability of success of each exploit is measured
by exhaustively executing the exploit against a series of targets, covering a wide
range of OS and application versions.
Although it improves the realism of the model, considering probabilistic actions
also makes the planning problem more difficult. Using general purpose probabilis-
tic planners did not work as in the deterministic case; for instance, we experi-
mented with Probabilistic-FF [DH07] with poor results, since it was able to find
plans in only very small cases.
In the rest of this chapter, we will study algorithms to find optimal attack
paths in scenarios of increasing difficulty. We first describe two primitives, and
then apply them in the context of regular automated pentesting. In these scenarios
we make an additional hypothesis: the independence of the actions. Relaxing this
hypothesis is a subject for future work.
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7.3 The Choose Primitive
We begin with the following basic problem. Suppose that the attacker (i.e. pen-
tester) wants to gain access to the credit cards stored in a database server H by
installing a system agent. The attacker has a set of n remote exploits that he can
launch against that server. These exploits result in the installation of a system
agent when successful (see Fig. 7.2).
Exploit 1 Exploit 2 Exploit n
System Agent
Figure 7.2: Multiple exploits may install a System agent (on the target host).
In this scenario, the attacker has already performed information gathering
about the server H, collecting a list of open/closed ports, and running an OS
detection action such as Nmap. The pentesting tool used provides statistics on
the probability of success and expected running time for each exploit in the given
conditions.3 The attacker wants to minimize the expected execution time of the
whole attack. A more general formulation follows:
Problem 7.1. Let g be a fixed goal, and let {A1, . . . , An} be a set of n independent
actions whose result is g. Each action Ak has a probability of success pk and
expected cost tk. Actions are executed until an action is successful and provides
the goal g (or all the actions fail).
Task: Find the order in which the actions must be executed in order to minimize
the expected total cost.
As already stated, we make the simplifying assumption that the probability of
success of each action is independent from the others. If the actions are executed
in the order A1, . . . , An, using the notation pi = 1 − pi, the expected cost can be
written as
T{1...n} = t1 + p1 t2 + . . .+ p1 p2 . . . pn−1 tn. (7.1)
3In our experiments we used the database of tests of Core Impact and Core Insight Enterprise.
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The probability of success is given by
P{1...n} = p1 + p1 p2 + p1 p2 p3 + . . .+ p1 . . . pn−1 pn,
and the complement P{1...n} = p1 p2 . . . pn. In particular this shows that the total
probability of success does not depend on the order of execution.
Even though this problem is very basic, we didn’t find references to its solution.
This is why we give below some details on the solution that we found.
Lemma 7.2. Let A1, . . . , An be actions such that t1/p1 6 t2/p2 6 . . . 6 tn/pn.
Then
T{1...n−1}
P{1...n−1}
6 tn
pn
.
Proof. We prove it by induction. The case with two actions is trivial, since we
know by hypothesis that t1/p1 6 t2/p2. For the inductive step, suppose that the
proposition holds for n − 1 actions. Consider the first three actions A1, A2, A3.
The inequality
T{12}
P{12}
6 t3
p3
holds if and only if t2/p2 6 t3/p3. So the first two actions can be considered as a
single action A12 with expected cost (e.g. running time) T{12} and probability of
success P{12}. We have reduced to the case of n − 1 actions, and we can use the
induction hypothesis to conclude the proof.
Proposition 7.3. A solution to Problem 7.1 is to sort the actions according to
the coefficient tk/pk (in increasing order), and to execute them in that order. The
complexity of finding an optimal plan is thus O(n log n).
Proof. We prove it by induction. We begin with the case of two actions Ai and
Aj such that ti/pi 6 tj/pj. It follows easily that −pitj 6 −pjti and that
ti + (1− pi) tj 6 tj + (1− pj) ti.
For the inductive step, suppose for the moment that the actions are numbered
so that t1/p1 6 . . . 6 tn/pn, and that the proposition holds for all sets of n − 1
actions. We have to prove that executing A1 first is better that executing any
other action Ak for all k 6= 1. We want to show that
t1 +
∑
26i6n
ti ·
∏
16j6i−1
pj
6 tk +
∑
16i6n, i 6=k
ti · pk ·
∏
16j6i−1, j 6=k
pj.
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Notice that in the two previous sums, the coefficients of tk+1, . . . , tn are equal in
both expressions. They can be simplified, and using notations previously intro-
duced, the inequality can be rewritten
T{1...k−1} + P{1...k−1} tk 6 tk + pk T{1...k−1}
which holds if and only if
T{1...k−1}
P{1...k−1}
6 tk
pk
which is true by Lemma 7.2. We have reduced the problem to sorting the coeffi-
cients tk/pk. The complexity is that of making the n divisions tk/pk and sorting
the coefficients. Thus it is O(n+ n log n) = O(n log n).
We call this the choose primitive because it tells you, given a set of actions,
which action to choose first: the one that has the smallest t/p value. In particular,
it says that you should execute first the actions with smaller cost (e.g. runtime)
or higher probability of success, and precisely which is the trade-off between these
two dimensions.
The problem of choosing the order of execution within a set of exploits is
very common in practice. In spite of that, the automation methods currently
implemented in penetration testing frameworks offer an incomplete solution,4 over
which the one proposed here constitutes an improvement.
7.4 The Combine Primitive
7.4.1 Predefined Strategies
We now consider the slightly more general problem where the goal g can be ob-
tained by predefined strategies. We call strategy a group of actions that must be
executed in a specific order. The strategies are a way to incorporate the expert
knowledge of the attacker in the planning system (cf. the opening moves in chess).
This idea has been used in the automation of pentesting tools, see [SW08].
4As of July 2011, Immunity Canvas [Ait04] doesn’t provide automated execution of exploits;
Metasploit [Moo10] has a feature called “autopwn” that launches all the exploits available for the
target ports in arbitrary order; Core Impact Pro launches first a set of “fast” exploits and then
“brute-force” exploits [SW08], but arbitrary order is used within each set; Core Insight Enterprise
uses planning techniques based on a PDDL description [LSR10] that takes into account the
execution time but not the probability of success of the exploits.
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Figure 7.3: Multiple strategies for a Local Privilege Escalation.
For example consider an attacker who has installed an agent with low privileges
on a host H running Windows XP, and whose goal is to obtain system privileges
on that host. The attacker has a set of n predefined strategies to perform this
privilege escalation (see Fig. 7.3). An example of a strategy is: refine knowledge of
the OS version; verify that the edition is Home or Professional, with SP2 installed;
get users and groups; then launch the local exploit Microsoft NtUserMessageCall
Kernel Privilege Escalation that (ab)uses the vulnerability CVE-2008-1084. More
generally:
Problem 7.4. Let g be a fixed goal, and {G1, . . . , Gn} a set of n strategies, where
each strategy Gk is a group of ordered actions. For a strategy to be successful,
all its actions must be successful. As in Problem 7.1, the task is to minimize the
expected total cost.
In this problem, actions are executed sequentially, choosing at each step one
action from one group, until the goal g is obtained. Considering only one strategy
G, we can calculate its expected cost and probability of success. Suppose the
actions of G are {A1, . . . , An} and are executed in that order. Then the expected
cost (e.g. expected runtime) of the group G is
TG = t1 + p1 t2 + p1 p2 t3 + . . .+ p1 p2 . . . pn−1 tn
and, since all the actions must be successful, the probability of success of the group
is simply PG = p1 p2 . . . pn (again, we suppose that the actions are independent).
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Proposition 7.5. A solution to this problem is to sort the strategies according to
the coefficient TG/PG (smallest value first), and execute them in that order. For
each strategy group, execute the actions until an action fails or all the actions are
successful.
Proof. In this problem, an attack plan could involve choosing actions from different
groups without completing all the actions of each group. But it is clear that this
cannot happen in an optimal plan.
In effect, suppose that there are only two groups GA and GB, whose actions
are {A1, . . . , As} and {B1, . . . , Bt} respectively. Suppose that in the optimal plan
As precedes Bt. Suppose also that the execution of an action Bj 6= Bt precedes the
execution of As. Executing Bj will not result in success (that requires executing
Bt as well), and it will delay the execution of As by the expected running time
of Bj. Thus to minimize the expected total running time, a better solution can
be obtained by executing Bj after the execution of As. This contradiction shows
that all the actions of GB must be executed after As in an optimal solution. This
argument can be easily extended to any number of groups.
So an optimal attack plan consists in choosing a group and executing all the
actions of that group. Since the actions of each group G are executed one after the
other, they can be considered as a single action with probability PG and expected
time TG. Using the choose primitive, it follows that groups should be ordered
according to the coefficients TG/PG.
7.4.2 Multiple Groups of Actions
We extend the previous problem to consider groups of actions bounded by an
AND relation (all the actions of the group must be successful in order to obtain
the result g), but where the order of the actions is not specified. The difference
with Problem 7.4 is that now we must determine the order of execution within
each group.
Fig. 7.4 shows an example of this situation. A System Agent can be installed
by using a Remote exploit, a Client-side exploit or a SQL injection in a web
application. Each of these actions has requirements represented as assets, which
can be fulfilled by the actions represented on the second layer. For example,
before executing the Remote exploit, the attacker must run a Host probe (to
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Figure 7.4: Probabilistic attack tree (with two layers).
verify connectivity with the target host), Port probe (to verify that the target
port of the exploit is open), and an OS Detection module (to verify the OS of the
target host).
Problem 7.6. Same as Problem 7.4, except that we have n groups {G1, . . . , Gn}
of unordered actions. If all the actions in a group are successful, the group provides
the result g.
Proposition 7.7. Let G = {A1, . . . , An} be a group of actions bounded by an
AND relation. To minimize the expected total cost, the actions must be ordered
according to the coefficient tk/(1− pk).
Proof. If the actions are executed in the order A1, . . . , An, then the expected cost
is
TG = t1 + p1 t2 + . . .+ p1 p2 . . . pn−1 tn (7.2)
This expression is very similar to equation (7.1). The only difference is that costs
are multiplied by pk instead of pk. So in this case, the optimal solution is to order
the actions according to the coefficient tk/pk = tk/(1− pk).
Intuitively the actions that have higher probability of failure have higher pri-
ority, since a failure ends the execution of the group. The coefficient tk/(1 − pk)
represents a trade-off between cost (time) and probability of failure.
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Wrapping up the previous results, to solve Problem 7.6, first order the actions
in each group according to the coefficient t/(1 − p) in increasing order. Then
calculate for each group G the values TG and PG. Order the groups according to
the coefficient TG/PG, and select them in that order. For each group, execute the
actions until an action fails or all the actions are successful.
We call it the combine primitive, because it tells you how to combine a group
of actions and consider them (for planning purposes) as a single action with prob-
ability of success PG and expected running time TG.
7.5 Using the Primitives in an Attack Tree
We apply below the choose and the combine primitives to a probabilistic attack
tree, where the nodes are bounded by AND relations and OR relations. The tree
is composed of two types of nodes, distributed in alternating layers of asset nodes
and action nodes (see Fig. 7.5).
Asset
Action Action Action
Figure 7.5: Attack tree with alternating layers of Assets and Actions.
An asset node is connected by an OR relation to all the actions that provide
this asset: for example, an Agent asset is connected to the Exploit actions that
may install an agent on the target host.
An action node is connected by an AND relation to its requirements: for ex-
ample, the local exploit Microsoft NtUserMessageCall Kernel Privilege Escalation
requires an agent asset (with low level privileges) on the target host H, and a
Windows XP OS asset for H.
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The proposed solution is obtained by composing the primitives from previous
sections. In the AND-OR tree, the leaves that are bounded by an AND relation
can be considered as a single node. In effect, using the combine primitive, that
group G can be considered as a single action with compound probability of success
PG and execution time TG.
The leaves that are bounded by an OR relation can also be (temporarily)
considered as a single node. In effect, in an optimal solution, the node that
minimizes the t/p coefficient will be executed first (using the choose primitive),
and be considered as the cost of the group in a single step plan.
By iteratively reducing groups of nodes, we build a single path of execution that
minimizes the expected cost. After executing a step of the plan, the costs may be
modified and the shape of the graph may vary. Since the planning algorithm is very
efficient, we can replan after each execution and build a new path of execution. We
are assured that before each execution, the proposed attack plan is optimal given
the current environment knowledge and within the horizon of a single next step.
It is still only an approximation to the global optimal plan, whose computation
requires a much powerful (and computationally expensive) framework such as the
POMDP framework of Chapter 8.
7.5.1 Constructing the Tree
We briefly describe how to construct a tree beginning with an agent asset (e.g.
the objective is to install an agent on a fixed machine). Taking this goal as root of
the tree, we recursively add the actions that can complete the assets that appear
in the tree, and we add the assets required by each action.
To ensure that the result is a tree and not a DAG, we make an additional
independence assumption: the assets required by each action are considered as
independent (i.e. if an asset is required by two different actions, it will appear
twice in the tree).
That way we obtain an AND-OR tree with alternating layers of asset nodes
and action nodes (as the one in Fig. 7.5). The only actions added are Exploits,
TCP/UDP Connectivity checks, and OS Detection modules. These actions don’t
have as requirements assets that have already appeared in the tree, in particular
the tree only has one agent asset (the root node of the tree). So, by construction,
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we are assured that no loops will appear, and that the depth of the tree is very
limited.
We construct the tree in this top-down fashion, and as we previously saw, we
can solve it bottom-up to obtain as output the compound probability of success
and the expected running time of obtaining the goal agent.
7.6 The Graph of Distinguished Assets
In this section we use the previous primitives to build an algorithm for attack
planning in arbitrary networks, by making an additional assumption of indepen-
dence between machines. First we distinguish a class of assets, namely the assets
related with agents. We refer to them as distinguished assets. At the PDDL level,
the predicates associated with the agents are considered as a separate class.
Planning is done in two different abstraction levels: in the first level, we
evaluate the cost of compromising one target distinguished asset from one fixed
source distinguished asset. More concretely, we compute the cost and probability
of obtaining a target agent given a source agent. At this level, the attack plan
must not involve a third agent. The algorithm at the first level is thus to construct
the attack tree and compute an attack plan as described in Section 7.5.
At the second level, we build a directed graph G = (V , E) where the nodes
are distinguished assets (in our scenario, the hosts in the target network where we
may install agents), and the edges are labeled with the compound probability and
expected time obtained at the first level. Given this graph, an initial asset s ∈ V
(the local agent of the attacker) and a final asset g ∈ V (the goal of the attack),
we now describe two algorithms to find a path that approximates the minimal
expected time of obtaining the goal g.
The first algorithm is a modification of Floyd-Warshall’s algorithm to find
shortest paths in a weighted graph. Let M = |V| be the number of machines in
the target network. By executing M2 times the first level procedure, we obtain
two functions: the first is Prob(i, j) which returns the compound probability of
obtaining node j from node i (without intermediary hops), or 0 if that is not
possible in the target network; the second is Time(i, j) which returns the expected
time of obtaining node j directly from node i, or +∞ if that is not possible. The
procedure is described in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 Modified Floyd-Warshall
P [i, j]← Prob(i, j) ∀ 1 ≤ i, j ≤M
T [i, j]← Time(i, j) ∀ 1 ≤ i, j ≤M
for k = 1 to M do
for i = 1 to M do
for j = 1 to M do
T ′ ← T [i, k] + P [i, k]× T [k, j]
P ′ ← P [i, k]× P [k, j]
if T ′/P ′ < T [i, j]/P [i, j] then
T [i, j]← T ′
P [i, j]← P ′
return 〈T, P 〉
When the execution of this algorithm finishes, for each i, j the matrices contain
the compound probability P [i, j] and the expected time T [i, j] of obtaining the
node j starting from the node i. This holds in particular when i = s (the source
of the attack) and j = g (the goal of the attack). The attack path is reconstructed
just as in the classical Floyd-Warshall algorithm.
In a similar fashion, Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm can be modified to use
the choose and combine primitives. See the description of Algorithm 2.
When execution finishes, the matrices contain the compound probability P [v]
and the expected time T [v] of obtaining the node v starting from the node s.
Using the modified Dijkstra’s algorithm has the advantage that its complexity is
O(M2) instead of O(M3) for Floyd-Warshall. Let n be the number of actions
that appear in the attach trees, this gives us that the complexity of the complete
planning solution is O(M2 · n log n+M2) = O(M2 · n log n).
7.7 Our implementation
We have developed a proof-of-concept implementation of these ideas in the Python
language. This planner takes as input a description of the scenario in the PPDDL
language, an extension of PDDL for expressing probabilistic effects [YL04].
Our main objective was to build a probabilistic planner able to solve scenar-
ios with 500 machines, which was the limit reached with classical (deterministic)
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Algorithm 2 Modified Dijkstra’s algorithm
T [s] = 0, P [s] = 1
T [v] = +∞, P [v] = 0 ∀v ∈ V , v 6= s
S ← ∅
Q← V (where Q is a priority queue)
while Q 6= ∅ do
u← arg minx∈Q T [x]/P [x]
Q← Q\{u}, S ← S ∪ {u}
for all v ∈ V\S adjacent to u do
T ′ = T [u] + P [u]× Time(u, v)
P ′ = P [u]× Prob(u, v)
if T ′/P ′ < T [v]/P [v] then
T [v]← T ′
P [v]← P ′
return 〈T, P 〉
planning solutions in [LSR10]. Additionally we wanted to tame memory complex-
ity, which was the limiting factor. The planner was integrated with the pentesting
framework Core Impact, using the procedures previously developed for the work
[LSR10]. The architecture of this solution is described in Fig. 7.6.
PlannerPlan
PDDL Description
Actions
Initial conditions
Pentesting Framework
Exploits & Attack Modules
Attack Workspace
transform
transform
execution
Figure 7.6: Architecture of our solution.
This planner solves the planning problem by breaking it into two levels as
described in Section 7.6. On the higher level, a graph representation of goal objects
is built. More concretely, there is a distinguished node for each host. The directed
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edges in this graph are obtained by carrying out the tree procedure described in
Section 7.5.1, obtaining a value for the probability and the cost of obtaining the
predicate represented by the target node, when the predicate represented by the
source node is true.
The final plan can then be determined by using the modified versions of Di-
jkstra and Floyd-Warshall algorithms. The figures that follow show the planner
running time using the modified Dijkstra’s algorithm.
7.7.1 Testing and Performance
The experiments were run on a machine with an Intel Core2 Duo CPU at 2.4
GHz and 8 GB of RAM. We focused our performance evaluation on the number
of machines M in the attacked network. We generated a network consisting of
five subnets with varying number of machines, all joined to one main network to
which the attacker initially has access.
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Figure 7.7: Memory consumption vs number of machines.
Fig. 7.7 shows the memory consumption of this planning solution, which clearly
grows linearly with M . Our current implementation manages to push the network
size limit up to 1000 machines, and brings memory consumption under control.5
5By contrast, in [LSR10] the hard limit was memory: in scenarios with 500 machines we ran
out of memory in a computer with 8 GB of RAM. The memory consumption growth was clearly
exponential, for instance 400 machines used 4 GB of RAM. This was difficult to scale up.
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Figure 7.8: Solver runtime vs number of machines.
For M = 1000, we are using less than 1 GB of RAM, with a planner completely
written in Python (not optimized in terms of memory consumption).
Fig. 7.8 shows the growth of solver running time, which seems clearly quadratic,
whereas in [LSR10] the growth was exponential. It should be noted however that,
comparing only up to 500 machines, running times are slightly worse than those
of the solution based on deterministic planners. This can be improved: since our
planner is written in Python, a reasonable implementation in C of the more CPU
intensive loops should allow us to lower significantly the running time.
And of course we added a notion of probability of success that wasn’t present
before. As a comparison, in another approach that accounts for the uncertainty
about the attacker’s actions [SBH11], the authors use off-the-shelf solvers, man-
aging to solve scenarios with up to 7 machines – and are thus still far from the
network sizes reached here.
Both curves are compared in Fig. 7.9 showing the quadratic growth of solver
runtime. In the testing scenarios, the nodes are fully connected, so we have to
solve a quadratic number of attack trees. This figure also confirms in practice the
computed complexity.
An interesting characteristic of the solution proposed is that it is inherently
parallelizable. The main workload are the M2 executions of the first level proce-
dure of Section 7.6. This could be easily distributed between CPUs or GPUs to
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Figure 7.9: Time and memory relatives to the 100 machines case.
obtain a faster planner. Another possible improvement is to run the planner “in
the cloud” with the possibility of adding processors on demand.
7.8 Related Work
Early work on attack graph solving relied on model checking techniques [JSW02,
SHJ+02], with their inherent scalability restrictions; or on monotonicity assump-
tions [AWK02, NEJ+09, NJ05] that are not able to express situations in which
compromised resources are lost due to crashes, detection or other unforeseen cir-
cumstances.
The first application of planning techniques and PDDL solving for the security
realm was [BGHH05], however this application was not focused on finding actual
attack paths or driving penetration testing tools. In [GG09] attack paths are
generated from PDDL description of networks, hosts and exploits, although the
scenarios studied do not cover realistic scales. Previous work by the authors
[LSR10] addresses this limitation by solving scenarios with up 500 machines, and
feeding the generated attack plans to guide a penetration testing tool. However,
this work does not include probabilistic considerations. Recent work [EKMM11]
also manages to provide attack paths to a penetration testing tool, in this case the
Metasploit Framework, but again does not include probabilistic considerations.
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Previous work by one of the authors [SBH11] takes into account the uncertainty
about the result of the attacker’s actions. This POMDP-based model also accounts
for the uncertainty about the target network, addressing information gathering as
an integral part of the attack, and providing a comprehensive notion of attack
planning under uncertainty. However, as previously stated, this solution does not
scale to medium or large real-life networks.
7.9 Summary and Future Work
We have shown in this chapter an extension of established attack graphs models,
that incorporates probabilistic effects, and numerical effects (e.g. the expected
running time of the actions). This model is more realistic than the deterministic
setting, but introduces additional difficulties to the planning problem. We have
demonstrated that under certain assumptions, an efficient algorithm exists that
provides optimal attack plans with computational complexity O(n log n), where
n is the number of actions and assets in the case of an attack tree (between two
fixed hosts), and O(M2 · n log n) where M is the number of machines in the case
of a network scenario.
Over the last years, the difficulties that arose in our research in attack planning
were related to the exponential nature of planning algorithms (especially in the
probabilistic setting), and our efforts were directed toward the aggregation of
nodes and simplification of the graphs, in order to tame the size and complexity
of the problem. Having a very efficient algorithm in our toolbox gives us a new
direction of research: to refine the model, and break down the actions in smaller
parts, without fear of producing an unsolvable problem.
A future step in this research is thus to analyze and divide the exploits into
basic components. This separation gives a better probability distribution of the
exploit execution. For example, the Debian OpenSSL Predictable Random Number
Generation Exploit – which exploits the vulnerability CVE-2008-0166 reported
by Luciano Bello – brute forces the 32,767 possible keys. Each brute forcing
iteration can be considered as a basic action, and be inserted independently in the
attack plan. Since the keys depend on the Process ID (PID), some keys are more
probable than others.6 So the planner can launch the Debian OpenSSL PRNG
6The OpenSSL keys generated in vulnerable Debians only depend on the PID. Since Secure
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exploit, execute brute forcing iterations for the more probable keys, switch to
others exploits and come to back to the Debian PRNG exploit if the others failed.
This finer level of control over the exploit execution should produce significant
gains in the total execution time of the attack.
Other research directions in which we are currently working are to consider
actions with multidimensional numeric effects (e.g. to minimize the expected
running time and generated network traffic simultaneously); and to extend the
algorithm to solve probabilistic attack planning in Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG)
instead of trees. In this setting, an asset may influence the execution of several
actions. This relaxes the independence assumption of Sections 7.4.2 and 7.5.
Although finding a general algorithm that scales to the network sizes that we
consider here seems a difficult task, we believe that efficient algorithms specifically
designed for network attacks scenarios can be found.
Shell usually generates the key in a new installation, PIDs between 2,000 and 5,000 are more
probable than the others.
Part III
The Search for a Better Model
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Chapter 8
The POMDP Model
In Chapter 5 we presented an approach to the attack planning problem that uses
classical planning and hence ignores all the incomplete knowledge that character-
izes hacking. The more recent approach of Chapter 7 makes strong independence
assumptions for the sake of scaling, and lacks a clear formal concept of what the
attack planning problem actually is. In this chapter, we model that problem in
terms of partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDP). This grounds
penetration testing in a well-researched formalism, highlighting important aspects
of this problem’s nature. POMDPs allow to model information gathering as an in-
tegral part of the problem, thus providing for the first time a means to intelligently
mix scanning actions with actual exploits.
8.1 Introduction
The problem of automatically generating attacks to assess network security is
known in the AI Planning community as the “Cyber Security” domain [BGHH05].
Independently (though considerably later), the approach was put forward also
by the pentesting industry [LSR10]. The two domains essentially differ only in
the industrial context addressed.1 Herein, we are concerned exclusively with the
specific context of regular automatic pentesting, as in Core Security’s “Core Insight
Enterprise” tool. We will use the term “attack planning” in that sense.
1Boddy et al. [BGHH05] provide a tool for system administrators to experiment with attacker
models including behavioral attributes, and model also actions in the physical world, i.e., office
environments.
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Lucangeli et al. [LSR10] encoded attack planning into PDDL, and used off-the-
shelf planners. This already is useful,2 however it is still quite limited. In partic-
ular, the planning is classical—complete initial states and deterministic actions—
and thus not able to handle the uncertainty involved in this form of attack plan-
ning. We herein contribute a planning model that does capture this uncertainty,
and allows to generate plans taking it into account. To understand the added
value of this technology, it is necessary to examine the relevant context in some
detail.
The pentesting tool has access to the details of the client network. So why
is there any uncertainty? The answer is simple: pentesting is not Orwell’s “Big
Brother”. Do your IT guys know everything that goes on inside your computer?
It is safe to assume that the pentesting tool will be kept up-to-date about the
structure of the network, i.e., the set of machines and their connections—these
changes are infrequent and can easily be registered. It is, however, impossible to
be up-to-date regarding all the details of the configuration of each machine, in the
typical setting where that configuration is ultimately in the hands of the individual
users. Thus, since the last series of attacks was scheduled, the configurations may
have changed, and the pentesting tool does not know how exactly. Its task is to
figure out whether any of the changes open new dangerous vulnerabilities.
One might argue that the pentesting tool should first determine what has
changed, via scanning methods, and then address what is now a classical planning
problem involving only exploits, i.e., hacking actions modifying the system state.
There are two flaws in this reasoning: (a) scanning doesn’t yield perfect knowledge
so a residual uncertainty remains; (b) scanning generates significant costs in terms
of running time and network traffic. So what we want is a technique that (like a
real hacker) can deal with uncertainty by intelligently inserting scanning actions
where they are useful for scheduling the best exploits. To our knowledge, ours is
the first work that indeed offers such a method.
There is hardly any related work tackling uncertainty measures (probabilities)
in network security. The few works that exist (e.g., [Bil03, DH03]) are concerned
with the defender’s viewpoint, and tackle a very different kind of uncertainty
attempting to model what an attacker would be likely to do. The above mentioned
2In fact, this technology is currently employed in Core Security’s commercial product, using
a variant of Metric-FF.
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work on classical planning is embedded into a pentesting tool running a large
set of scans as a pre-process, and afterwards ignoring the residual uncertainty.
This incurs both drawbacks (a) and (b) above. The single work addressing (a)
was performed in part by one of the authors [SRL11]. On the positive side, the
proposed attack planner demonstrates industrial-scale runtime performance, and
in fact its worst-case runtime is low-order polynomial. On the negative side, the
planner does not offer a solution to (b)—it still reasons only about exploits, not
scanning—and of course its efficiency is bought at the cost of strong simplifying
assumptions. Also, the work provides no clear notion of what attack planning
under uncertainty actually is.
Herein, we take the opposite extreme of the trade-off between accuracy and
performance. We tackle the problem in full, in particular addressing information
gathering as an integral part of the attack. We achieve this by modeling the
problem in terms of partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDP). As
a side effect, this modeling activity serves to clarify some important aspects of this
problem’s nature. A basic insight is that, whereas Sarraute et al. [SRL11] model
the uncertainty as non-deterministic actions—success probabilities of exploits—
this uncertainty is more naturally modeled as an uncertainty about states. The
exploits as such are deterministic in that their outcome is fully determined by the
system configuration.3 Once this basic modeling choice is made, all the rest falls
into place naturally.
Our experiments are based on a problem generator that is not industrial-scale
realistic, but that allows to create reasonable test instances by scaling the number
of machines, the number of possible exploits, and the time elapsed since the last
activity of the pentesting tool. Unsurprisingly, we find that POMDP solvers do
not scale to large networks. However, scaling is reasonable for individual pairs of
machines. As argued by Sarraute et al. [SRL11], such pairwise strategies can serve
as the basic building blocks in a framework decomposing the overall problem into
two abstraction levels.
We next provide some additional background on pentesting and POMDPs. We
then detail our POMDP model of attack planning, and our experimental findings.
We close the chapter with a brief discussion of future work.
3Sometimes, non-deterministic effects are an adequate abstraction of state uncertainty, as in
“crossing the street”. The situation in pentesting is different because repeated executions will
yield identical outcomes.
121
M2
M5
M3
M4
M1
M0
Figure 8.1: An example network made of two sub-networks (cliques): (M0,M1,M2)
(e.g., M0 an outside computer, M1 a web server and M2 a firewall), and
(M2,M3,M4,M5). 1 computer is under control (M0), 2 are reachable (M1 and
M2), and 3 are unreachable (M3, M4, M5).
8.2 Comment on Penetration Testing
The objective of a typical penetration testing task is to gain control over as many
computers in a network as possible, with a preference for some machines (e.g.,
because of their critical content). It starts with one controlled computer: either
outside the targeted network (so that its first targets are machines accessible from
the internet), or inside this network (e.g., using a Trojan horse). As illustrated
in Figure 8.1, at any point in time one can distinguish between 3 types of com-
puters: those under control (on which an agent has been installed, allowing to
perform actions); those which are reachable from a controlled computer because
they share a sub-network with one of them: and those which are unreachable from
any controlled computer.
Given currently controlled machines, one can perform two types of actions
targeting a reachable machine: tests—to identify its configuration (OS, running
applications, . . . )—, and exploits—to install an agent by exploiting a vulnerability.
A successful exploit turns a reachable computer into a controlled one, and all its
previously unreachable neighbors into reachable computers.
A “classic” pentest methodology consists of a series of fixed steps (refer also
to Section 2.3), for example:
• perform a network discovery (obtain a list of all the reachable machines),
• port scan all the reachable machines (given a fixed list of common ports,
probe if they are open/closed/filtered),
122
• given the previous information, perform OS detection module(s) on reach-
able machines (e.g., run nmap tests),
• once the information gathering phase is completed, the following phase is to
launch exploits against the (potentially vulnerable) machines.
This could be improved—a long-term objective of this work—as POMDP planning
allows for more efficiency by mixing actions from the different steps.
More details on pentesting will be given later when we describe how to model
it using the POMDP formalism.
8.3 Background on POMDPs
Before describing how penetration testing can be modeled in terms of POMDPs in
Section 8.4, we provide the necessary background and terminology. Planning based
on Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) is designed to deal with nondeterminism,
probabilities, partial observability, and extended goals. It is based on the following
conventions:
• A planning domain is modeled as a stochastic system, that is a nondetermin-
istic state-transition system that assigns probabilities to state transitions.
• Goals are represented by means of utility functions, numeric funtions that
give preferences to states to be traversed and/or actions to be performed.
Utility functions can express preferences on the entire execution path of a
plan, rather than just desired final states.
• Plans are represented as policies that specify the action to execute in each
belief state.
• The planning problem is seen as an optimization problem, in which planning
algorithms search for a plan that maximizes the utility function.
• Partial observability is modeled by observations that return a probability
distribution over the state space, called belief states.
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8.3.1 Basic Definitions of MDPs
Definition 8.1. A Markov Decision Process (MDP), also called stochastic system
[GNT04], is a nondeterministic state-transition system with a probability distri-
bution on each state transition. It is defined by a tuple Σ = 〈S,A, T 〉 where:
• The state space S is a finite set of states.
• The action space A is a finite set of actions.
• T : S × A → Π(S) is the state-transition function, giving for each world
state s and agent action a, a probability distribution over world states. We
write T (s, a, s′) for the probability of ending in state s′ given that the agent
starts in state s and executes action a.
• r : S×A → R is the reward function, giving the expected immediate reward
gained by the agent for taking action a in state s.
Definition 8.2. A plan specifies the actions that a controller should execute in a
given state, and can thus be represented as a policy pi, a function mapping states
into actions:
pi : S → A (8.1)
Definition 8.3. Policy executions correspond to infinite sequence of states, called
histories, which are Markov Chains. Given a policy, we can compute the prob-
ability of a history. Let pi be a policy and h = 〈s0, s1, s2, . . .〉 be a history. The
probability of h induced by pi is the product of all transition probabilities induced
by the policy:
Pr(h|pi) =
∏
i≥0
T (si, pi(si), si+1) (8.2)
Definition 8.4. A common way to ensure a bounded measure of utilities for
infinite histories is to introduce a discount factor γ, with 0 < γ < 1, that makes
rewards accumulated at later stages count less than those accumulated at early
stages.
Definition 8.5. Let h be a history 〈s0, s1, s2, . . .〉. We define the utility of h
induced by a policy pi as follows:
V (h|pi) =
∑
i≥0
γi r(si, pi(si)) (8.3)
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Definition 8.6. Let Σ be a stochastic system, H be the set of all the possible
histories of Σ, and pi be a policy for Σ. Then the expected utility of pi is
E(pi) =
∑
h∈H
Pr(h|pi)V (h|pi) (8.4)
Definition 8.7. A policy pi∗ is an optimal policy for a stochastic system Σ if
E(pi∗) ≥ E(pi), for any policy pi for Σ. We can now define a planning problem
as an optimization problem: given a stochastic system Σ and a utility function, a
solution to a planning problem is an optimal policy.
Definition 8.8. Given an optimal policy pi∗, E(pi∗) is called the optimal reward.
Definition 8.9. Let E(s) be the expected reward in a state s. We define Q(s, a),
the expected reward in a state s when we execute action a:
Q(s, a) = r(s, a) + γ
∑
s′∈S
T (s, a, s′)E(s′) (8.5)
It can be shown that the optimal reward E(pi∗) satisfies the fixed-point equation
E(s) = max
a∈A
Q(s, a) for all s ∈ S (8.6)
Formula (8.6) is called the Bellman Equation [Bel54]. We call Epi∗(s) the optimal
reward in state s. From the Bellman Equation we have that:
Epi∗(s) = max
a∈A
{
r(s, a) + γ
∑
s′∈S
T (s, a, s′)Epi∗(s′)
}
(8.7)
8.3.2 Basic Definitions of POMDPs
Definition 8.10. POMDPs are usually defined [Mon82, Cas98, GNT04] by a
tuple Σ = 〈S,A,O, T, O, r, b0〉 where:
• 〈S,A, T, r〉 is a Markov decision process.
• The observation space O is a finite set of observations.
• b0 is the initial probability distribution over states.
• At any time step, the system being in some state s ∈ S, the agent performs
an action a ∈ A that results in
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1. a transition to a state s′ according to the transition function:
T : S ×A× S → [0, 1]
T (s, a, s′) = Pr(s′|s, a)
2. an observation o ∈ O according to the observation function:
O : S ×A×O → [0, 1]
O(s′, a, o) = Pr(o|s′, a)
3. a scalar reward r(s, a) according to the reward function:
r : S ×A → R
Definition 8.11. In POMDPs, the controller can observe a probability distri-
bution over states of the system, rather than exactly the state of the system.
Probability distributions over S are called belief states. Let b be a belief state and
B = Π(S) the set of belief states. Let b(s) denote the probability assigned to state
s by the belief state b. Because b(s) is a probability, we require 0 ≤ b(s) ≤ 1 for
all s ∈ S and ∑s∈S b(s) = 1.
Definition 8.12. In POMDPs, a policy is a function that maps belief states into
actions. Let B ⊆ [0, 1]|S| be the set of belief states. A policy is a function
pi : B → A (8.8)
In this setting, the problem is for the agent to find a decision policy pi choosing,
at each time step, the best action based on its past observations and actions so as
to maximize its future gain (which can be measured for example through the total
accumulated reward). Compared to classical deterministic planning, the agent has
to face the difficulty in accounting for a system not only with uncertain dynamics
but also whose current state is imperfectly known.
Given a belief state b, the execution of an action a results in a temporary belief
state ba (before the observation is made). For each s
′′ ∈ S, the probability ba(s′′)
can be computed as:
ba(s
′′) = Pr(s′′|a, b) =
∑
s∈S
Pr(s′′|a, s) b(s)
=
∑
s∈S
T (s, a, s′′) b(s) (8.9)
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The probability of observing o ∈ O after executing action a ∈ A in belief state b
is:
Pr(o|a, b) =
∑
s′′∈S
O(s′′, a, o) ba(s′′) (8.10)
The agent typically reasons about the hidden state of the system using the fol-
lowing Bayesian update formula, which gives the probability boa(s
′) that the state
is s′ after performing action a in belief state b and observing o:
boa(s
′) = Pr(s′|o, a, b) = Pr(o|s
′, a, b)
Pr(o|a, b) Pr(s
′|a, b)
=
O(s′, a, o)
Pr(o|a, b)
∑
s∈S
T (s, a, s′)b(s). (8.11)
8.3.3 Reformulation as an MDP over B
Using belief states, a POMDP can be rewritten as an MDP over the belief space, or
belief MDP, Σ′ = 〈B,A, T , ρ〉, where the new transition and reward functions are
both defined over B×A×B. With this reformulation, a number of theoretical re-
sults about MDPs can be extended, such as the existence of a deterministic policy
that is optimal. An issue is that this belief MDP is defined over a continuous—and
thus infinite—belief space.
Let us first compute the transition probabilities for belief states. Given a belief
state b ∈ B and an action a ∈ A, each observation can yield a different succeeding
belief state. The belief state transition τ can be written as:
τ(b, a, b′) = Pr(b′|a, b) =
∑
o∈O
Pr(o|a, b) δ(boa, b′) (8.12)
where
δ(x, y) =
1 if x = y0 if x 6= y. (8.13)
In other words, the probability of a belief state is the sum of the probabilities of
all the observation that would lead to that belief state.
Since A and O are finite, there are only a finite number of possible successor
belief states. We define the set of possible successor states as:
B′(b, a) = {boa | o ∈ O} (8.14)
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The reward ρ for the belief MDP has to be defined for each belief state-action
pair. For the belief state b, it’s simply the expectation over all states:
ρ(b, a) =
∑
s∈S
r(s, a) b(s) (8.15)
As in Definition 8.9, we define Q(b, a), the expected reward in a state b when
we execute action a:
Q(b, a) = ρ(b, a) + γ
∑
b′∈B
τ(b, a, b′)E(b′) (8.16)
The Bellman Equation (8.6) is now written as:
Epi∗(b) = max
a∈A
{
ρ(b, a) + γ
∑
b′∈B
τ(b, a, b′)Epi∗(b′)
}
(8.17)
For a finite horizon4 T > 0 the objective is to find a policy verifying pi∗ =
arg maxpi∈AB Jpi(b0) with
Jpi(b0) = E
[
T−1∑
t=0
γtrt
∣∣∣∣∣b0, pi
]
,
where b0 is the initial belief state, rt the reward obtained at time step t, and
γ ∈ (0, 1) a discount factor.
Bellman’s principle of optimality [Bel54] lets us compute this function recur-
sively through the value function
Vn(b) = max
a∈A
[
ρ(b, a) + β
∑
b′∈B
ϕ(b, a, b′)Vn−1(b′)
]
,
where, for all b ∈ B, V0(b) = 0, and Jpi(b) = Vn=T (b).
8.3.4 POMDP Solving Algorithms
A number of algorithms exploit the fact that Vn(b) is a piecewise linear and convex
function (PWLC). This allows for direct computations or approximations where
the target function is the upper envelope of a set of hyperplanes. This led to
algorithms performing exact updates like Batch Enumeration [Mon82], Witness
or Incremental Pruning [Cas98], but also approximate ones as in Point-Based
4In practice we consider an infinite horizon.
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Value Iteration (PBVI) [PGT06], Heuristic Search Value Iteration (HSVI) [SS04],
PERSEUS [SV05] or SARSOP [KHL08].
If not relying on PWLC functions, one can also solve a POMDP as an MDP on
a continuous state space, for example with tree search algorithms—which allow for
online planning [RPPCd08]—or with RTDP-bel, a variant of dynamic program-
ming that continuously focuses on relevant parts of the state space [BG09].
Let us also mention that some algorithms—such as Symbolic HSVI [SKK+08]—
can exploit the structure of a factored POMDP, i.e., a POMDP in which the state
and/or the observation is described through multiple variables.
SARSOP Solver
For our experiments we use SARSOP [KHL08], a state of the art point-based
algorithm, i.e., an algorithm approximating the value function as the upper en-
velope of a set of hyperplanes, these hyperplanes corresponding to a selection of
particular belief points.
SARSOP is being developed at the National University of Singapore, with the
goal of creating practical POMDP algorithms and software for common robotic
tasks – such as coastal navigation, grasping, mobile robot exploration and target
tracking, all modeled as POMDPs with a large number of states.
The key idea of point-based POMDP algorithms is to sample a set of points
from B and use it as an approximate representation of B, instead of representing
B exactly.
Definition 8.13. The reachable spaceR(b0) is the subset of belief points reachable
from a given initial point b0 ∈ B under arbitrary sequences of actions.
Definition 8.14. The optimally reachable space R∗(b0) is the subset of belief
points reachable from a given initial point b0 ∈ B under optimal sequences of
actions.
Note that R∗(b0) is usually much smaller than R(b0), which is in turn usually
much smaller than B. In particular:
R∗(b0) ⊆ R(b0) ⊆ B
Of course, R∗(b0) is not known in advance, since it requires to know which
are the optimal sequences of actions. SARSOP proceeds by computing successive
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approximations of R∗(b0), hence the acronym (Successive Approximations of the
Reachable Space under Optimal Policies).
8.4 Modeling Penetration Testing with POMDPs
As penetration testing is about acting under partial observability, POMDPs are
a natural candidate to model this particular problem. They allow to model the
problem of knowledge acquisition and to account for probabilistic information,
e.g., the fact that certain configurations or vulnerabilities are more frequent than
others. In comparison, classical planning approaches [LSR10] assume that the
whole network configuration is known, so that no exploration is required. The
present section discusses how to formalize penetration testing using POMDPs.
As we shall see, the uncertainty is located essentially in the initial belief state.
This is different from modeling the uncertainty in pentesting using probabilistic
action outcomes as in [SRL11], which does not account for the real dynamics of
the system. Also, as indicated previously, unlike our POMDPs, the approach of
Sarraute et al. [SRL11] only chooses exploits, assuming a naive a priori knowledge
acquisition and thus ignoring the interaction between these two.
8.4.1 States
First, any sensible penetration test will have a finite execution. There is nothing to
be gained here by infinitely executing a looping behavior. Every pentest terminates
either when some event (e.g., an attack detection) stops it, or when the additional
access rights that could yet be gained (from the finite number of access rights)
do not outweigh the associated costs. This implies that there exists an absorbing
terminal state and that we are solving a Stochastic Shortest Path problem (SSP).
Then, in the context of pentesting, we do not need the full state of the system
to describe the current situation. We will thus focus on aspects that are relevant
for the task at hand. This state for example does not need to comprise the network
topology as it is assumed here to be static and known. But it will have to account
for the configuration and status of each computer on the network.
A computer’s configuration needs to describe the applications present on the
computer and that may (i) be vulnerable or (ii) reveal information about poten-
tially vulnerable applications. This comprises its operating system (OS) as well as
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states :
terminal
M0-win2000
M0-win2000-p445
M0-win2000-p445-SMB
M0-win2000-p445-SMB-vuln
M0-win2000-p445-SMB-agent
M0-win2003
M0-win2003-p445
M0-win2003-p445-SMB
M0-win2003-p445-SMB-vuln
M0-win2003-p445-SMB-agent
M0-winXPsp2
M0-winXPsp2-p445
M0-winXPsp2-p445-SMB
M0-winXPsp2-p445-SMB-vuln
M0-winXPsp2-p445-SMB-agent
M0-winXPsp3
M0-winXPsp3-p445
M0-winXPsp3-p445-SMB
Table 8.1: A list of states in a setting with a single computer (M0) which can be a
Windows 2000, 2003, XPsp2 or XPsp3, may have port 445 open and, if so, may be
running a SAMBA server which may be vulnerable (except for XPsp3) and whose
vulnerability may have been exploited.
server applications for the web, databases, email, ... The description of an applica-
tion does not need to give precise version numbers, but should give enough details
to know which (known) vulnerabilities are present, or what information can be
obtained about the system. For example, the open ports on a given computer are
aspects of the OS that may reveal not only the OS but also which applications it
is running.
The computers’ configurations (and the network topology) give a static picture
of the system independently of the progress of the pentest. To account for the
current situation one needs to specify, for each computer, whether a given agent
has been installed on it, whether some applications have crashed (e.g., due to the
failure of an exploit), and which computers are accessible. Which computers are
accessible depends only on the network topology and on where agents have been
installed, so that there is no need to explicitly add this information in the state.
Table 8.1 gives a states section from an actual POMDP file (using the file format
of Cassandra’s toolbox) in a setting with a single machine M0, which is always
accessible (not mentioning the computer from which the pentest is started).
Note that a computer’s configuration should also provide information on whether
having access to it is valuable in itself, e.g., if there is valuable data on its hard
drive. This will be used when defining the reward function.
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actions :
Terminate
Probe-M0-p445
OSDetect-M0
Exploit-M0-win2000-SMB
Exploit-M0-win2003-SMB
Exploit-M0-winXPsp2-SMB
Table 8.2: A list of actions in the same setting as Table 8.1, with 1 Terminate
action, 2 tests, and 3 possible exploits.
8.4.2 Actions & Observations
First, we need a Terminate action that can be used to reach the terminal state
voluntarily. Note that specific outcomes of certain actions could also lead to that
state.
Because we assume that the network topology is known a priori, there is no
need for actions to discover reachable machines. We are thus left with two types of
actions: tests, which allow to acquire information about a computer’s configura-
tion, and exploits, which attempt to install an agent on a computer by exploiting a
vulnerability. Table 8.2 lists actions in our running example started in Table 8.1.
Tests
Tests are typically performed using programs such as nmap [Lyo98], which scans
a specific computer for open ports and, by analyzing the response behavior of
ports, allows to make guesses about which OS and services are running. Note
that such observation actions have a cost either in terms of time spent performing
analyses, or because of the probability of being detected due to the generated
network activity. This is the reason why one has to decide which tests to perform
rather than perform them all.
In our setting, we only consider two types of tests:
OS detection: A typical OS detection will return a list of possible OSes, the
ones likely to explain the observations of the analysis tool. As a result,
one can prune from the belief state (=set to zero probability) all the states
corresponding with non-matching OSes, and then re-normalize the remaining
non-zero probabilities.
Keeping with the same running example, Table 8.3 presents the transition
and observation models associated with action OSDetect-M0, which can dis-
tinguish winXP configurations from win2000/2003; and following is an ex-
ample of the evolution of the belief state:
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T: OSDetect-M0 identity
O: OSDetect-M0: * : * 0
O: OSDetect-M0: * : undetected 1
O: OSDetect-M0: M0-win2000 : win 1
O: OSDetect-M0: M0-win2000-p445 : win 1
O: OSDetect-M0: M0-win2000-p445-SMB : win 1
O: OSDetect-M0: M0-win2000-p445-SMB-vuln : win 1
O: OSDetect-M0: M0-win2000-p445-SMB-agent: win 1
O: OSDetect-M0: M0-win2003 : win 1
O: OSDetect-M0: M0-win2003-p445 : win 1
O: OSDetect-M0: M0-win2003-p445-SMB : win 1
O: OSDetect-M0: M0-win2003-p445-SMB-vuln : win 1
O: OSDetect-M0: M0-win2003-p445-SMB-agent: win 1
O: OSDetect-M0: M0-winXPsp2 : winxp 1
O: OSDetect-M0: M0-winXPsp2-p445 : winxp 1
O: OSDetect-M0: M0-winXPsp2-p445-SMB : winxp 1
O: OSDetect-M0: M0-winXPsp2-p445-SMB-vuln : winxp 1
O: OSDetect-M0: M0-winXPsp2-p445-SMB-agent: winxp 1
O: OSDetect-M0: M0-winXPsp3 : winxp 1
O: OSDetect-M0: M0-winXPsp3-p445 : winxp 1
O: OSDetect-M0: M0-winXPsp3-p445-SMB : winxp 1
Table 8.3: Transition and observation models for action OSDetect-M0. The first
line specifies that this action’s transition matrix is the identity matrix. The re-
maining lines describe this action’s observation function by giving the probability
(here 0 or 1) of each possible state-observation pair, defaulting to the undetected
observation for all states.
initial (0,0,0,0,0,0,1
8
,1
8
,1
8
,1
8
,0,1
8
,1
8
,1
8
,1
8
,0,0,0,0)
winXP (0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1
4
,1
4
,1
4
,1
4
,0,0,0,0)
win2000/2003 (0,0,0,0,0,0,1
4
,1
4
,1
4
,1
4
,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0)
Port scan: Scanning port X simply tells if it is open or closed; by pruning from
the belief state the states that match the open/closed state of port X, one
implicitely refines which OS and applications may be running.
Action Probe-M0-p445, for example, is modeled as depicted on Table 8.4
and could give the following evolution:
initial (0,0,0,0,0,0,1
8
,1
8
,1
8
,1
8
,0,1
8
,1
8
,1
8
,1
8
,0,0,0,0)
open-port (0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1
6
,1
6
,1
6
,0,0,1
6
,1
6
,1
6
,0,0,0,0)
closed-port (0,0,0,0,0,0,1
2
,0,0,0,0,1
2
,0,0,0,0,0,0,0)
Note that a test has no state outcome (the state remains the same), and that its
observation outcome is considered as deterministic: given the—real, but hidden—
configuration of a computer, a given test always returns the same observation.
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T: Probe-M0-p445 identity
O: Probe-M0-p445: * : * 0
O: Probe-M0-p445: * : closed-port 1
O: Probe-M0-p445: M0-win2000-p445 : open-port 1
O: Probe-M0-p445: M0-win2000-p445-SMB : open-port 1
O: Probe-M0-p445: M0-win2000-p445-SMB-vuln : open-port 1
O: Probe-M0-p445: M0-win2000-p445-SMB-agent : open-port 1
O: Probe-M0-p445: M0-win2003-p445 : open-port 1
O: Probe-M0-p445: M0-win2003-p445-SMB : open-port 1
O: Probe-M0-p445: M0-win2003-p445-SMB-vuln : open-port 1
O: Probe-M0-p445: M0-win2003-p445-SMB-agent : open-port 1
O: Probe-M0-p445: M0-winXPsp2-p445 : open-port 1
O: Probe-M0-p445: M0-winXPsp2-p445-SMB : open-port 1
O: Probe-M0-p445: M0-winXPsp2-p445-SMB-vuln : open-port 1
O: Probe-M0-p445: M0-winXPsp2-p445-SMB-agent: open-port 1
O: Probe-M0-p445: M0-winXPsp3-p445 : open-port 1
O: Probe-M0-p445: M0-winXPsp3-p445-SMB : open-port 1
Table 8.4: Transition and observation models for action Probe-M0-p445. The
transition is again the identity, and the observation is closed-port by default,
and open-port for all states in which port 445 is open.
Another interesting point is that (i) tests provide information about computer
configurations and (ii) computer configurations are static, so that there is no use
repeating a test as it cannot provide or update any information.
Exploits
Exploits make use of an application’s vulnerability to gain (i) some control over
a computer from another computer (remote exploit), or (ii) more control over
a computer (local exploit / privilege escalation). Local exploits do not differ
significantly from remote exploits since it amounts to considering each privilege
level as a different (virtual) computer in a sub-network. As a consequence, for the
sake of clarity, we only consider one privilege level per computer.
More precisely, we consider that any successful exploit will provide the same
control over the target computer, whatever the exploit and whatever its configu-
ration. This allows (i) to assume that the same set of actions is available on any
controlled computer, and (ii) to avoid giving details about which type of agent is
installed on a computer.
The success of a given exploit action E depends deterministically on the con-
figuration of the target computer, so that: (i) there is no use in attempting an
exploit E if none of the probable configurations is compatible with this exploit,
and (ii) the outcome of E—either success or failure—provides information about
134
T: Exploit-M0-win2003-SMB identity
T: Exploit-M0-win2003-SMB: M0-win2003-p445-SMB-vuln
: * 0
T: Exploit-M0-win2003-SMB: M0-win2003-p445-SMB-vuln
: M0-win2003-p445-SMB-agent 1
O: Exploit-M0-win2003-SMB: * : * 0
O: Exploit-M0-win2003-SMB: * : no-agent 1
O: Exploit-M0-win2003-SMB: M0-win2003-p445-SMB-agent
: agent-installed 1
Table 8.5: Transition and observation models for action
Exploit-M0-win2003-SMB. The transition is the identity except if M0 is
vulnerable, where an agent gets installed. The observation is no-agent by default
and agent-installed if the exploit is successful.
the configuration of the target. In the present chapter, we even assume that a
computer’s configuration is completely observed once it is under control.
Exploit-M0-win2003-SMB is modeled in Table 8.5, and an example evolution
of the belief under this action is:
initial (0,0,0,0,0,0,18 ,
1
8 ,
1
8 ,
1
8 ,0,
1
8 ,
1
8 ,
1
8 ,
1
8 ,0,0,0,0)
success (0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0)
failure (0,0,0,0,0,0,17 ,
1
7 ,
1
7 ,
1
7 ,0,
1
7 ,
1
7 ,
1
7 ,0,0,0,0,0)
8.4.3 Rewards
First, no reward is received when the Terminate action is used, or once the ter-
minal state is reached. Otherwise, the reward function has to account for various
things:
Value of a computer (rc): The objective of a pentest is to gain access to a
number of computers. Here we thus propose to assign a fixed reward for
each successful exploit (on a previously uncontrolled machine). In a more
realistic setting, one could reward accessing for the first time a given valuable
data, whatever computer hosts these data.
Time is money (rt): Each action—may it be a test or an exploit—has a du-
ration, so that the expected duration of the pentest may be minimized by
assigning each transition a cost (negative reward) proportional to its dura-
tion. One could also consider a maximum time for the pentest rather than
minimizing it.
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Risk of detection (rd): We do not explicitely model the event of being detected
(that would lead to the terminal state with an important cost), but simply
consider transition costs that depend on the probability of being detected.
As a result, a transition s, a, s′ comes with a reward that is the sum of these three
components: r = rc + rt + rd. Although some rewards are positive, we are still
solving an SSP since such positive rewards cannot be received multiple times and
thus cyclic behavior is not sensible.
8.4.4 POMDP Model Generation
Generating a POMDP model for pentesting requires knowledge about possible
states, actions, and observations, plus the reward function and the initial belief
state. Note first that the POMDP model may evolve from one pentest to the next
due to new applications, exploits or tests.
Action and observation models for the various possible tests and exploits can
be derived from the documentation of testing tools (see, e.g., nmap’s manpage)
and databases such as CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures)5. Informa-
tion could presumably be automatically extracted from such databases, which are
already very structured. In our experiments, we start from a proprietary database
of Core Security Technologies. The two remaining components of the model—
the reward function and the initial belief state—involve quantitative information
which is more difficult to acquire. In our experiments, this information is estimated
based on expert knowledge.
Regarding rewards, statistical models can be used to estimate, for any par-
ticular action, the probability of being detected, and the probabilistic model of
its duration. But a human decision is required to assign a value for the cost of
a detection, for gaining control over one target computer or the other, and for
spending a certain amount of time.
The definition of the initial belief state is linked to the fact that penetration
testing is a task repeated regularly, and has access to previous pentesting reports
on the same network. The pentester thus has knowledge about the previous con-
figuration of the network (topology and machines), and which weaknesses have
5http://cve.mitre.org/
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v1 v2 v3 v4 v5
p1,2 p2,3 p3,4 p4,5
p3,5p2,5
p1,5
p2,2p1,1 p3,3 p4,4 p5,5
Figure 8.2: Markov Chain modeling an application’s updating process. Vertices
are marked with version numbers, and edges with transition probabilities per time
step.
been reported. This information, plus knowledge of typical update behaviors (ap-
plying patches or not, downloading service packs...), allows an informed guess on
the current configuration of the network.
We propose to mimick this reasoning to compute the initial belief state. To
keep things simple, we only consider a basic software update behavior (assuming
that softwares are independent from each other): each day, an application may
probabilistically stay unchanged, or be upgraded to the next version or to the
latest version. The updating process of a given application can then be viewed
as a Markov chain as illustrated in Fig. 8.2. Assuming that (i) the belief about a
given application version was, at the end of the last pentest, some vector v0, and
(ii) T days (the time unit in the Markov chain) have passed, then this belief will
have to be updated as vT = U
Tv0, where U is the matrix representation of the
chain. For Fig. 8.2, this matrix reads:
U =

p1,1 0 0 0 0
p1,2 p2,2 0 0 0
0 p2,3 p3,3 0 0
0 0 p3,4 p4,4 0
p1,5 p2,5 p3,5 p4,5 p5,5

.
This provides a factored approach to compute initial belief states. Of course,
in this form the approach is very simplistic. A realistic method would involve
elaborating a realistic model of system development. This is a research direction
in its own right. We come back to this at the end of the chapter.
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8.5 Solving Penetration Testing with POMDPs
We now describe our experiments. We first fill in some details on the setup, then
discuss different scaling scenarios, before having a closer look at some example
policies generated by the POMDP solver.
8.5.1 Setup of Experiments
The experiments are run on a machine with an Intel Core2 Duo CPU at 2.2 GHz
and 3 GB of RAM. We use the APPL (Approximate POMDP Planning) toolkit6.
This C++ implementation of the SARSOP algorithm is easy to compile and use,
and has reasonable performance. The solver is run without time horizon limit,
until a target precision  = 0.001 is reached. Since we are solving a stochastic
shortest path problem, a discount factor is not required, however we use γ = 0.95
to improve performance. We will briefly discuss below the effect of changing  and
γ.
Our problem generator is implemented in Python. It has 3 parameters:
• number of machines M in the target network,
• number of exploits E in the pentesting tool, that are applicable in the target
network,
• time delay T since the last pentest, measured in days.
For simplicity we assume that, at time T = 0, the information about the network is
perfect, i.e., there is no uncertainty. As T grows, uncertainty increases as described
in the previous section, where the parameters of the underlying model, cf. Fig. 8.2,
are estimated by hand. The network topology consists of 1 outside machine and
M − 1 other machines in a fully connected network. The configuration details are
scaled along with E, i.e., details are added as relevant for the exploits (note that
irrelevant configuration details would not serve any purpose in this application).
As indicated, the exploits are taken from a Core Security database which contains
the supported systems for each exploit (specific OS and application versions that
are vulnerable). The E exploits are distributed evenly over the M machines. We
require that E ≥M so that each machine gets at least one exploit (otherwise the
machine could be removed from the encoding).
6APPL 0.93 at http://bigbird.comp.nus.edu.sg/pmwiki/farm/appl/
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8.5.2 Combined Scaling
Figure 8.3: POMDP solver runtime (z axis) when scaling time delay vs. the
number of machines
Figure 8.4: POMDP solver runtime (z axis) when scaling time delay vs. the
number of exploits
We discuss performance—solver runtime—as a function of M , E, and T . To
make data presentation feasible, at any one time we scale only 2 of the parameters.
Consider first Figure 8.3, which scales M and T . E is fixed to the minimum
value, i.e., each machine has a fixed OS version and one target application. In
this setting, there are 3M states. For M = 8, the generated POMDP file has 6562
states and occupies 71 MB on disk; the APPL solver runs out of memory when
attempting to parse it. Thus, in this and all experiments to follow, M ≤ 7.
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Figure 8.5: POMDP solver runtime (z axis) when scaling machines vs. exploits
with time delay 10
Figure 8.6: POMDP solver runtime (z axis) when scaling machines vs. exploits
with time delay 80
Naturally, runtime grows exponentially with M—after all, even the solver in-
put does. As for T , interestingly this exhibits a very pronounced easy-hard-easy
pattern. Investigating the reasons for this, we found that it is due to a low-high-
low pattern of the “amount of uncertainty” as a function of T . Intuitively, as
T increases, the probability distribution in the initial belief state first becomes
“broader” because more application updates are possible. Then, after a certain
point, the probability mass accumulates more and more “at the end”, i.e., at the
latest application versions, and the uncertainty decreases again. Formally, this can
be captured in terms of the entropy of b0, which exhibits a low-high-low pattern
reflecting that of Figure 8.3.
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In Figure 8.4, scaling the number E of exploits as well as T , the number of
machines is fixed to 2 (the localhost of the pentester, and one target machine).
We observe the same easy-hard-easy pattern over T . As with M , runtime grows
exponentially with E (and must do so since the solver input does). However, with
small or large T , the exponential behavior does not kick in until the maximum
number of exploits, 10, that we consider here. This is important for practice since
small values of T (up to T = 50) are rather realistic in regular pentesting. In the
next sub-section, we will examine this in more detail to see how far we can scale
E, in the 2-machines case, with small T .
Figures 8.5 and 8.6 show the combined scaling over machines and exploits, for
a favorable value of T (T = 10, Fig. 8.5) and an unfavorable one (T = 80, Fig. 8.6).
Here the behavior is rather regular. By all appearances, it grows exponentially in
both parameters. An interesting observation is that, in Fig. 8.5, the growth in M
kicks in earlier, and rather more steeply, for M . This is not as much the case for
the larger T value in Fig. 8.6. Note though that, there, the curve over E flattens
around T = 10. It is not clear to us what is causing this behavior; cf. the next
sub-section.
To give an impression on the effect of the discount factor on solver performance,
with M = 2, E = 11, T = 40, solver runtime goes from 17.77 s (with γ = 0.95) to
279.65 s (with γ = 0.99). APPL explicitly checks that γ < 1, so γ = 1 could not
be tried. With our choice γ = 0.95 we still get good policies (cf. further below).
8.5.3 The 2-Machines Case
As hinted, the 2-machines case is relevant because it may serve as the “atomic
building block” in an industrial-scale solution, cf. also the discussion in the outlook
below. The question then is whether or not we can scale the number of exploits
into a realistic region. We have seen above already that this is not possible for
unfavorable values of T . However, are these values to be expected in practice? As
far as Core Security’s “Core Insight Enterprise” tool goes, the answer is “no”. In
security aware environments, pentesting should be performed at regular intervals
of at most 1 month. Consequently, Figure 8.7 shows data for T ≤ 50.
For the larger values of T , the data shows a very steep incline between E = 5
and E = 10, followed by what appears to be linear growth. This behavior is caused
141
Figure 8.7: POMDP solver runtime when scaling the number of exploits, for
different realistically small settings of the time delay, in the 2-machines case.
by an unwanted bias in our current generator.7 Ignoring this phenomenon, what
matters to us here is that, for the most realistic values of T (T = 10, 20), scaling
is very good indeed, showing no sign of hitting a barrier even at E = 50. Of
course, this result must be qualified against the realism of the current generator.
It remains an open question whether similar scaling will be achieved for more
realistic simulations of network development.
8.5.4 POMDPs make Better Hackers
As an illustration of the policies found by the POMDP solver, consider a simple
example wherein the pentester has 4 exploits: an SSH exploit (on OpenBSD, port
22), a wu-ftpd exploit (on Linux, port 21), an IIS exploit (on Windows, port 80),
and an Apache exploit (on Linux, port 80). The probability of the target machine
being Windows is higher than the probability of the other OSes.
Previous automated pentesting methods, e.g. Lucangeli et al. [LSR10], proceed
by first performing a port scan on common ports, then executing OS detection
module(s), and finally launching exploits for potentially vulnerable services.
7The exploits to be added are ordered in a way so that their likelihood of succeeding decreases
monotonically with |E|. After a certain point, they are too unlikely to affect the policy quality
by more than the target precision . The POMDP solver appears to determine this effectively.
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With our POMDP model, the policy obtained is to first test whether port 80
is open, because the expected reward is greater for the two exploits which target
port 80, than for each of the exploits for port 21 or 22. If port 80 is open, the
next action is to launch the IIS exploit for port 80, skipping the OS detection
because Windows is more probable than Linux, and the additional information
that OS Detect can provide doesn’t justify its cost (additional running time). If
the exploit is successful, terminate. Otherwise, continue with the Apache exploit
(not probing port 80 since that was already done), and if that fails then probe
port 21, etc.
In summary, the policy orders exploits by promise, and executes port probe
and OS detection actions on demand where they are cost-effective. This improves
on Sarraute et al. [SRL11], whose technique is capable only of ordering exploits by
promise. What’s more, practical cases typically involve exploits whose outcome
delivers information about the success probability of other exploits, due to common
reasons for failure—exploitation prevention techniques. Then the best ordering of
exploits depends on previous exploits’ outcome. POMDP policies handle this
naturally, however it is well beyond the capabilities of Sarraute et al.’s approach.
We omit the details for space reasons.
8.6 Discussion
POMDPs can model pentesting more naturally and accurately than previously
proposed planning-based models [LSR10, SRL11]. While, in general, scaling is
limited, we have seen that it appears reasonable in the 2-machines case where
we are considering only how to get from one machine to another. An idea to
use POMDP reasoning in practice is thus to perform it for all connected pairs of
machines in the network, and thereafter use these solutions as the input for a high-
level planning procedure. That procedure would consider the pairwise solutions
to be atomic, i.e., no backtracking over these decisions would be made. Indeed,
this is one of the abstractions made—successfully, as far as runtime performance
is concerned—by Sarraute et al. [SRL11]. Our immediate future work will be
to explore whether a POMDP-based solution of this type is useful, the question
being how large the overhead for planning all pairs is, and how much of the solution
quality gets retained at the global level.
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A line of basic research highlighted by our work is the exploitation of special
structures in POMDPs. First, in our model, all actions are deterministic. Second,
some of the uncertain parts of the state (e.g. the operating systems) are static, for
the purpose of pentesting, in the sense that none of the actions affect them. Third,
unless one models possible detrimental side-effects of exploits (cf. directly below),
pentesting is “monotonic”: accessibility, and thus the set of actions applicable,
can only grow. Fourth, any optimal policy will apply each action at most once.
Finally, some aspects of the state—in particular, which computers are controlled
and reachable—are directly visible and could be separately modeled as being such.
To our knowledge, this last property alone has been exploited in POMDP solvers
(e.g., [ALTBC10]), and the only other property mentioned in the literature appears
to be the first one (e.g., [Bon09]).
While accurate, our current model is of course not “the final word” on modeling
pentesting with POMDPs. As already mentioned, we currently do not explicitly
model the detrimental side-effects exploits may have, i.e., the cases where they
are detected (spawning a reaction of the network defense) or where they crash
a machine/application. Another important aspect that could be modeled in the
POMDP framework is that machines are not independent. Knowing the configu-
ration of some computers in the network provides information about the configu-
ration of other computers in the same network. This can be modeled in terms of
the probability distribution given in the initial belief. An interesting question for
future research then is how to generate these dependencies—and thus the initial
belief—in a realistic way. Answering this question could go hand in hand with
more realistically simulating the effect of the “time delay” in pentesting. Both
could potentially be adressed by learning appropriate graphical models [KF09],
based on up-to-date real-world statistics.
To close the chapter, it must be admitted that, in general, “pentesting 6=
POMDP solving”. Computer security is always evolving, so that the probability
of meeting certain computer configurations changes with time. An ideal attacker
should continuously learn the probability distributions describing the network and
computer configurations it can encounter. This kind of learning can be done
outside the POMDP model, but there may be better solutions doing it more
natively. Furthermore, if the administrator of a target network reacts to an attack,
running specific counter-attacks, then the problem turns into an adversarial game.
Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future Work
Part I
In this first part, we presented the basic model and a complete implementation that
integrates a planner system with a penetration testing framework. We described
an algorithm for transforming the information present in the pentesting tool to
the planning domain, and we showed how the scalability issues of attack graphs
can be solved using current planners.
The planner retained in our implementation is Metric-FF, developed by Jo¨rg
Hoffmann [Hof02]. Our research prototype continued its way outside the research
lab: it was adopted by the engineering team in charge of developing the product
Core Insight Enterprise, integrated into the product and shipped to customers. To
meet the engineering requirements, further work was performed on the prototype.
In particular, the testing team of Core Insight Enterprise developed a suite of
testing scenarios, more realistic and closer to the customer’s networks than the
ones used during our research. Having access to those testing scenarios was a
valuable resource in subsequent steps of the research, in particular the testing and
evaluation of the prototypes of Parts II and III.
Part II
In the second part, we introduced a custom probabilistic planner, specifically
designed for this problem. We contributed a planning model that captures the
uncertainty about the results of the actions, which is modeled as a probability
of success of each action; and we presented efficient planning algorithms, that
achieve industrial-scale runtime performance. The computational complexity of
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this planning solution is O(M2 · n log n) where n is the total number of actions,
and M is the number of machines in the target network.
After this work was published in [Sar09a, Sar09b, SRL11], the following step
was to further evaluate this research prototype as a potential engineering solution
(i.e. to perform attack planning for the company’s product). As part of this eval-
uation, we tested the probabilistic planner prototype with the scenarios developed
by the testing team. This allowed us to improve both the planner prototype and
the testing scenarios. In particular, by making clever use of the results of inter-
mediate computations, we were able to bring down the complexity of the solution
to O(M · n log n), and obtain remarkable improvements in planner runtime. A
natural next step for this prototype is thus to graduate from the research lab, and
enter the engineering circuit.
Part III
The work described in the third part is the result of a collaboration with Jo¨rg
Hoffman (Saarland University) and Olivier Buffet (INRIA, Nancy). In this col-
laboration we took a different direction: instead of trying to improve the efficiency
of the solutions developed, we focused on improving the model of the attacker,
and formulating the problems that we think will have to be solved in the longer
term.
We modeled the attack planning problem in terms of partially observable
Markov decision processes (POMDP). This grounded penetration testing in a well-
researched formalism, and highlighted important aspects of the problem’s nature.
In particular POMDPs allowed us to model information gathering as an integral
part of the attack, thus providing for the first time a means to intelligently mix
scanning actions with actual exploits.
As a continuation of this modeling activity, we devised a method that relies on
POMDPs to find good attacks on individual machines, which are then composed
into an attack on the network as a whole. This decomposition exploits the network
structure to the extent possible, making targeted approximations (only) where
needed. This new approach will be presented at the JFPDA conference in Nancy,
France, during May 2012 [SBH12a]; and at the AAAI conference, that will take
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Figure 9.1: Illustration of Levels 1, 2, and 3 (from left to right) of the 4AL
algorithm.
place in Toronto, Canada, in July 2012 [SBH12b]. An insight of this approach was
given at the Hackito Ergo Sum conference this year [Sar12].
We give below a brief summary of the ideas of this decomposition. The ap-
proach is called 4AL since it addresses network attack at 4 different levels of
abstraction. 4AL is a POMDP solver specialized in attack planning as addressed
here. Its inputs are the logical network LN and POMDP models encoding attacks
on individual machines. Its output is a policy (an attack) for the global POMDP
encoding LN , as well as an approximation of the value of the global value function.
The four levels are: (1) Decomposing the Network, (2) Attacking Components,
(3) Attacking Subnetworks, and (4) Attacking Individual Machines. We outline
these levels in turn. Figure 9.1 provides illustrations.
• Level 1: Decompose the logical network LN into a tree of biconnected com-
ponents, rooted at ∗. In reverse topological order, call the Level 2 procedure
on each component; propagate the outcomes upwards in the tree.
• Level 2: Given component C, consider, for each rewarded subnetwork N ∈
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C, all paths P in C that reach N . Backwards along each P , call the Level 3
procedure on each subnetwork and associated firewall. Choose the best path
for each N . Aggregate these path values over all N , by summing up but
disregarding rewards that were already accounted for by a previous path in
the sum.
• Level 3: Given a subnetwork N and a firewall F through which to attack N ,
for each machine m ∈ N approximate the reward obtained when attacking
m first. For this, modify m’s reward to take into account that, after breaking
m, we are behind F : call Level 4 to obtain the values of all m′ 6= m with
an empty firewall; then add these values, plus any pivoting reward, to the
reward of m and call Level 4 on this modified m with firewall F . Maximize
the resulting value over all m ∈ N .
• Level 4: Given a machine m and a firewall F , model the single-machine
attack planning problem as a POMDP, and run an off-the-shelf POMDP
solver. Cache known results to avoid duplicated effort.
In conclusion, the POMDP model of penetration testing that we devised al-
lows us to naturally represent many of the features of this application, in particular
incomplete knowledge about the network configuration, as well as dependencies
between different attack possibilities, and firewalls. Unlike any previous methods,
the approach is able to intelligently mix scans with exploits. While this accurate
solution does not scale, large networks can be tackled by a decomposition algo-
rithm. Our present empirical results suggest that this can be accomplished with
a small loss in quality relative to a global POMDP solution.
An important open question is to what extent our POMDP + decomposi-
tion approach is more cost-effective than the classical planning solution currently
employed by Core Security. Our next step will be to answer this question experi-
mentally, comparing the attack quality of 4AL against that of the policy that runs
extensive scans and then attaches FF’s plan for the most probable configuration.
Other important directions for future work are to devise more accurate models
of software updates (hence obtaining more realistic designs of the initial belief);
to tailor POMDP solvers to this particular kind of problem, which has certain
special features, in particular the absence of non-deterministic actions and that
some of the uncertain parts of the state (e.g. the operating systems) are static;
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and to drive the industrial application of this technology. We hope that these will
inspire other researchers as well.
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